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Causes of disasters



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Causes of the disaster

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M. I. Meltyukhov

**The initial period of the war
in military documents
counterintelligence
(June 22 - July 9, 1941)**

The study of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. continues to be an urgent task of Russian historical science. The declassification of previously inaccessible funds of military archives makes it possible to introduce into scientific circulation

previously unknown materials about the events of the beginning of the war. Of great importance for these studies, along with other sources, are documents of political agencies and military counterintelligence, reflecting the current

position

V

army.

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Counterintelligence in the Red Army since December 1918.

were engaged in the Special Departments of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD.

However, on February 8, 1941, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee VKP(b) and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 278-131ss "On the transfer of the Special Department from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy" as part of the NPO and the NKVMF, the Third Directorates were created, and in the NKVD - the Third Department, engaged in

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counterintelligence work . However, during the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on July 17

1941 according to the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss Third NPO Directorate reorganized into the Office of Special

departments of the NKVD² .

Of course, military counterintelligence materials, like historical source, have a number of features.

First of all, it should be noted that they are critical to the described events. Aimed at identifying and generalization of negative facts and phenomena, the bodies of military counterintelligence performed the function of a control and supervisory apparatus in the Army in the Field. Naturally, these documents reflect negative phenomena to the greatest extent. At the same time, these documents provide an opportunity to feel the new trends in the perception of the events that took place by their contemporaries. The following excerpts from military counterintelligence documents make it possible to show the main problems with which Soviet troops clashed in the first weeks of the war with Germany.

For ease of perception, these materials are grouped into the following thematic sections. The first selection is devoted to problems in the Soviet Air Force, then there are collections of information on land troops of the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts during the initial period of the war, although some of these documents were compiled much later than the events described. Of course, the given

¹ State archive of the Russian Federation. F. R-5446.

Op. Zas. D. 3. L. 114-119. Partially published: 1941. Documentation. Book. 1. S. 598-600.

21941. Documentation. Book. 2. S. 473-474.

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materials do not give a coherent picture of events, it is rather a mosaic of individual episodes, the description of which also should not be taken as true in the post-war instance. Like any historical source, these documents require a critical attitude, but at the same time they are a necessary part of a comprehensive understanding of the causes of the tragedy of 1941.

...

At 3:15 am on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In an effort to seize air supremacy, the German Luftwaffe launched airstrikes on Soviet airfields, headquarters, communication centers and large populated areas. Accordingly, Soviet The Air Force was forced to engage in combat under the conditions of a surprise attack. As a result, due to the complexities of the combat situation in the first days of the war, a whole number of problems associated with logistics aviation, the organization of its combat work.

The most important problem **of the Air Force forces of the Red Army** became a big loss of aircraft. So, according to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 35134 dated June 25, on the North-Western Front "our aviation suffers heavy losses: there were 880 aircraft, with On June 24, about 500 remained in service. Aircraft were out of action mainly at airfields, due to not their overcrowding of accommodation, the lack of the necessary the number of alternate airfields, sites "3 .

On June 25, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO sent to the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red

¹There. L. 263-264.

³ There. L. 272.

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army a copy of special communication No. 2/35064, in which it was reported that "in the manual the fuzziness is mildly corporeal. The mood at the headquarters of the PribOVO district nervous, on the part of a number of executives, uncertainty is manifested for the created location.

As of June 24, from each regiment

Aviation of the PribOVO left an average of 10-20 aircraft. The entire 7th air division has about 60 aircraft, the motor resources of the "SB" units are on average lower

50%, aviation ammunition will last for 1-2 days

only until June 26th. According to the promised side transportation

aviation ammunition from Estonia is not provided

due to lack of transport. In connection with the withdrawal of units, there is a shortage of airfields, since airfields were mainly built in the southwestern places of the Lithuanian and

Latvian republics with the calculation of the offensive.

The present leadership of the Air Force units is carried out by the Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Major General Aviation Andreev and the Deputy Chief of Staff

Colonel Rasskazov is not provided due to

lack of communication with some units and command

front point feel the lack of leadership and

Indiscretion on the part of the front, they themselves did not organize the proper measures for the bombing of the enemy. Airplanes are sitting at

their airfields, as a result, large losses on the ground, due to disorganization

getting out from under the blow of the enemy .

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate

No. 2/35552 dated June 28, 1941: "The main losses of the [7th

air division] refer to the 46th SBAP and explain

due to disorganization and confusion on the part of the commander of the regiment, Major Senko and the chief

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headquarters of Lieutenant Colonel Kanunov, who brought all the personnel in panic during the first enemy raid state.

On June 22, the 46th SBAP lost 20 aircraft, of which 10 were destroyed during an enemy raid on the Siauliai airfield, and the rest were shot down during combat missions to bombard enemy troops in the Tilsit area and st. Killen. Three nine aircraft of the

46th SBAP were released to perform combat missions without escort of their fighters. The observation posts were not organized, the headquarters of the regiment had no connection with them and did not know about their existence . In

addition, it turned out that not all important points were covered by air defense. For example, on June 27, 1941, the head of the 2nd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, Brigadier

Commissar Avseevich reported: "The defense of the objects of the Dvina [Daugavpils] garrison is not provided; railway junctions, bridges and warehouses are not covered by anti-aircraft points and remain vulnerable to enemy aircraft."

The remaining fighter squadron of the 49th Air Regiment is unable to protect the facilities from enemy attacks.

The enemy is showing exceptional attention to the destruction of bridges, trying to interrupt the sources of support for the Dvina garrison, followed by environment.

VNOS posts do not work well, they confuse the transmission of signals to the command post, which is why on June 22 this year. the flight crew of the regiment stationed at the Rendene airfield took to the air six times on a false alarm, and in the event of a real attack, the enemy

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how our fighters, being unwarned, took to the air when the enemy was already bombarding outskirts of the city.

The personnel of the air defense units of Dvinsk [Daugavpils] do not know the types of our aircraft and, despite the good visibility of identification marks, exposes them to shelling, so on June 22 of this year. 6 aircraft "SB" left the Lithuanian airfields from under attack the enemy through Dvinsk and were subjected to shelling, which accidentally did not end in casualties. [...]

The same state of air defense Velikoluksky airfield, where there are no anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aviation, although this airfield is a hub for transport aircraft.

The lack of air defense means of the airfield makes it possible for enemy aircraft to appear over the city with impunity, which took place on June 25, 1941"⁴

According to memorandum No. 03 dated June 28 by the head of the 3rd department of the North-Western Front, divisional commissar Babich, "Aviation units of the Air Force front, due to the incapacitation of all airfields on the territory of Lithuania and most of Latvia, deployed to various points of airfields

Pskov node, however, on June 28 by 11.00 communication with air regiments, directorates of the 8th, 7th and 57th air divisions have not been identified and nothing is known about their actions. Communication is maintained only with the 6th air division - mountains. Riga, part of which operates in the district Riga and directions of the 8th Army. Number of combat Air Force aircraft, due to heavy losses at airfields, number 150-160 aircraft, of which about 100 are fighters. Lack of communication does not the ability to concentrate these aircraft in combat

⁴ There. L. 133-134.

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howl fist, and they are scattered. Separate regiments have 6-10 aircraft.

Some commanders of air regiments and air divisions, without receiving orders from the front, they move from place to place independently (7th air division and 54th SBAP) and this further confuses the return of their battle out orders.

Commander of the 7th Air Division, Colonel Petrov from the very beginning of hostilities, all sorties organized at its own discretion, properly did not direct military operations from the very beginning. On June 19, Petrov was warned by the deputy commander of the Air Force for political work about possible military actions; he was given a deadline for 3 o'clock June 22 this year Petrov reacted extremely negligently to this instruction. Did not demand from the commanders regiments of the implementation of this instruction and the regiments were actually taken by surprise by the enemy, in as a result of which there were large losses of aircraft at the airfields.

The commander of the 54th SBAP, Major Skiba, does not manage combat missions well, he does not happen at airfields, gives orders from the dugout, without any data: "Go bomb - you will find the target yourself."

To the remark that without data on the enemy it is possible to bomb our own, Skiba replied: "I didn't I know". On the first day of the war, he gave the order to raise the 3rd squadron and wait for further orders in the air. Squadron armed with aircraft "Ar-2" and four "SB" aircraft, was waiting for orders in the air for 1.5 hours, resulting in combat could not complete the task, as she can do everything be in flight for 3-4 hours. Ar-2 planes were forced to land on their airfield with bombs, and

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the "SB" flight that flew out on a combat mission, after 1.5 hours of stay in the air is completely lost.

Major Ivanov's squadron, being prepared for night flights, was not used at night, and when Ivanov turned to Skiba on this issue, to fly only at night, Skiba replied: "No, that who's order."

Skiba himself did not fly out on a combat mission and handed over the aircraft attached to it to another pilot, as did his assistant, Major Leontiev.

Before basing from one airfield to another, Skiba, having the opportunity to take out valuable military equipment, abandoned or destroyed it.

The matter is under investigation for the subject of giving the court Major Skib "5 .

As indicated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 37738 dated July 14, 1941, "the remaining minimum number of fighter aircraft of the Air Force Northwestern Front due to the lack of a compressed air to start the motors is idle.

Bombers sent to destroy enemy manpower without fighter cover, suffer heavy losses of both materiel and aircraft

lifting composition.

July 7 this year to destroy enemy troops mountain region. The island flew 17 aircraft "SB" 7th air division without fighter cover, and not one of them did not return to their base.

In total, 24 combat aircraft remained in the units of the division, the rest of the materiel was destroyed by enemy aircraft in large numbers at airfields. [...]

Evacuation of bases and units from the forward lines of the front-

⁵ There. D. 103. L. 86-87.

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that happens in an unorganized way, the command itself shows panic, which causes a large loss of ammunition and other types of technical supplies.

July 3 this year relocated from the OPOCHKA district 110th air base of the 6th air division, engineer Kashinien and assistant chief responsible for loading Headquarters for the rear, Major Shmelev, having no explosives, left 48 wagons of aerial bombs to the enemy.

July 6 this year The 25th air base of the 8th air division was relocated from the town of Karamyshev, for transportation cargo was served on 4 platforms, but Colonel Shevchenko ordered to blow up the stock of bombs and fuel, destroy 9 existing aircraft, machine guns Throw ShKAS into the wells. What was done and platforms and vehicles were used for transportation of personal items of command (moto cycles, bicycles, padded cars).

The destruction of the material part, stocks of fuel and air bombs was not necessary, so as the enemy was at a great distance from places of basing, there was a full opportunity to transfer to the rear.

The 13th, 127th and 206th air bases, during the stampede, left most of the supplies on the territory occupied by the enemy, without destroying combat equipment.

The commander of the 127th air base, senior lieutenant Chetyrkin, left the enemy 5,144 bombs (various brands), 442,500 rifle and aviation cartridge and 10 ShKAS machine guns.

18 wagons of air bombs left in Siauliai, 3 million air cartridge, several tons of gasoline, food nye, clothing and technical warehouses.

The supply department of the headquarters of the Air Force of the front, headed by a military engineer of the 1st rank Ivanov and quartermaster

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volume of the 1st rank by Lisyansky, issues of evacuation of battle
They don't really manage their property, they didn't give instructions
to air units in case of retreat in terms of taking measures with fuel and
ammunition. Sent employees of the headquarters in part for leadership

evacuation does not provide practical assistance.

Military engineer Bataev, who was sent from headquarters to the
Shauliai garrison, instead of providing practical assistance to the
garrison in transporting ammunition, enlisted a receipt from the
commander of the base, Lyuboboshchev,
obliging the latter to withdraw all property.

For the destruction of secret and top secret documents of the
10th air regiment and the 206th base in
Mitava [Jelgava], the battalion commissar Malozhin, the senior political
instructor Barybin and the head of the general unit Kudryavtsev were
sent, who, having entrusted this
assignment to the junior commander and the Red Army men, began
collecting personal belongings, as a result, the documentation of
these units, including the cipher, remained undestroyed during the
retreat.

The air force of the front, having lost its bases, is content
supply of ammunition, fuel and vehicles from the depots of the LVO,
the stocks of which, being not designed to support two fronts, fully
satisfy the requests of the Air Force of the North-Western Front

they can't" 1 .

The situation for **the Air Force of the Western Front** has developed
nothing better. So, according to the report of the authorized 3rd
department of the 10th mixed air division Leonov dated June 27,
"there was an alarm in the Velsky Fighter Aviation Regiment 2 hours
before the raid, and they had just gone home when the raid was
carried out
German aviation.

There. D. 99. L. 376-379.

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At dawn on Sunday 22 June the German aviation attacked the fortress, the training ground and all the places of deployment of units in the amount of 100 aircraft Red Army in the mountains. Brest. German aviation knew the location of our airfields with particular accuracy, who were subjected to machine gun fire behind incendiary bullets, as a result of which Brest - Kobrin direction, which was covered 4 regiments of the 10th air division, located: 123rd IAP - in the village. Name day (Kobrin), 74th ShAP - Small Platoons (which is 18 km from the border), 33rd IAP - mountains Pruzhany and the 39th SBAP - mountains. Pinsk, German aircraft have been almost completely destroyed on the ground. There are only a few combat-ready materiel left. It is characteristic that the materiel in these regiments, with the exception of the 39th air regiment, was not dispersed.

At the Pinsk airfield, where the 39th SBAP, a squadron of aircraft of the Pinsk flotilla, which was not dispersed, was subjected to complete destruction by the enemy. It is characteristic that objects located closer to the German border, such as: the 74th ShAP, the 123rd IAP were attacked earlier than the 39th SBAP, [but] did not warn our units located in a remote place from the front line, that is, from the German border, as a result of this, enemy aircraft destroyed these, the most remote airfields, by firing from a cannon
Lemetov.

At the same time, military camps and houses of command personnel were subjected to heavy bombardment, as a result of which from the fortress and the range of mountains. Brest left a small number of people from the family and command staff, the rest all died in the ruins houses. So, for example, the regimental school in the fortress

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the city of Brest was destroyed, none of the cadets could be saved.

In the mountains Kobrin many died in the destroyed before

the move of the command staff and members of their families of the headquarters of the 4th army.

From the 472nd artillery regiment, 7 families were saved; from 48th Rifle Regiment saved 6 families.

Warehouses of gasoline and ammunition of the 33rd IAP, 123rd IAP, 39th SBAP were destroyed.

According to the 39th SBAP, despite the fact that 3 raids were carried out, they could not defend and preserve the materiel aircraft.

The flight crew suffered almost no losses, with the exception of the 74th ShAP, about which the command

division did not have any data, since

communication with this regiment was interrupted, and it was impossible to establish contact with the U-2 aircraft, since the enemy air raid was carried out in a wave with a short interval. termal.

Despite the heavy loss of aircraft materiel for the 10th air division, the remaining 6 aircraft of the 123rd IAP produced a strong repulse of the attack
The enemy air force, both at the station, military camp and mountains Kobrin.

When a squadron of enemy aircraft appeared, numbering from 12 to 18 aircraft, our pilots
2 - 3 planes of the 123rd air regiment flew out to meet, took a frontal battle, shooting down 3 - 4 planes,
put the enemy to flight and prevented further destruction.

German pilots are dressed in civilian uniforms - in gray cloth single-breasted uniforms, trousers for release of the same quality as the service jacket,
without any emblems and military-style buttons, caps with large leather earmuffs, in civilian

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Danish silk shirts, yellow leather boots with thick soles. Over all this, they are dressed in gray flight suits. Clothes seem to work for shelter in case of forced landings.

Of the German pilots killed, one was Pole, taken prisoner by one pilot, also ended up in lakom.

The same uniform was on the downed pilot aircraft near the Pinsk airfield.

German pilots fly Czech-made Skoda aircraft and have a Parabellum personal weapon.

The main reason for the large number of aircraft losses at airfields was that that the command of the division did not disperse the mat part of the aircraft. In addition, the raid was sudden, and the protection of airfields from subsequent German air raids after the first attack was not organized. fall.

Such a fact took place in the 39th SBAP, where there were 3 for the summer. As a result of the absent-mindedness of command and the absence of an order to act, the equipment of aircraft was destroyed. During the last raid SB aircraft shot down an enemy Yu-88 aircraft.

The anti-aircraft machine guns at the airfields were inactive. The machine guns on the surviving aircraft were not activated. Between the breaks of the raids measures to the rescue of aircraft materiel was not undertaken.

On the very first day of hostilities, the entire flight the train was at the airfields, did nothing, that is, did not went to the rear and was at a loss, as a result of that there was nothing to fight.

At the airfields, preparations were mainly made to repulse the proposed landing. Stocks

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bombs, food, uniforms, you didn't fumble in the rear, the bombs didn't disperse.

With the advance of the enemy on the air garrison

The reserves of the 123rd and 33rd IAP, apparently, will not be destroyed, since the evacuation is not organized at all, run in disarray, the focus of these garrisons will be on saving lives families.

The command of the division does not plan to evacuate military personnel and family members.

The mood of the personnel is fighting, despite what a big loss. Lack of materiel .aircraft Comrade leads the pilots to despair.

Enemy aircraft do not enter combat, any once our planes appear out of battle at high speeds. [...]

Railway signaling (semaphores, arrows) on the entire highway from Kobrin to Gomel and from Gomel to Moscow are not disguised, they are a good object of bombarding railways, which can disrupt the communications of our troops,

and also serves as a good guide (beacons) at night no time during the flights of German aircraft.

German planes on this railway highways run at an altitude of 400 - 300 meters at night with two strongly lit headlights (spotlights) and grope for our echelons .

According to the report of the chief of the 3rd department of the 10th army, regimental commissar Los, dated July 13, "at 3 o'clock 58 minutes later, the first enemy planes appeared over Bialystok, and after that they began to bomb the Bialystok airfield, the army communications battalion, the communications center, the railway and a number of other objects. Simultaneously

¹There. D. 99. L. 331.

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almost all cities were bombed
and the places where the headquarters of the formations of the 10th
army.

The 4th air defense brigade, covering Bialystok, was
inactive until about 8 a.m. and did not fire a single shot at the
enemy. During the investigation, it turned out that the 4th air
defense brigade had a special
directive from the assistant commander
ZapOVO on air defense until a special order is not to shoot at
enemy aircraft, and this order was
already canceled by the commander of the 10th Army.

9th Air Division, stationed in Bialystok,
despite the fact that she received an order to be in combat
readiness from 20 to 21, was also caught
unawares and began to cover Bialystok with several MIG
aircraft from the 41st regiment"1 .

As indicated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of
the NPO No. 37928 dated July 15, "an investigation into the
reasons for the destruction of all materiel by fascist aviation in
the 41st and 124th IAP
9th mixed air division established:

Commander of the 41st Aviation Regiment, Major Ershov at the moment
raid of enemy aircraft on the morning of June 22, he was
confused and could not organize the personnel of the regiment for
rebuff to the enemy.

Despite the fact that during the first raid of fascist
aircraft to the Siburchin airfield, where the 41st IAP was
stationed, the enemy did not disable a single
combat aircraft, since they were all dispersed and camouflaged,
Ershov did not take independent actions to deliver a decisive
blow to enemy aircraft, waiting for instructions from the
command of the 9th AD.

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Major Ershov, having at his disposal a combat the regiment, instead of making a decision to act in formations, sent out 1-2 aircraft to meet the enemy, which were destroyed by the enemy. So

the best pilots of the regiment were killed in this way - Solo ha, Aksenov, Chernyavsky and shot down - Krutoverets, Korobkov, Kukushkin and Kiselev.

Ershov, having no need to relocate from the Siburchin airfield, since this airfield had everything for combat, decided

to transfer the regiment to the airfield of Kuryany, and then on the evening of June 22 it was transferred to the airfield of Kvar tery. Subsequently, the entire material part was destroyed due to the fact that the aircraft on these airfields did not have air for refueling aircraft and a cartridge for a BS machine gun, proving to be unusable.

The commander of the 124th IAP, Major Polunin, by the time hostilities was on vacation and arrived in the regiment only on the afternoon of June 22, when the enemy had already made two raids on the airfield. After the third raid by enemy planes, Polunin flew away in a UTI-4 plane without giving any instructions.

The assistant commander of the 124th IAP, Captain Kruglov, remained with the regiment commander during his vacation, on June 22 in the morning during a raid by fascist aircraft confused and did not take drastic measures to combat her.

All Kruglov's orders were unorganized. Aircraft were released into the air subunits, but loners, which did not give the desired effect in rebuffing enemy aircraft.

Most of the MIG-3 fighters did not fire machine guns, since the brigade of plant No. 1 did not have time to

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adjust them. All this led to the fact that all the aircraft of the regiment were destroyed .

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 36701 of July 5, "VNOS and air defense services for the defense of Minsk worked extremely poorly. In a number of cases, there was no signaling and communication at the time of the appearance enemy aircraft. The anti-aircraft batteries acted erratically. When one battery opened fire, then others opened behind her, not knowing if they were shooting on enemy aircraft or on their own. For June 23 Our anti-aircraft batteries damaged 3 SB aircraft during the shelling. There was a shelling over their own airfield of aircraft "SB" of the 313th separate reconnaissance aviation regiment, returning from combat tasks, fighters of the 163rd IAP of the 43rd air division.

This caused a number of negative sentiments among the di personnel of the regiment.

Commander of the 6th Battery, Military Unit 4229, 7th Air Defense Brigade junior lieutenant Chekurov in the town of Shchuchin fled after shelling the battery from an enemy aircraft, leaving the fighters, who then also fled"⁸ .

Similar problems arose before **the Air Force of the South-Western Front**. As stated in the special 3rd Directorate of NPO No. 36137 dated July 1, "despite to signals about the real possibility of an enemy attack, individual commanders of units of the Southwestern Front were unable to quickly repel an attack by tivnik.

In the mountains Chernivtsi June 21 this year the flight crew was released to the city, as a result of which fighter planes were not raised to repel the attack enemy.

⁷ There. D. 100. L. 96-98.

⁸ There. D. 99. L. 205-206.

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Commander of the 87th IAP and the 16th Air Division Major Slygin and his deputy] for political affairs, the battalion commissar Cherny on the night of June 22, together with other commanders got drunk in a restaurant in the city of Buchach. After receiving a telegram from headquarters of the 16th Air Division about the combat alert, the command of the regiment, being in a drunken state, was unable to quickly put the regiment in order.

On June 22 at 5.50 a German bomber appeared over the airfield, which was mistaken for the aircraft of the division commander. In view of this, he began shelling the airfield without hindrance from a height of 10-15 meters and disabled 9 aircraft.

Air defense was organized Badly. Anti-aircraft artillery of five air defense brigades of the front and anti-aircraft divisions, consisting of 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, did not have shells for them.

Pe-2 bombers could not be used to carry out combat missions, since they are armed with heavy machine guns, which

there were no cartridges. [...]

Anti-aircraft artillery of the 18th anti-aircraft artillery regiment 12th Army, guarding the mountains. Stanislav from air enemy raids, did not have 37-mm shells"⁹.

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 35303 of June 26, "according to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR for the first 3 days of the war with 7 anti-aircraft raids on Kyiv Artillery and aviation landed 1 aircraft in Kyiv.

The 3rd Air Defense Division was not prepared for defense. The new 85-mm anti-aircraft guns received by the division did not mastered. The personnel of the division is trained on guns 76 mm, which were removed from service, 85 mm shells not enough.

⁹ There. D. 98. L. 250-251.

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The 36th air division instead of 240 aircraft has 90, of these, only 8 aircraft are provided with walkie-talkies. Par taxiing over the city is not organized.

The enemy, after reconnaissance and bombing, leaves without punishment, which negatively affects the mood

population research.

Bombing is carried out only on vital objects.

On June 25, the enemy advanced in large groups towards low altitude. Despite intense fire from anti-aircraft artillery, he bombed an iron foundry "Bolshevik" and a melting furnace; at Plant No. 43, the electrical shop, the 4th, 22nd, and 25th shops, and the design bureau were destroyed; at the airfield of the civil fleet, 6 civil aviation aircraft and 5 fighters were destroyed. There are about 50 people killed and 105 wounded.

The airfields in the vicinity of Kyiv are crammed with bomber-training aircraft and heavy machines that can be bombarded.

It is required to strengthen the defense of Kyiv with 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 18 37-mm cannons, 81 large-caliber machine guns, one air division and the corresponding number of shells and cartridges"¹⁰ .

But most of all problems arose with the supply of air force and air defense of the Southwestern Front with shells and cartridges. June 24, 1941 Deputy Chief 3rd department of the KOVO reported: "Anti-aircraft defense units we do not have shells, as a result, aviation is against Nika daily bombs Lutsk, Stanislav. 40,000 rows of sleep are located in the Nizhyn warehouse, near Kyiv. The command decided to transfer them wagons, it will take 3 days. Shells must be transferred immediately with aircraft, I repeat, immediately

¹⁰ There. L. 234-235.

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lazily by planes"11. It turned out that the 5th air defense brigade in Tarnopol, 186th, 139th, 563rd and 259th separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the Southwestern Front, armed with "37-mm and 85-mm guns, do not have shots" and "immediate dispatch of artillery of arrows to the main warehouses from the central warehouses GAU"12. Even on July 2, 1941, "the supply of KOVO air units with weapons and ammunition was not established. There are no BS cartridges in the units. 36th Air Division severely limit PC projectiles. Shells were delivered to the division, the suspension system of which is not suitable, it is impossible to remake, but there are no necessary ones. Art Administration KOVO promises to give 300 pcs. from Vinnitsa, but it is not confident that the shells will be suitable "13 .

In addition, it turned out that the interaction between aviation branches and air units of different subordination was poorly worked out. Fighting resulted in between Soviet aircraft. So, on June 26, "the head of the 3rd department of the Odessa naval base, comrade. Morozov said that on June 25 at 9 o'clock. 25 min. link aircraft "SB" of the 70th air squadron under the command squadron commander Major Krasnodarsky, having received permission from the air defense of the mountains. Mogilev about the departure, took to the air from his airfield to carry out the battle task.

After the first turn, the link was fired upon anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and then attacked Air Force OdVO fighters. As a result of the shelling and attacks, aircraft 1 and 2, piloted by pilots Kramtsov and Zemtsov, having holes, sat on their airfield.

— There. L. 125.

12 There. L. 237.

13 There. D. 99. L. 159.

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Aircraft No. 4, piloted by the flight commander Anufriev, caught fire in the air. As they landed, bombs exploded. The crew died.

At 9 o'clock. 42 min. while returning from reconnaissance, 2 SB-R2 aircraft of the 82nd squadron were attacked by OdVO Air Force fighters. The fighters forced one of the planes to land in the sea"14 .

A similar situation took place in the Western front. As noted in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35753 dated June 27, "due to the poor organization of communication between the rear and the forward front lines, bomber aviation, when returning from combat missions to bomb enemy targets, continues to be attacked by our

fighters.

June 26 aircraft of the 96th Air Regiment of the Western front, flying out on a combat mission to destroy mechanized columns and tanks of the enemy in the Minsk direction, in the area of Merkulevichi, were attacked by a link of our fighters

"I-16", as a result of which the plane of Lieutenant Dons whom was shot down, and the return fire of bombers one I-16 aircraft was shot down.

On the same date, our fighters attacked bomber planes of the 98th air regiment of the 52nd air division, returning from the bombing of the enemy ground forces. Aircraft shot down during attack

Lieutenant Grishin, in the Mogilev area was shot down and the aircraft was planted by Deputy] Commander of the 52nd Air Division, Major Kartakov.

The attacks of their fighters cause a panic in the environment aircrew of bomber aircraft"15 .

¹⁴

There. D. 98. L. 236.

¹⁵

There. L. 270.

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Unfortunately, the Southwestern Front was no exception. According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36253 dated July 2, "cases of

shelling of their aircraft, leading to the loss of materiel and the death of the flight crew.

June 26, during the time from 15.00 to 17.00 were attacked with their fighters several groups of aircraft "DB-Zf". As a result of the attacks, one aircraft was shot down and 6 aircraft landed at different airfields in the Kyiv region.

The 2nd Aviation Regiment of the 36th

air division.

The junior pilot, Lieutenant Zaitsev, attacked an SB aircraft of the 52nd SBAP. Letnab is slightly wounded, the plane needs repairs.

The squadron commander of the same regiment of Soldiers from his pilots fired at his SU-2 and Douglas twice. Soldatov, having arrived at the airfield, reported that he clearly saw crosses and a swastika.

The pilot of this regiment, Bardner, shot down the DB-Zf aircraft. The plane burned down. The crew accidentally survived.

Pilots of the 2nd Air Regiment attacked planes

"DB-Zf", which have already released the chassis. As a result, one gunner-radio operator was killed, and on the second plane radio operator wounded.

On June 26, at 10 o'clock, an I-16 aircraft attacked a DB-Zf aircraft of the 22nd Air Division, which was returning after a combat mission. As a result, the pilot of the DB-Zf aircraft was slightly wounded in the arm,

The driver was seriously injured, the plane burned down.

A link of DB-Zf aircraft, flying on a combat mission, lost orientation in the Sarny area. After raz-

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gate heading 90 degrees with access to the Dnieper for restoration of the landmark, the link was attacked by their I-16 aircraft. One of the attacked DB-Zf aircraft was carrying bombs, the other two were dropped bombs in an unknown area on their territory.

All three DB-Zf aircraft were damaged, and junior sergeant Goberman was killed .

Similar cases took place in the future.

So, for example, according to the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 39778 dated August 4, in the North-West front "July 13 this year. a group of aircraft "DB-Zf" 53rd air regiment of the 40th air division of the 1st air corps on the flight route to a combat mission at 19:32 in the area The village of Nikitinki, Kalinin Region, was attacked 4 times by a unit of MIG-3 fighters of the 27th IAP.

As a result of the attacks, the DB-Zf aircraft manned Lieutenant Knyazev was hit, fell to the ground and caught fire from the explosion. Crew Commander Lieutenant Knyazev burned down, the rest of the crew escaped with minor injuries.

The second aircraft "DB-Zf", having received holes in the ben goiter and the left plane, returned to its airfield Budovo. The gunner-radio operator of this aircraft, junior military technician Gavrin, was wounded in the shoulder.

The direct culprit of this incident the fighter flight commander of the 27th air regiment, junior lieutenant Karachevich, who clearly saw the identification marks (star), nevertheless attacked the DB-Zf aircraft, opening fire on them from machine guns.

Karachevich explained his actions by the fact that the DB-Zf aircraft did not respond to his signals of shaking wing, and he doubted their belonging to to their aircraft.

¹⁶ There. D.99. L. 158 - 159.

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The materials of the investigation were handed over to the military prosecutor of the 24th air division to bring Ka Rachevic.

On the same date at 6:45 p.m. in the area of vil. Dokho Slavl, Kalinin region, 5 I-16 aircraft

On the 29th IAP, a DB-Zf aircraft of the 200th air regiment of the 40th air division was attacked over its airfield, returning from a combat mission. The fighter group was led by the commander of the 29th air regiment, captain Leshko.

When the DB-Zf aircraft was turning for landing, the fighter pilot Popov went into its tail and fired

two bursts of flying, but, noticing the identification marks ki, the shelling stopped and went down.

After that, Captain Leshko himself attacked the plane "DB-Zf", opening fire on him. Aircraft DB-Zf you launched the landing gear, trying to land on the airfield, but, not calculating the landing, went to the second circle.

Captain Leshko went into the tail of the plane for the second time "DB-Zf" and, despite the signals from the missiles, gave three more machine-gun bursts followed him, after which the DB-Zf aircraft caught fire. Gunner-radio operator Petrachkov and

air gunner Polyantsev. Captain Leshko gave them a burst of machine gun fire, wounding them.

Aircraft "DB-Zf" together with a senior pilot lieutenant Novikov and navigator lieutenant Bykov burned down.

The material of the investigation was handed over to the military prosecutor of the 31st IAD to bring Leshko to criminal responsibility"¹⁷ .

¹⁷ There. D. 100. L. 326-328.

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The enemy attack found the troops **of the Northwestern Front** unprepared for any immediate military action. As indicated in the special communication of the 3rd Directorate of NCOs No. 4/37155 dated July 8

1941, "in addition to No. 36833 dated July 7, 1941, we inform you that produced by the 3rd department of the North-Western front by an investigation, the fact that Dibrov, a member of the Military Council of the PribOVO, issued an order regarding the clearance of minefields and the delivery of cartridges issued to personnel in parts of 11 sk and 125 sd before the outbreak of hostilities, is confirmed.

The investigation found:

After the Intelligence Department received data on the beginning concentration of German troops on our nits, parts of the corps began to mine the fields, distribute ammunition to the personnel, at the same time, preparations began for the evacuation of the families of the commanding staff.

June 21 this year Corps Commissar Dibrova, a member of the Military Council of the BOVO, arrived at the place of concentration of the 11 [th] rifle] corps and ordered that the cartridges be taken away from the fighters and cleared of mines fields, explaining this as a possible provocation on the part of our units.

The head of the OPP of the 125th Infantry Division, Levchenko, gave an explanation to Dibrov about the reasons for the evacuation families of commanders, referring to the data reconnaissance department about the beginning concentration of enemy troops on the borders.

To Levchenko's explanation, Dibrova said: "Although Germany and a fascist country, but the moment they can start a war with the USSR, it is not yet ripe that we have eyes widen in fear."

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After that, Dibrova ordered for the second time to stop the panic, to take away the issued cartridges from the fighters, clear the fields, stop preparations for the evacuation of the families of command personnel.

On the same day, June 21, a member of the Military Council of the 8th army divisional commissar Shabalov telegram confirmed Dibrov's order to stop preparations for evacuation. As a result of this, at the time of the enemy's offensive, the families of the commanding staff had to take out during the battle, while a significant part families perished; the personnel of the division was without ammunition and their issuance was carried out under artillery enemy skim fire.

True, P.A. Dibrova explained his orders by the fact that "there were no mined fields, because no min. It was about preparing for the mining of fields (holes), referring to the instructions of the commander. He instructed to take away the cartridges and hand them over to platoon posts or squads. The evacuation of the families of the commanders was forbidden by the people's commissar of defense¹ .

On June 22, the 3rd department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front reported that "according to unverified information in the rear 128th Rifle Division there are cases of kulak local speeches. In the 29th National Corps, cases of military sabotage by former officers of the Lithuanian Army were noted. 3rd Directorate

NCOs of the USSR were given instructions to arrest them"¹⁸ .

The neighboring 48th Rifle Division found itself in an equally difficult situation. As shown by the investigation of the reasons for its defeat, reported in a special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 38186 of July 18, "ko command of the division, having received the task of concentrating

¹⁸ There. D. 98. L. 174.

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its troops on the border, withdrew parts of the division almost unprepared for combat with the enemy.

The necessary supply of ammunition and shells was not taken.

The division went to the border as if it were another exercise, taking your study guides with you.

In addition, by the start of hostilities, the division was not mobilized even in the states of peaceful time. There was a large shortage of command and enlisted personnel and materiel.

In this state, by June 22, the division concentrated in 2 places: rifle regiments on the German border, to the left of the city of Taurage, artillery regiments and special units beyond the city. Rossieni [Raseiniai], due to which the interaction of artillery with infantry was impossible.

The command of the division, being directly on the battlefield, died on June 23 during the German attack. Killed: division commander Major General Bogdanov, regimental commissar Fominov, chief headquarters Brodnikov and a number of other commanders.

After the enemy has disabled communications, The division completely lost its leadership and began to retreat. Rifle regiments, having no communication with each other, fought independently, making their way from the encirclement.

niya.

Together with units of the division, the construction battalions and individual groups of soldiers of the 125th Infantry Division retreated in disorder. This caused panic and disorganization.

On June 25, the division concentrated in the mountains. Siauliai, where he took command of the division deputy] division commander for combat unit Colonel Melnikov.

From mountains. Shauliai to the shore of Lake Peipus, the withdrawal of units of the 48th Infantry Division took place exclusively

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but disorganized. The command post of the division was separated from the regiments at a distance of 50-80 km, there was no connection with the regiments. collection points and from June 25 to July 4, the division headquarters did not indicate the routes, individual units committed disorderly marches and wandered"¹⁹ .

During the fighting on June 22, 1941, the enemy succeeded not only push the advanced units of the Northwestern Front of the Red Army away from the border, but also cut the Soviet front at the junction of the 8th and 11th armies. It is in this gap that the command of Army Group North brought in units of the 4th Panzer Group, rushing to Daugavpils. The Soviet command for several days lost sight of this direction and the appearance German tanks near the city on June 26 turned out to be completely unexpected. In addition, as reported on June 27 brigadier commissar Avseevich, head of the 2nd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, "the garrison of the city of Dvinsk [Dagavpils] is not provided with means of defense and in case landing by the enemy, will not be able to repel his attack, since the garrison has only 150 rifles with which the cadets of ShMAS are armed.

The flight crew is armed with pistols

"TT" and there are 50 grenades for the entire composition. The lack of security of the garrison with defense means panic among the personnel"²⁰ .

As stated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35134 dated June 25, "according to the 3[th] Department of the North-Western Front On June 24, 1941, the enemy advanced in the Kaunas direction to 80 km, directing the blow to the northeast, and advanced 60-70 km in the Siauliai direction. Created-

¹⁹ There. D. 99. L. 370-371.

²⁰ There. D. 98. L. 133-134.

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there is a serious situation for the 11th army and the left flank of the 8th army.

Troop control from the headquarters of the front and below - bad. The front headquarters often loses contact with the armies. Radio stations are poorly used.

On the night of June 24 of this year. the enemy occupied Kaunas. [...]

The material part of the artillery of the front dropped out in significant quantity. Most left when withdrawing, for example: 414th howitzer artillery regiment 125th of the rifle division withdrew 2-3 guns from the battle due to the loss of the cavalry.

The supply of ammunition, especially shells, is poor. There are absolutely no 85-mm shells, 37 mm, 107 mm, 122 mm and 155 mm are running out.

Counterattack of the 12th mechanized corps on June 23 of this year. essentially frustrated due to the lack of communication and control on the part of the front headquarters. After the order for a counterattack was issued on the evening of June 22, the front headquarters had absolutely no connection with the corps for a day, did not know about the preparations for counterattack, the very course of the counterattack, as a result of the body late with the attack for 6 hours, the blow was dealt separately and in general - no result from the blow.

Units suffer heavy losses in people and materiel, but there are no reinforcements.

According to preliminary data, the 2nd Panzer Division, acting in the direction of Rossien [Raseiniai], knocked out 40 tanks and 18 enemy guns.

The 3rd Front Department sent 35 operatives from the apparatus of the 3rd Front Department to provide assistance and improve communications to the army for a long period.

Together with the command, detachments were organized barriers for detention without permission leaving those who take combat positions and to collect those who wander.

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Organized fight against manifestations of local banditry"²¹ .

On June 25, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported that "The 3rd [th] department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front reported that as a result of enemy bombing communication with the troops is often cut off. Restoration work on the communication line is being carried out by the People's Commissariat Communications are very slow, while military units do not participate in the restoration of permanent lines.

The protection of airfields, warehouses and troops from enemy air attack is poorly organized due to the abundance of anti-aircraft weapons, as a result of which the enemy often bombs with impunity.

Rear organs are slowly deployed for support for active troops, military formations suffer losses, but replenishments do not arrive.

There is no printed propaganda among the German soldiers and the German population by the front"²² .

At 6.45 on June 26, a message was received from Rezekne to Moscow by the deputy head of the 3rd department of the Northwestern Front, Asmolov, who informed that "the situation in the Baltic states of our army requires immediate intervention of the High Command and the Central Committee of the Party. The leadership of the front lost all contact with the army. The army is uncontrollable, spontaneously retreats, riots.

To rectify the situation, it is necessary to immediately to allocate an air force for reinforcements, otherwise it threatens with the loss of the main forces .

On June 27, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported that "the situation on the North-Western Front from the beginning of the military

²¹There. L. 163-164.

²²There. L. 165.

²³There. L. 2-3.

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operations and is still exceptionally difficult. Since June 23, the front headquarters has lost communication with many formations and units, with the 11th Army as a whole, essentially stopped leadership them, since all attempts to establish a connection of success are not had.

The main reason for the lack of communication is destruction of it by enemy aircraft, as well as action scattered sabotage and rebel groups of local citizens who sympathize German National Socialism.

In some parts, communication was not provided due to the lack of a telephone cable, which resulted in a lack of interaction between the branches of the military (infantry and artillery).

As we have already pointed out, the aviation of the North-Western Front on the first day of the war suffered great losses of combat aircraft destroyed by the enemy on the ground (out of the available 880 aircraft on the ground 400 were destroyed).

In the following days - from 23 to 26 June aviation the enemy, having gained absolute superiority in the air, bombed our troops with impunity, both on the front line and in the rear, while the lack of sufficient

air defense means.

Despite the heroic efforts of our troops, in the very first day of the war, German aviation, having received superiority in the air, inflicted significant losses on our troops, which replenishment is not half chali.

Superiority gained by German forces in the air, the use of significant armored forces acting in cooperation with aviation,

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led to the superiority of enemy forces over our troops, as a result, our units began to withdraw from occupied lines, which, in the absence of leadership from the end of June 23, began to take a panic character. Continuous unpunished air raids complicated the situation. Particularly strong panic was experienced by the units that suffered heavy losses.

11th Army, in respect of which the headquarters of the North-Western Front from June 23 to 26 no information had.

Separate formations of the 11th Army, being surrounded by the enemy, were almost completely destroyed (5th, 128th rifle divisions, 324th separate anti-aircraft artillery division).

The 12th mechanized corps also suffered losses, which walks around the enemy.

The panicky retreat has become especially acute due to the spread of all sorts of provocative rumors about actions in the rear of the divisions German airborne landings and sabotage groups, which in many cases did not exist.

Front headquarters, receiving incorrect data about airborne assaults from various random persons, equipped operational groups to destroy the landings, and when leaving for the place, information about the landings was often not confirmed. Generally until today there is no confirmation of the landings and, in my opinion, there were none.

Along the way of the retreat of the units, there were cases of attacks from the forest by individual gangs and individuals, which among the personnel of the departing units caused greater nervousness and increased panic.

Due to the difficult situation in front - a panic withdrawal of our units of the 11th Army,

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from the front command and the Political Directorate necessary measures were taken, by sending no mediocre in terms of individual leaders, but All this has not corrected the situation and the situation at the front has not changed at all by now .

June 28, head of the 3rd department of the North-Western front divisional commissar Babich sent to Moscow memorandum No. 03, in which he reported that "parts of the North-Western Front under pressure the enemy continues to withdraw. On June 26, units of the 8th Army in an organized manner continued to retreat to a new defensive line. 10th Rifle Corps went beyond the river V[e]nta, 11th Rifle Corps - for Shauli [Shauliai]. There was no information about the position of the 12th mechanized corps and its whereabouts; the corps headquarters did not respond to radio calls.

In parts continues to be dysfunctional ammunition situation. According to the artillery department of the 8th army in parts can be no more than 1 / 4 BC of all shots.

Ammunition from the warehouse Linkongan, where they ate 11th Rifle Corps and partly 10th Rifle Corps the hull, during June 25 and 26, were partly taken out, and the rest, approximately 70-100 wagons, were blown up.

According to the representative of the Art Administration front, located at the command post of the 8th army, on June 26 of this year. parts of the army must be supplied with ammunition from the depots of the mountains. Riga. Departure of ammunition by train from Riga by rail is considered risky, since the possibility of bombing it by enemy aircraft is not ruled out.

Such arguments of the Art Administration are disastrous affect the course of hostilities, especially since

There. L.283-289.

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it is not possible to deliver ammunition by road, due to its absence in units and at the headquarters

missions.

Through the Military Council of the Front, we accept measures for the delivery of ammunition in part by various launchers tyami.

Parts of the front as a result of continuous battles with the enemy lost a large amount of materiel. So, for example, in the 125th rifle

divisions as of June 26, there are 3 anti-tank guns, 2 76-mm guns, the 414th light artillery regiment has 2 guns, in the 459th howitzer artillery regiment - 18 guns.

Command of the front, armies, corps and divisions they cannot carry out their activities in an organized way, as a result of which panic appears and there is no possibility of firmly implementing the planned activities. For example,

June 22 this year At the request of the commander of the 10th Rifle Division, Major General Fadeev, the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General Nikolaev, was promised to give 2 tank battalions to the 23rd tank divisions.

On June 22, Major General Nikolaev gave an oral order to the commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlyonok, to provide 2 tank battalions from his division at the disposal of the commander of the 10th rifle division to support the infantry during the offensive leniya for inflicting a counterattack on the enemy with his subsequent destruction and occupation of the former positions on the border.

June 23 commander of the 10th Rifle Corps a combat order was given to the commander of the 10th rifle division about how, in cooperation parts of the 10th Infantry Division with 2 tank battalions

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lions of the 23rd Panzer Division destroyed, would have been on the advancing enemy units, would have restored earlier occupied position with subsequent application counterattack to the enemy. On the basis of the combat order of the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, the command of the division developed a combat order command to units to go over to the offensive with the support of 2 tank battalions of the 23rd tank division.

The commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlenok, told the commander of the 10th Infantry Division that he will put at the disposal of the division 2 tank battalion by 5 - 6 o'clock in the morning on June 23. Due to this all units were warned that our offensive would be supported by 2 tank battalions, which inspired the entire personnel of the units,

with the desire to destroy the enemy.

The offensive was scheduled for June 23 at 6 o'clock in the morning. The commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlenok, not only did not send these 2 battalions by 6 o'clock on the morning of June 23, but did not even consider it necessary to notify the division commander in time. The offensive was postponed until the arrival of the battalions. June 23 Colonel Orlyonok arrived at the command post 10th Infantry Division at 2330 hours and announced that the commander of the 8th Army did not allow him to give 2 tank battalions for the 10th Rifle Division and ordered him to carry out his first order, and that in connection with this, he cannot provide these battalions. On in fact, these 2 tank battalions were sent at the disposal of the 10th Infantry Division and were in the Plunge area and did not act for a day and a half. But about the presence of these battalions in the area The command of the 10th Rifle Division was not aware of the city of Plunge. As a result, the offensive units

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents division was disrupted, and the tanks for one and a half days were in the area of the city of Plunge and were inactive. In addition, on June 24, units of the division retreated to the direction of the mountains. Tyalshaya [Telypyai]. Red Army soldiers who were guarding the command post divisions, it was reported the presence of tanks going to towards Tyalshaya.

The command of the division, knowing that no tanks were attached to the division, and the tanks of the 23rd Panzer Division were mistaken for tanks of the enemy, as a result of which an alarming situation was created that the enemy had cut off the division's path to Tyalypay [Telypiiai] and division is surrounded. In fact, there were no enemy tanks, and they were 2 tank battalions of the 23rd tank division. The offensive on June 23 was the most convenient moment for the division, the enemy had only 2 infantry divisions and

2 divisions of artillery and already in the evening of June 23, by according to the testimony of the prisoners, the enemy in our direction pulled up 2 more infantry divisions and several artillery regiments and led an active offensive.

Who specifically gave the order to these battalions to go to the disposal of the 10th Infantry Division not installed. Actions of the commander of the 23rd tank divisions, which entailed the creation of an exceptionally difficult situation for the division, are foot-dressing.

The matter is under investigation, we will report the results later.

The commander of the 8th Army, in connection with the withdrawal of units and the resulting critical situation in the sector of the 12th Mechanized Corps by the end of the day on June 25 (surrounded by the enemy) in order to avoid being cut off in 1.00 June 26 decided to change the command

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point. The organization of the evacuation to the new command post was extremely disgraceful. The headquarters was not an organized unit retreating to a new command post, but a panicked unit.

Order from the evacuation of the command post was given at 1.00 on June 26 with the calculation of departure through 40 minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Mamchenko and a military engineer of the 3rd rank Shishkin, who were appointed responsible for the evacuation, did not properly organize this work, and turned it into a panic. Machines for departments under loading of property and things were not organized. The departments seized the cars on their own and loaded their things. All evacuation work was carried out in the bustle and bustle, as a result of which the headquarters, instead of appointed time 1.40, left at 4.20. On site of the old command post were abandoned: a map with the situation, inventory, a car of a foreign brand.

About the location of the new command post knew only a limited circle of people who left in the echelon with the command. Remaining 2 echelons the location of the command post is not knew, in connection with which they were confused along the roads in search of him for a long time. The main staff of the headquarters arrived at command post only at 13.00 on June 26, having thus spent 9 hours on the road.

As a result of such disorganization and separation of the headquarters in the daytime, the echelons on the way the route was bombed and machine-gunned bombardment from aircraft. There are losses among the Red Army guard battalion: 1 killed, 3 wounded. It is characteristic to note that all these panicked evacuations of the command post took place

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at a time when the command post was 30 km away from the front line.

The rapid advance of the enemy's motorized parts on June 26 of this year. created a threat to the town of Dvinsk [Daugavpils Su]. To prevent the enemy in the mountains. Dvinsk and right bank of the Dvina River, it was decided blow up two bridges across the river. Dvina, however, as a result of the disorganization of the command, the bridges were not blown up, and the enemy, having crossed the river, on June 27 took mountains Dvinsk. After some time, our units beat the enemy from the mountains. Dvinsk. under pressure from him our units were forced to leave the mountains again. Dvinsk, however, the location in the city was not used and the bridges were not blown up, which made it possible for the enemy to reach the right bank of the river.

Panic in front of the enemy is infected not only fighters, but also a large number of command personnel. So, for example: assistant to the commander of the 459th GAP 125th Infantry Division, Major Kondratyuk Grigory Sergeevich, born in 1900, member of the CPSU(b), in the moment of artillery fire opened by the German troops at 5 o'clock. 30 min. On June 22, he left without permission firing positions. At 8.30 on June 22, the commander of the GAP on name of Kondratyuk, an order was given to withdraw the 3rd division, but since Kondratyuk was not at the location of the division, the order was not carried out and di The division managed to bring only 8 guns to new firing positions, leaving many shells in place and food. Returned to unit June 23.

Material about Kondratyuk's flight is drawn up on arrest and trial by the Military Tribunal.

Commander of the 206th autobattalion of the 125th rifle division of captain Starovoitov, member of the CPSU (b), from the first day the battlefield is in the rear. Starovoitov during the bombing

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mountains Tauragÿ did not ensure the export of gasoline and cars, and most of all took care of himself personally.

Head of supply of the 125th Infantry Division

Major Kornilkov had not been to the front since the beginning of hostilities. According to Captain Sizov Kornilkov sent his family and has not appeared at the headquarters until now.

June 25 with the relocation of the headquarters of the North-Western front from Ponevezhys at the command post, by order of the commander, the task force of the headquarters was left led by Deputy Chief of Staff for Operatives, Major General Trukhin.

For the protection of the command post in Ponevezhys at the disposal of Major General Trukhin were left

Anti-aircraft defense consisting of 12 guns, air defense consisting of 9 anti-aircraft guns heavy machine guns and a company of airborne batallion.

On June 25, Trukhin left the command post, with than the units guarding the command post, no clear instructions were given to them, and no arrangements were made to send them to a new command post, as a result, Trukhin, having left in a passenger car, essentially left the units to the mercy of fate, which who got lost on the road and to the new place of the teams No item arrived.

Anti-tank guns, due to the lack of thrust for them, were loaded onto trucks, which Trukhin gave the order to follow him, but since the trucks could not keep up with the car, the trucks with guns fell behind on the road for various reasons, and Trukhin ignored this.

Trukhin was again returned to the unit to establish contact with them. According to the information received, he ran into the Germans and was killed. However, as later

²⁴ There. D. 103. L. 80-87.

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it turned out that Trukhin was wounded and taken prisoner, where he became cooperate with the Germans.

According to the special message of the 3rd Directorate of NPO No. 4/35820 dated June 29, "3rd Department of the North-Western Front reports: created by barrage detachments to combat banditry, espionage and sabotage, as well as to return their units who fled or lost at the front, the following has been done:

in the region of mountains. Krupiskis (Lithuanian SSR), a kulak-insurgent gang was partially liquidated, appeared on June 21 with up to 100 people. 43 people were arrested, including 9 fighters and 2 commanders of the 29th rifle corps, the rest were citizens

Russian population.

The case was considered by the Military Tribunal in an expedited manner, 27 people were sentenced to death, the remaining 16 people were sent to the mountains. Polotsk to central prison.

Captured 3 paratroopers dropped from German bomber in the area of Dvinsk. At During the capture, officer Helm put up armed resistance and killed one activist in the city of Dvinsk. Under interrogation Helm stated that he, as a German nationalist and enemy Communism, will not give any evidence.

Helm was sentenced to death by a military tribunal"²⁵ .

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 4/36833 dated July 7, "The 3rd Department of the North-Western Front on July 3 of this year. reported the following data on the situation in parts of the front:

The 27th Army included 4 corps, the personnel of the latter ranges from a thousand to a thousand and a half thousand people.

²⁵ There. D. 98. L. 290-291.

M. Meltyukhov

The formations and units that are part of the 27th Army are not combat-ready, as they have lost material part and personnel.

About how many were killed, wounded, missing and fled, not a single part can give exact data

nyh.

The command of the 27th Army is only establishing communication with the corps, the situation on the army sector, the presence enemy, his direction and approximate

thought does not know.

The fight against tank and motor units of the enemy, and also with his aviation, parts of the 27th army are not conducted, due to the complete absence of the material part.

In separate sections of the enemy they beat off with rifle and machine-gun fire.

The enemy feels complete impunity with from our side, descends over the front line and strafing fires at our units, as well as residents in the cities.

The lack of support for the infantry by tanks, aircraft and artillery is bewildering to the highest commanders of the armies and negative moods among a number of unstable commanders and fighters.

Some commanders assess the current situation as a betrayal by the high command, which has not yet been revealed, and believe that

our tactic is the tactic of placing first the infantry, and then the tank units, which are not supported by infantry and aviation. Anti-Soviet elements are fueling these sentiments and creating panic among the personnel of the army units.

June 25 while moving from Tallinn to Shavli [Shauliai] to lead the combat operations of the 11th Infantry Division and the 180th Territory

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

al rifle division units and command

65th Rifle Corps met on the highway in

18 km from the city of Mitava [Jelgava] with a group of Red

Army men and commanders of the 11th and 90th rifle divisions, indiscriminately retreating from the forward positions.

Instead of taking measures to stop the flow of retreating troops

and organize defense, the command

65th Rifle Corps took to flight, bringing

even more disorganization in retreat.

Contact with the 11th Rifle Division and the 180th Rifle

Division headquarters of the 65th Rifle Corps is not established.

tanovil.

June 29 this year after the shelling of the column of the

65th rifle corps by the bandits, the panic increased even more

more. As a result, the column of the 65th Rifle Corps was

divided into two groups. One of them (headquarters,

part of the 3rd department and the commandant's platoon) moved

in the direction of Weymouth, and where is located in

currently unknown. The second group (123rd

OBS, part of the sapper battalion and the operational staff of

the 3rd from the case) moved in the direction of the city of Riga

and after some time joined the 8th army.

Parts of the 65th Rifle Corps did not accept the battle with

the enemy due to indiscipline and panic created by the corps

command itself, and dispersed in different directions; where

are they located at

standing time is unknown.

Part of the 10th Infantry Division on June 28 began to

move in the direction of the city of Riga. On the way from

Mitava [Elga you] to Riga were cut off by the enemy: 204th, 48th

rifle regiments, 30th light artillery regiment.

On the morning of June 29, units of the 10th Infantry Division

began to defend the left bank of the Western Dvina River, repelling

the onslaught of the enemy.

M. Meltyukhov

A disadvantage in the fighting of the 10th rifle division was the lack of communication headquarters divisions with their units operating on the right and left flanks. Shooting was carried out on the map without appropriate adjustment, as a result, accuracy the fire was low and part of the shells fell into the position of our units and their headquarters.

Approaching from the city of Mitava [Jelgava] to the city of Riga, the 30th the light artillery regiment was mistaken for enemy artillery, and fire was opened on it. In turn, the 30th the light artillery regiment opened fire on the city of Riga.

Despite the active activity of enemy aviation, our aviation in the area of Riga on June 29 did not appeared.

The command of the 8th Army does not carry out the necessary leadership of subordinate formations, it works uncertainly, without sufficient decisiveness. Panic reigns at the army headquarters and rear units, caused by unsubstantiated stories of the military units of the 48th and 125th rifle divisions retreating from the front, and systematic raids not

friendly planes to the rear of the army.

There is no fight with enemy aircraft is underway.

Due to the lack of leadership, units and subunits are withdrawing from the front lines to new lines of defense, wherever they please.

The 11th Rifle Corps, retreating with stubborn fighting, gave the enemy 200 km deep into the front. The reasons for the failure of the corps in battles were the complete unpreparedness for hostilities. 10 hours before the outbreak of hostilities on the orders of a member of the Military Council of PribOVO Corps Commissar Dibrov cartridges were collected and the setting of mines was stopped

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents at the forefront of defense. Previously placed mines were taken out.

Anticipating a retreat, the commanders of units and formations do not communicate to the troops the routes of probable retreat, points of regroupings and formations, as a result of which it is not a withdrawal, but a panic escape.

The 55th Tank Regiment did not take part in the fighting, except for two attacks.

On June 24 and 25, the personnel of the regiment remained without food, did not sleep for three days. All this caused massive unhealthy conversations. When the regiment retreats to the rear on the way following left 15% of the cars.

Losses in personnel and materiel

regimental headquarters are not taken into account. The workers of the headquarters of the regiment are inactive.

The 202nd motorized division, when withdrawing on June 24, did not have no support left or right. They retreated in a disorganized manner, leaving a lot of weapons, ammunition, materiel, food and losing their sign

significant number of personnel.

Approximately this position was 28th heavy artillery regiment and reconnaissance battalion 11th Rifle Corps.

Recently, as a result of the work of the barrage detachments, desertion and disorderly flight from army units has ceased. The retreat is already being carried out in a more organized way .

The situation at the beginning of the war **in fall front**, also revealed a number of problems.

²⁶ There. D. 101. L. 330-333.

M. Meltyukhov

According to the report of the authorized 3rd department
10th mixed air division Leonov dated June 27, "in
12 a.m. June 22, 1941 from Germany to
area of Brest (fortress and training ground) were given
German military units rocket signals:
red, white and green.

Commanders and members of their families in the fortress believed
that the teaching of the German troops is taking place, no measures
no precautions were taken by the command of the Brest garni
zone.

The commanders and members of their families thought that
this exercise was carried out in the German army in the same way as in
our army, which was allegedly supposed to be carried out on the
20th of this month.

After signals on the side of the enemy in 1-2 hours
night in the city of Brest, all communication was broken,
apparently by a saboteur group. [...]

unrest of a counter-revolutionary nature and
other manifestations on the part of military personnel and
there are no family members.

15-year-old girls: daughter of the deputy chief
3rd Division of the 4th Army Khvalensky and the daughter of a military doctor
2nd rank Orlovsev fled from their families to the Kobrin hospital
to help the wounded soldiers.

There are no medicines in hospitals, especially bandages,
local doctors work without military supervision.
The soldiers of the Brest garrison, who went out on alarm,
had a supply of cartridges of 15 pieces, having used them up,
Zhabinki retreated to the district in disorder, as there were no
ammunition.

Communication between railway stations from
Kobrin to the station. Mikashevichi is missing.

The behavior of the local Polish population in relation to the
Red Army and their families in Bolsheviks

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

hostile. Yes, in the mountains. Brest, they offered armed resistance, they shot from the windows or salted with stones and sticks.

The fight against such manifestations is not carried out, since there are no instructions.

In the region of mountains. Gorodets, east of the mountains. Kobrin, me solid Polish fist with a machine gun made a raid on the auxiliary recovery train, which followed from Pinsk to restore the track from bombardment"²⁷ .

On June 26, the head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, Major State Security A. N. Mikheev sent Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar of the 1st rank L. 3. Report to Mekhlis: "According to the head of the 3rd [th] department of the 6th rifle division, comrade. Markeev, the situation in the Slutsk-Bobruisk region is catastrophic.

Today, at 10:00, the advance detachments of the enemy captured the city of Slutsk. There is nothing to oppose to tanks and aviation.

Valuables fall into the hands of enemies.

The command was lost.

Asks for urgent action. Considers that for restoration of the situation will require a dozen 2-3 tanks and aircraft"²⁸ .

On June 29, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO prepared a special message No. 35887, which stated that "according to according to the head of the 3rd department of the Western Front, major of state security comrade. Begma, the situation on the Western Front continues to remain still.

²⁷

There. D. 98. L. 243,248-249.

²⁸

There. L. 1.

M. Meltyukhov

The bulk of the fighters, commanders, including and fled from the front, expresses readiness to fight with enemy, to defend the homeland.

Questions arose among the commanders, mainly accountants, where is our aviation, where are anti-tank weapons, why the fascists can us shoot with impunity from the air.

The same mood is expressed by Major General Yer Makov, commanders of the 2nd Rifle Corps Pern,

Volkov and others.

Vigorous action direction v

Minsk - Borisov Corps Commissar Susaykov, with the participation of workers of the 3rd department of the main front the stream of soldiers who fled from the front

updated

Spare parts are formed and sent to front, but these parts are not provided with sufficient equipment cheny: there is no anti-aircraft, anti-tank artillery, tanks. Without the equipment of this technician, the morale of the troops is low.

Due to the lack of effective communications, command and control of troops has not yet been established. Unit commanders make their own decisions about joining fight, impose it on the enemy, without knowing who is on their flank.

With the suspension of the movement of the enemy pani The morale has fallen, but it may rise again at the slightest success of the enemy.

The apparatus of the 3rd department of the Western Front sent to restore order at the front and strengthen the morale of the fighters"²⁹.

As indicated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36026 dated June 30 on the situation in the West

²⁹ There. D. 99. L. 139-140.

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

on the front, "during the offensive of the German troops, a group of saboteurs from among the local Poles an ammunition depot was attacked.

The group consisted of 6 people armed with grenades and revolvers. All members of the group were detained and shot"30 .

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 36701 of July 5, "The 3rd Department of the Western Front reported a number of facts that had a negative impact on the course of military operations of our troops in the first days wars on the Western Front.

The Military Council of the Western Special Military District, the command of the armies and individual military formations in the preparation of units for combat operations with the enemy showed disorganization.

Parts of the district at the beginning of hostilities were not fully provided with materiel, weapons, ammunition, food and other types of supplies.

On June 21, the commander of the 3rd Army Kuznetsov, together with Lieutenant General of the Red Army General Staff Karbyshev's armies were watched by units located on border. The deputy commander of the artillery regiment of the 56th rifle division, Major Dyurba, reported what was happening a large concentration of German troops on the border, which our fortified points are not provided with ammunition and in the event of an attack will be incapacitated. On Dyurba Kuznetsov replied to this report: "There is nothing terrible and cannot be." No measures to ensure points of ammunition Kuznetsov did not accept.

After the invasion of the fascist troops, Dyurba said among the command staff: "Kuznetsov and the command We were sold to the 3rd Army."

³⁰ There. D. 98. L. 294.

M. Meltyukhov

444th heavy corps artillery regiment, which was at the border, he had no ammunition, while there was enough ammunition in the warehouses of Grodno and Lida.

When moving away from the border, the regiment left 3 152-mm guns, 2 tractors and 2 cars.

Parts of the 38th Panzer Division on June 23 went in the direction of the mountains. Baranovichi was not provided with materiel, ammunition and weapons, in particular, the motorized rifle regiment left without artillery, which was handed over for repairs.

Corps parts of the 2nd Rifle Corps in front of entry into battle on the night of June 26 material part were not fully staffed, due to with which on the day of entry into battle in the 151st corps artillery regiment only 2 divisions could be used.

The 127th separate sapper battalion of the 4th rifle corps by the beginning of hostilities had only 30 rifles. The battalion lost up to 70% of its personnel. [...]

The military formations of the 4th Army on June 26 were defeated by the enemy. To repel the onslaught of the enemy and to support the actions of rifle units, the 4th Army did not have aviation and tanks. The artillery was destroyed by the enemy.

Troop control by leaders headquarters with the outbreak of hostilities was dissatisfied talkative.

Due to the frequent bombardments of the mountains. Minsk headquarters of the ZapOVO from the city was evacuated to the forest, to the area Uruchcha. The evacuation of the departments of the headquarters proceeded randomly, the employees of the headquarters in groups of 20-30 people for 10 hours or more were looking for a new headquarters deployment. The executives from the affairs, instead of organizing the evacuation, took up the withdrawal

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

zom their families from the city, allowing panic and growing zeal.

Due to the lack of communication with parts of Art supply the district did not know the consumption and the need for ammunition in operating parts, as a result did not provide them ammunition.

On June 22-23, the artillery supply of the district was to send 3 echelons of ammunition to the active armies, but due to the fault of the workers of the artillery supply, the ammunition was not sent.

The reconnaissance department of the front headquarters lost all its subdivisions - reconnaissance points and 2 radio divisions, took no action to search. to the organization of partisan detachments in the rear of the enemy did not attack. The location of the enemy and the situation did not know.

In the first days of hostilities, intelligence reports were compiled on the basis of materials from the Air Force, the operations department of the headquarters and one hundred eye intelligence materials.

The panic that began after the unexpected invasion of German troops assumed wide proportions. The soldiers and commanders of the units of the 3rd Army disorganized, scattered, retreated along all roads in the direction of Minsk. Many of them on the second the defense lines were looking for their units and, not finding them, turned to the commanders of the units with a request accept them into a unit for further struggle against the German fascists. Unit commanders refused to enlist these fighters in their units, motivating them that "there is nothing to feed them."

Data from the 3rd Division of the Western Front on July 4 they say that disorganization in parts of the front continues.

Unloaded in the area of active units 9 transports of weapons were not found, and who received them

M. Meltyukhov

us, not established. Artillery to search for this
th weapons sent by courier.

Communication with parts of the front, lost from the first days
fighting is not recoverable. The communication department does
not deal with the repair of damaged lines.

There is also no radio communication with the headquarters of
the formations. The central radio node due to a malfunction of two
PAT type radios cannot operate smoothly. Communication is
carried out only through delegates.

The 74th Air Regiment lost the encryption
means and code SZh-40.

The enemy uses our code 16h RAP for provocative
purposes. Two telegrams received
of a provocative nature without an address and a signature,
encrypted with the specified code.

The General Staff gave an order to change the code
4 p.m. RAP³¹.

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd NPO
Department No. 4/37175 dated July 8, "according to the message of the 3rd
Department of the Western Front as of July 1
There were the following significant shortcomings.

There was not enough artillery
dov and other ammunition.

Supplying parts of the front with ammunition from the beginning
hostilities took place with great interruptions.

On the part of the Artistic Directorate of the Front,
represented by Lieutenant General Klich, no effective measures
are being taken to streamline the provision of units with ammunition.
elk.

The shells available in the 28th Rifle Corps in
combat readiness were not brought (did not turn over
fuses); most of the mines received in the unit
did not have fuses.

³¹ There. D. 99. L. 204-207.

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During the evacuation of the anti-aircraft division of military unit 1822 from mountains Grodno, due to the lack of traction, the material part remained unexported. The division did not provide proper resistance to the enemy, since it was not provided with ammunition.

The 56th Infantry Division was not prepared for battle. was - the mortar platoon did not have mines, the regimental the school of the 37th rifle corps did not have rifles and cartridges. Parts of the division entered the battle with weapons and peacetime ammunition.

The 27th Rifle Division was also brought into battle unprepared - there were not enough shells and cartridges.

The advanced units located on the border were not provided with weapons and ammunition, as a result, at the first appearance of the enemy, they fled, creating panic in the main parts of the 3rd Army.

The supply of the units of the 85th Rifle Division with fuel, ammunition and provisions was delivered extremely poorly. Already on the third day of the battle the artillery regiments of the division had no shells.

By the beginning of hostilities, the 24th separate mortar battalion was only half provided with rifles; it had no grenades and mines at all. For this reason, in the battalion did not enter the battle with the enemy, and when leaving from the military camp of Kozekov (near Minsk) left on the territory of the town up to 30 mortars and more than you

thousands of minutes

Of the 12 ammunition depots in the district, 6 were destroyed by explosion, which is 24.5% general stock.

In the corps artillery units of the 28th Rifle Corps and regiments of the RGK, shells are running low and they don't know where to get them.

The shells delivered on June 26 turned out to be without explosives.

M. Meltyukhov

vatsels. Part of the 3rd Army in the Molodechno-Krulevshchina region had no ammunition.

Located in the Baranovichi region and cut off from the front, the 6th mechanized corps is not provided with ammunition was.

Since the beginning of hostilities in the work of the VOSO department there is a lot of confusion.

When departing a transport with ammunition, the numbering and the station of departure of the transport are often absent, which led to the disruption of timely supply of ammunition to the front line.

Department of Military Communications of the Red Army did not report the numbers sent from the central warehouse trains with ammunition.

Supply of parts of the front with fuel and lubricant materialami was extremely disorganized.

R-9 lubricants, diesel fuel and autol in parts were running out. OSG front application dated On June 23, for the shipment of R-9 by the Fuel Supply Directorate of the Red Army, by July 1, it was not completed. Lubricants and fuel shipped for parts of the front in the period from 23 to 30 June arrived in in small quantities, which in no way did not provide for the needs of the front, and individual types of lubricants and fuels whether at all.

On June 29, the commander of the front ordered the transfer of fuel for the front in transport aircraft.

This task was entrusted to representative of the ABT front, captain Sorokin and head of the OSG department, military engineer 3rd rank Po Nomarev, who, due to a disagreement between battle fuel to the airfield in the required quantity

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

did not deliver, as a result, out of 22 transport aircraft, only 3 were loaded, the rest did not fly away loaded.

Heads of individual warehouses in a panic before

the warehouses were set on fire by the enemy, while they themselves deserted.

The head of the fuel and lubricants warehouse No. 497 in the city of Orsha - quartermaster of the 3rd rank Tregubov and pompolit - battalion Commissar Pivovarov set fire to warehouse No. 497 in a panic in the city of Orsha, but they themselves deserted. 700 tons of gasoline and 6 wagons of lubricants and oil burned down.

Tregubov and Pivovarov were brought to trial by the Military Three Bunals.

Head of fuel and lubricants warehouse No. 645 at station. Horodishche - Quartermaster 2nd rank May on June 26 burned the warehouse, and he himself deserted.

On this fact, the 3rd department of the front is conducting a race following.

The supply of parts of the front along the line of the quartermaster's office was not established.

Due to the lack of communication of the Front Office with the quartermasters of armies, corps and individual military formations, the quartermaster's office on polo dealing with food and other types of property did not know.

As of July 1, the main food depots had not yet been formed and were not sent to the front line. thrown out.

Autobattalions at the disposal of the Quartermaster there was no control, and therefore the transfer of food to the advanced units of the front was extremely difficult. Other modes of transport control is not disposed.

The Military Council of the front was instructed to immediate formation of 1 auto battalions with

M. Meltyukhov

I would like to use them to deliver art supplies, fuel and food to parts of the front, but auto battalions were not created.

The position of the front with hospitals

yami is very heavy.

Mobilization of sanitary institutions according to the deployment scheme on the territory of the Western Special the military district was disrupted. In addition, the Minsk, Molodechno, Volkovysk and Kobrin military hospitals were destroyed, in connection with this

there was no place to treat the wounded . "32

July 13, 1941, leaving the encirclement, the head Regimental Commissar Elk of the 3rd Division of the 10th Army to rule in the name of the head of the 3rd NPO Directorate a report in which he wrote: "According to your order, I am reporting the situation in which the events and their development. On June 21, at 24:00, a member of the Military Council called me and asked me to come to headquarters. Arriving at the army headquarters, the commander of the 10th Army Major General Golubev said that the situation was extremely tense and that there was an order from the district to the commanding staff to wait for orders without departing from device.

In turn, by this time they were called to wire and all the corps and division commanders were waiting for orders.

At about 1 a.m. on June 22, Pavlov, the former commander of the ZapOVO, called HF and ordered the troops to be put on full combat readiness and said he would give details in code. In accordance with this, instructions were given to all commanders parts. At about 3 o'clock all means of communication were cut off. I believe that the enemy before the start of the bombardment

³² There. L.187-190.

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paratroopers were dropped and they took out

all means of communication.

By 10-11 o'clock in the morning the encryption arrived, the exact I don't remember its contents now, but I remember well that it said to bring the troops to combat readiness, not to succumb to provocations and not to cross the state border. By this time the enemy troops had already penetrated 5-10 km into our territory in places. The encryption was signed - Pavlov,

Fomin, Klimovsky. [...]

At 8 a.m. the command post moved near vil. Staroseltsy in the forest, which is 5 km northwest of Bialystok. Immediately, the command took measures to establish communication between the formations, and by 12 o'clock the delegates had restored contact with them. Radio communication was restored by the end of 22 numbers both with the county and with all connections. Communication wire during the actions of the army is not restored.

On the 22nd and 23rd, all units conducted intensified combat operations against the enemy. In some places (86th, 113th rifle divisions) went on the counteroffensive. By the evening of the 22nd, I don't remember now from whom, either from the deputy commander of the ZapOVO Boldy personally, or from the headquarters of the ZAPOVO, an order was received to retreat and gain a foothold at the turn of the Narev River. The order was caused by an alleged penalty from the neighbor on the left - the 3rd Army.

On the evening of the 22nd, the command post of the army moved near st. Valiis, east of Bialystok, partly completed their retreat across the Narew River.

Due to the fact that the retreat was carried out during the day, enemy aircraft acted with complete impunity, since there was not a single one of our aircraft, bombing

M. Meltyukhov

they beat and shot the outgoing units from the planes. All the following days, enemy aviation, with complete impunity, shot with bombs of various calibers and machine-gun fire from aircraft as advanced units and all troops of the army, not allowing our troops to raise their heads. In addition, the advancing troops the enemy fired heavily with flamethrowers, which we didn't have at all.

Enemy aircraft took control of everything highways, cars were shot at, and subsequently they even hunted individual people, which created great panic and a large number of people fled, throwing weapons on the move, material part and ammunition.

The Bialystok-Volkovysk highway was littered with human corpses, motor vehicles, tanks, ammunition, and it was absolutely impossible to get through it.

Thus, in essence, they reached the Narew River broken units, having a very small number of people in divisions, and formations such as the 13th MK was left with only one headquarters. It happened because the corps was formed as a mechanized corps to the beginning of hostilities and the materiel did not received, not counting a small part of the training tanks. The regiments were armed with 200-300 rifles, the rest of the personnel were unarmed.

zhiya.

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that, by order of the district headquarters, from May 15, all artillery regiments of divisions, corps and artillery regiments RGCs were gathered in camps in two places - Chervony Bor (between Lomzha and Zambrovo) of the 22nd regiment 10th Army and Obuz-Lesna artillery regiments of the rear divisions of the army and other parts of the district. For under-

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

the capture of these regiments was sent by the chief of artillery Army Major General Barsukov, who, as he told me he told me that at 6 o'clock in the morning he managed to get to the regiments, wake them up, raise the alarm and send them in division. This was already at a time when all the border divisions were fighting the enemy.

The artillery regiments on the mechtyag were in an exceptionally difficult situation. Some of the guns, without tractors, were left in winter quarters, some of the tractors in the camps were also out of order, and the command of the units this material part was blown up or thrown, without firing a single shot from them at the enemy. On

road, during retreat, due to damage to traction whose from the bombing rushed completely serviceable guns, even locks were not always removed.

A similar situation was also with anti-aircraft artillery. All divisions and regiments, in any case, the entire main command staff and materiel were assembled for camp training in the Krupki borough, near Minsk, and until recently in the 10th Army did not return, and their fate is unknown to me. Thus, formations, warehouses, cities were left without anti-aircraft guns.

artillery.

M. Meltyukhov

The 6th mechanized corps, commanded by Major General Khatskilevich, was fully equipped with a new materiel, tanks "KV" and T-34, was kept by the command of the 10th Army in reserve and was planned for counterattack. On June 22 Lieutenant-General Boldin, deputy commanding officer, arrived, and 23rd Marshal Kulik. Both left for the 6th building and [he] they [was] sent to the junction of the 3rd Army in the area of Sokolki - Kuznitsa, where the enemy managed to break through. The corps came out of the subordination of the 10th Army, they were commanded by Boldin and Kulik. The corps got into emergency

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

tea difficult situation due to lack of fuel and shells. The fuel supply base was in

Volkovysk, that is, more than 100 km from the building.

All measures were taken to supply fuel, but sending was hampered by the fact that movement was possible

only at night, that is, for 4-5 hours. During this time, it was necessary to clear the road from traffic jams after bombings.

Troops resisted the enemy

On the 26th, after which they began a disorderly retreat. The command post of the army was moved to the Zamkovy forest, which is northeast of the mountains. Volkovysk.

The commanders of formations began to arrive at the command post with reports on the state of the troops, of which it was clear that 500-600 people remained from the division, the rest of the composition was killed or fled.

The following contributed to the spread of panic and the increase in disorder in the rear.

On the night of June 22-23, everything shamefully fled party and Soviet leadership of the Belostok region. All employees of the NKVD and NKGB organs, headed by the heads of the organs, also fled. A similar situation took place in almost all regional

and city organizations. All the militia fled from Bialystok and other cities. cities, and in particular

Bialystok, as the nearest supply base, was left without power. The hostile elements took advantage of this and raised their heads. Released from prison

over 3,000 arrested who started looting and

pogroms in the city. Hostile elements opened

firing from windows at the passing units and rear of our troops, using hidden weapons for this

former Polish army and abandoned by our cha
stymi.

M. Meltyukhov

All this created an opportunity for small landings to direct an enemy of 10-15 people with impunity panic and create an impression of the environment, as their destruction was not organized.

June 22, 1941 in the evening at the command post I made a proposal due to the lack of opportunity try those arrested and evacuate them, shoot them all spies, rebels, saboteurs and traitors, draw up an act signed by the Secretary of the Regional Committee Comrade. Kudryaev, head of the UNKVD comrade Fukin, NKGB comrade Belchenko and mine. This proposal was made by me in the presence of Lieutenant General Bogdanov and Sokolov, who supported me. Tov. Kudryaev and Belchenko promised to think over this proposal and

let me know the result on the 23rd. As I stated above, On the 23rd, they all fled from Bialystok.

A similar situation took place in all other districts and cities. Population as in Western areas, and in the eastern, now occupied by the enemy, was not organized to fight the landings and counterrevolutionary elements.

The Military Council of the army decided on a further retreat and (since the paratroopers the headquarters of the 10th army was cut off from Volkovysk from the west and Slonim from the east) bypass from the northeast by country roads and reach Baranovichi.

As it turned out later, Baranovichi was taken Germans, after which the Military Council decided retreat east towards Slutsk. It turned out that these escape routes were also cut off by the Germans.

Crossing the highway [at] Baranovichi met with enemy, accepted the battle. Prior to this, the commander I was warned that it was decided to break into groups, moreover, the group, including the leadership of the staff

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ba of the army, will go along with Marshal Kulik will leave ahead in cars. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Kulik ordered me to go with him. The remaining operational staff under the leadership of my deputy, along with the rest a group of commanding officers of the army headquarters and under the leadership of the army commander, General Golubev should have gone in the same direction.

Since the 30th, I have no information about them.

The group in which I was, 24 people, made their way in cars along a country road to the old border in the area southwest of Minsk. After it turned out that Minsk was occupied by the enemy, it was decided decision to make his way to the Berezina. Divided into groups of 5-6 people, following the same direction 5-6 km apart, made their way to the Berezina, but also Berezina was occupied by the enemy, after which It was decided to move to the Dnieper.

July 9, 1941 in the evening we reached the Dnieper, to the north New Bykhov against vil. Selets. In the evening, the Dnieper was sailed on a raft made of logs and were detained by a detachment of the 183rd division.

All our way passed on a little-travelled road, country road, swamps, forests. Avoiding going into large villages and villages, with preliminary reconnaissance, they entered only small settlements. The highway along which the enemy forces moved, we crossed, as a rule, at night during breaks between vehicle traffic.

About the work of the 3rd department

Immediately after the bombing, all the documents of the 3rd from the case were handed over to the regional NKVD Directorate for delivering them to Minsk.

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The 3rd department had to deal with everything, and mainly to ensure the work of the rear.

3rd department of the army from the outgoing border guards in 200 people, under the leadership of the operational staff, detachments were created, detaining all fleeing and directing them to the points where the headquarters armies formed regiments and sent to front. A purge of people passing through the detachments was organized, an investigation was carried out on deserters, marauders, spies and alarmists.

At all the main decisive points sent operational staff to which the groups were assigned border guards and commanders.

In addition, due to the fact that from 22 to the night of 23 of Bialystok fled all the workers of the NKVD and the NKGB, party and Soviet apparatuses, the city was left without authorities, and since Bialystok was still a supply base for our units, I formed a task force under the commandant of the city, reinforced

border guards, order was restored in Bialystok using all wartime measures.

On the 25-26th, the task force left Bialystok only when it began to the Germans came in.

Walking for 10 days through enemy territory, entering separate villages, I observed the following.

A large number of Red Army soldiers who abandoned weapons, roam the villages, are not detained by the German troops, are not taken prisoner. In some cases, these groups are used by the Germans for work (building houses * clearing roads, etc.). The command staff is shot on the spot by any rank of German

army, as soon as it is established that this person belongs to the command staff. The civilian population is not

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gout. Representatives of not German command and proposed to leave the existing order, not to dissolve the collective farms, pushing especially for harvesting in an organized manner.

It should be noted that, as a rule, the regional party and Soviet leadership fled from all places 5-6 days before the appearance of the enemy, leaving the entire collective-farm Soviet asset of the village without leadership.

In addition, in the prewar period, all radios were confiscated, so that the collective farmers did not know instructions from the Soviet government to destroy all property upon departure. They are also unaware of creation of partisan detachments. At least for 10 days of advance through the territory of the enemy, I do not have not seen a single case of destruction of property and heard about the partisan detachments. There were times when the peasants of the villages dismantled the property belonging to the state farm and the state. On individual collective farms individual peasants terrorized the collective farmers and began to rob collective farm property.

Speaking about the behavior of commanders walking in a group during the exit from the environment, it should be noted that basically everyone went with the decision to either get to their own or die.

The behavior of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Kulik is incomprehensible. He ordered everyone to take off their insignia, throw away their documents, then change into peasant clothes, and he himself changed into peasant clothes. clothes. He himself did not have any documents with him, I don't know if he took them with him from Moscow. offered to drop weapons, and to me personally orders and documents, however, except for his adjutant, a major by rank, I forgot my last name, no one threw documents and weapons.

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He motivated this by the fact that if we get caught by a protivnik, he will take us for peasants and let us go.

Just before crossing the front, Comrade Kulik rode on a peasant cart along the same road along which the German tanks were moving, which was well known to Comrade. Kulik in the footsteps of German cars (they differ from ours) and according to the stories of the peasants, and only a lucky chance saved us from meeting with

the Germans. Marshal tov. Kulik said it was good can swim, but did not swim across the river, but waited for the raft to be put together .

...

Similar problems occurred in the troops **of the Southwestern Front**. On June 22, "according to the report of the 3rd [th] from the case of the 139th division of the KOVO, parts of the division are moving towards their starting position. Division vehicles without spare parts and without rubber. Shells left on winter quarters. There is a great shortage of shoes in the division, 200 people are completely barefoot. The division is not mobilized"³⁴ .

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate NKO No. 36137 of July 1, "according to the report of the 3 [th] department of the South-Western Front of June 25 with. during the deployment of hostilities in the first days of the war in parts of the front were marked by disorganization, demon bitterness and confusion.

Despite the signals of a real possibility of the enemy falling, individual unit commanders
The Southwestern Front failed to quickly repel the fall of the enemy. [...]

³³ There. L. 330-340.

³⁴ There. D. 98. L. 175.

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By the beginning of hostilities, the district headquarters was not in place. Headquarters departments followed scattered trains and arrived at the command post from Kyiv by the end of June 22. The headquarters had no regular communication with the armies and corps.

On the first day of the war, the command of the 5th Army lost contact with the units and did not know the situation on front.

On June 22, the commander of the 5th Army ordered that the command post be changed. Heads of departments were not warned about the place of the new concentration. Pe the crossing took place in an unorganized manner, the columns stretched out, were discovered by enemy aircraft and shot by her.

Anti-aircraft artillery of the 18th anti-aircraft artillery regiment 12th Army, guarding the mountains. Stanislav from air enemy raids, did not have 37-mm shells. Also the artillery battalions of the units, in particular the 164th rifle division, were not provided with shells divisions.

In some cities that were bombed, party and Soviet workers were the first to flee, which created panic and disorder.

June 22 p. after the bombing of the city of Lutsk by the enemy the entire party and Soviet apparatus left the city in a panic. The detainees who remained in the Lutsk prison rebelled, disarmed part of the guards and tried to escape. (The riot was soon put down.)

On June 22, after the first raid by German bombers, panic broke out in Lvov. Party and Soviet workers of regional organizations

mobilized all Lvov motor transport, gathered their families and left in large parties
give city.

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On June 23, there was actually no power in Lvov. This was taken advantage of by a bandit element, which ransacked a candy factory at night, some trading enterprises and apartments of evacuated families. Water was poisoned at the Lvov Meat Processing Plant.

In the transit prison in Lvov, the captured rebelled, disarming part of the guards. The rebellion was suppressed by the escort battalion of the NKVD troops.

Created by order of the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General Muzychenko, an operational group from workers of the 3rd Department of the Army and the Department of Political Propaganda in the city of Lvov, by June 24, the revolutionary order was restored. Organized barrage points began to return refugees back to Lviv.

On June 23, the first secretary of the Bussk district committee of the CP(b)U, Bezukhov, and the chairman of the executive committee, Popov, fled from the town of Buek, leaving the district without any leadership. (Both are arrested.)

The political and moral state of the parts of the front healthy, with the exception of isolated cases of unhealthy moods and desertion.

June 22 this year Chief of Artillery of the 12th Army, Major General Gavrilenko, declared: "The Germans will start advancing and beat us. Everything that was taken in 1939 will be taken away. We have ugliness at every step. In the 16th mechanized corps, the shells do not fit the gun system, it is impossible to shoot. Carry materiel in artillery brigades on nothing. The Germans will take us like chickens, without you arrow".

On June 23, an employee of the artillery department of the 12th Army, Major Serofanov said: "We were beaten, beaten and *will be* beaten from for disorganization, lack of discipline and row."

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In parts of the Southwestern Front on June 26 it was 69 deserters were detained, including 3 people from the beginning of the composition. Of the detainees, 32 people were shot by the command, 2 were sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal, with respect to the rest of the military prosecutors are investigating.

For the period from June 24 to June 26, 450 Red Army soldiers who had lost their units were picked up.

To detain deserters and those who lost their units, the 3rd department of the Southwestern Front created special barriers.

In a battle with the enemy units of the 97th Infantry Division, a group of German soldiers was captured.

By examining the weapons taken from them, it was established that the Nazi Germans were actively fighting, the barrels of their rifles were very hot; prisoners from the Austrians, Czechs, and other nationalities the forks remained lubricated with oil, because of them Not a single shot was fired . "

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 36698 of July 6, "according to the 3rd department of the Southwestern Front, the first days of the war with Germany showed that a number of units of the KOVO were ready for hostilities were not prepared. The units and formations did not have the required amount of ammunition and weapons, the relationship between the units was established

bad, there were cases among the senior command staff alarmism. All this led to heavy losses of personnel and weapons.

Due to the lack of ammunition, part of the 9th 36th UR (5th army of the city of Lyuboml) with the outbreak of hostilities

³⁵ There. L. 250-253.

³⁶ So in the text. This refers to the defensive structures of the 13th Kovelsky UR.

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suffered heavy losses and on the second day of the war they were forced to go to the front lines of the field units. The artillery of the UR did not go into firing positions due to the lack of shells.

The army command, having inaccurate data on the location of its units and on the movement of enemy units, often issues incorrect orders.
and orders.

June 24 by the chief of staff of the army, based on unverified intelligence from the army headquarters that 30 tanks are moving in the area of the Dubenskaya road enemy, artillery and 18 armored vehicles, which supposedly bypasses the German 14th Panzer Division on the right, was ordered to prepare for evacuation.

As a result of the check, these data were not confirmed, and the given order caused panic.

the state of the command staff of the army headquarters.

On June 23 and 24, the local authorities of Lvov and Luts'k began to leave these cities in disorder, causing panic among the population. Measures taken by 3rd Division and the command of the 5th Army, the panic was quickly eliminated.

On June 26, in connection with the supposed approach of the Germans, a panic was created in the very headquarters of the Southwestern Front. The investigation found that The deputy chief of staff for political affairs, regimental commissar Zinoviev, received an order from the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Purkaev, to prepare vehicles and load department property on them. The order was carried out. As a result

Major General Kovalev, head of the quartermaster service department, Major General Alekseev, head of the OSG, and others, from 3 o'clock on June 26, curtailed their work

their departments.

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In addition, on the orders of the Deputy Chief of Staff for the rear of Trutko, 100 trucks were taken to load the property of the headquarters, designed to transport fuel to the 15th mechanized corps fighting the enemy.

By the measures taken by the 3rd Department and the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, the work of the departments headquarters restored.

The command post of the headquarters of the army cavalry group is poorly organized: there are no dugouts, the guards are few in number and consist of poorly trained fighters. On the night from 24 to 25 June, the guard guarding the command post, aimless shooting was launched, which was stopped only in the morning.

Armgroup's supply station is not organized. Headquarters workers do not go to units to help and operational management "

As noted in the special report of the Special Department NKVD No. 4/38578 dated July 21, "according to the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, an investigation into the circumstances of the departure of units of the 199th Infantry Division from battlefields in the area of \u200b\u200bN[ovy] Miropol established: units of the division from July 5 this year, according to the order of the front command, took up defense in the southern sector of the N[ovograd]-Volyn fortified area, in particular on the section Borintsy - N[ovy] Miropol - Ko sprouts.

Due to the lack of leadership of the battle on the part of the division command and the premature abandonment of points by the UR units, during the breakthrough by the enemy on July 6 of this year. fortified area N[new]

Miropol The 7th Infantry Regiment of the division retreated from their positions in a panic.

'There. D. 99. L. 112-114.

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After this breakthrough, the division's communications with two shelves was lost.

July 9 this year division commander Alekseev, having a written order from the Military Council of the front - to hold positions, on the basis of an alleged oral order of the commander of the 7th Rifle Corps Dobroserdov, to the 492nd Rifle Regiment, which had by all means to hold the defense of the line until the arrival of reinforcements, ordered to retreat. This order was not transmitted to the rest of the regiments.

Division commander Alekseev together with the commissar Korzhev and other commanders, leaving units, with fled the battlefield.

In the area where the headquarters of the division was located on July 11, all the office work of the headquarters was found abandoned. divisions and about 2 million money.

The investigation into the case is being conducted by the Special Department of the Front."

On July 22, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, imposed the following resolution on this report: "T. Nosov, copy to Comrade Mekhlis. Not slow to arrest the corps commander, commander divisions, regimental commanders and judge at the very earliest order as traitors and cowards"³⁷.

On August 17, the Special Department of the NKVD prepared a special message No. 41/103, which indicated that "July 6 at Novo-Miropol was defeated, suffering heavy losses in people and materiel, 199th Rifle Division.

Special Department of the Southwestern Front in connection with carried out an investigation which resulted in installed:

June 30 Commander of the Southwestern Front ordered the 199th Rifle Division by the morning of July 5 to

³⁷ There. D.100. L.252-253.

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to take and firmly hold the southern front of the Novograd-Volynsky fortified area. The command of the division complied with this order belatedly. Parts of the division took up defense later than the specified period, in addition, during the march, food for the fighters was not organized. People, especially the 617th Infantry Regiment, arrived in defense area depleted.

After occupying the defense area, the command of the division did not reconnoiter the enemy forces, did not take measures to blow up the bridge across the Sluch River in the central defense sector, which made it possible for the enemy to transfer tanks and motorized infantry. Due

with the fact that the command did not establish communications with the headquarters divisions with regiments, on July 6, the 617th and 584th rifle regiments acted without any leadership from the side we command the division.

During the panic created in the units when the enemy attacked, the command failed to prevent the flight that had begun. Control divisional headquarters fled. Division commander Alekseev, deputy commander for political affairs Korzhev and division chief of staff Herman left the regiments and with the remnants of the headquarters fled to the rear.

Through the fault of Korzhev and Herman, party documents, blank letterheads were left to the enemy. party cards, seals of party and Komsomol organizations and all staff documents.

The division commander, Colonel Alekseev, the deputy commander for political affairs, the regimental commissar Korzhev, and the division chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel German arrested and brought before the Military Tribunal"³⁸.

As noted in the special report of the Special Department NKVD No. 4/51973 dated November 20, 1941, "according to

³⁸ There. D.101.L.110-111.

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Special Department of the NKVD of the Southern Front, returning from the encirclement of the enemy, former assistant to the chief of staff for intelligence of the 396th rifle regiment of the 135th rifle division of the 27th rifle corps of the 5th army, senior lieutenant Kudakov reported the following.

From the first days of the war, the 135th Rifle Division in near the Vladimir-Volyn direction suffered a defeat and was sent to Shepetovka for reform.

In connection with the available information about the death of the division commander, Major General Smekhotvortsev, Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky was appointed commander of the newly formed 135th Rifle Division.

As it turned out later, information about the death Major General Smekhotvortsev were false. In fact, Major General Smekhotvortsev, together with the division chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov, in a place east of the mountains. Korosten collected units that left the battlefield and formed a division from them, moreover, there were more personnel and weapons in these units than in the newly formed 135th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Dubrovsky.

Upon formation, the Dubrovsky division was deployed 20 kilometers west of st. Complete for defense exercises.

Somewhat later, the division was again transferred to the old SD on the Sluch River near the town of Baranovka, where parts of the division occupied the defense area along the eastern bank of the river Sluch.

A few days later, Dubrovsky's division and the 149th Rifle Division, which was operating to the left, found themselves in the opponent's circle.

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There was time to withdraw, since there was no enemy division in the defense area, but the withdrawal along unknown reasons organized by the command of the division is not was.

On July 7, Major General Smekhotvortsev sent an order to withdraw the remnants of Dubrovsky's division to the place formation of parts by Major General Laughmaker you m.

Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky did not comply with this order and did not release three lieutenants and one captain sent by Smekhotvortsev with six junior commanders.

The political instructor of the Special Branch of the Paplota Division, who left on the same day to Major General Smekhotvortsev, returned to the division on July 8 and brought confirmation of Smekhotvortsev's order, but the lieutenant colonel Dubrovsky again refused to fulfill it.

Discontent began to grow among the command staff. In fact, there were two 135 rifle divisions vision.

During this time, the enemy continued to bypass the division, and by July 10 the latter was completely surrounded.

In this regard, at a meeting of the commanders, it was decided to divide the division into three groups and begin to exit the encirclement of each group of independent seriously.

However, to break through the enemy's ring not a single the group failed. At the site of the planned breakthrough, not far from the village of Stribezh, Zhytomyr region, through the Kiev highway, reconnaissance detected a large movement of motorized parts to Zhitomir.

The units of the two groups of the division that had gathered near the village of Stribezh were 2 km from the enemy. From command-

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there was no one in the division, Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky, leaving his units, left at night in an unknown direction.

The remaining command staff adopted solution - bury excess weapons and ammunition in land, break people into small groups and through highway to go in the direction of Kyiv.

The available 3 cars after this decision were rendered unusable, the horses and carts were handed over to the collective farm in the village of Stribezh. The personnel broke up into small groups, many commanders went with their divisions.

As a result, only from efficient servicemen"³⁹ .

According to the special report of the 3rd NPO Directorate No. 38209 of July 18, "Command of the 25th Mechanized Corps of the Kharkov Military District June 24, 1941 received an order to send corps in the active army, with a loading period of the same day at 23:00.

The corps administration and separate corps units left Kharkov on June 24, 1941 by railroad, followed through Poltava, Kremenchug, Znamenka to st. Mironovka, from where they arrived on their own to Boguslav and became part of the 19th army.

From the city of Boguslav, the control of the corps on its own through Tarashcha, the city of Belaya Tserkov, the city of Vasilkovo arrived in the village. Glevakha, Vasilkovsky district, Kyiv region, from there the next day it was relocated to the village. Svyatoshino near the city of Kyiv, and then on their own to the station. Irpin, 15 km from Kyiv, where they plunged into railway echelon, which through Art. Nizhyn and Gomel on the night of July 5, 1941 arrived in Novo-

³⁹ There. D. 103. L. 388-389.

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Zybkov, Oryol Oblast, and were placed at the disposal of the 5th Army.

The corps spent 10 days on all the crossings listed above, wasting motor resources aimlessly, and lost corps units along the way, that is, a motorcycle regiment, a separate engineering battalion

and etc.

From the 50th Panzer Division, which made an almost similar route, it is not known where 4 echelons and in the same position are 4 echelons of the 219th motorized division, which, in addition to In addition, during the crossings, she lost 150 personnel killed and wounded, having fallen under the bombing of enemy aircraft at the station. Vasilkovo before unloading the train.

It would take only

only 1-1.5 days, therefore, the time lost for moving from one place to another, could be used to obtain the missing materiel and weapons, which the corps has until now not completed and therefore not brought to full combat readiness"⁴⁰ .

According to the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 39405 of August 1, "4th mechanized corps from the first days war was used by the command of the 6th Army as part of the cover.

In battles with the enemy, the corps lost 27 KV tanks and 174 T-34 tanks, in addition, 133 tanks of these brands were lost due to technical malfunctions.

Most of these losses were due to the fault of the command of the 6th Army, which transferred units body from place to place over long distances.

⁴⁰ There. D. 99. L. 352-353.

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There were cases when the corps with its parts did not managed to settle down at a new frontier, or only approached him, as the order of the 6th army followed with a new combat mission, causing new long-range movement (Kamenka-Strumilov, Moscisk, etc.).

Due to frequent crossings, the corps as a whole covered 800 kilometers (and the 32nd Panzer Division - 1000 kilometers) and was left completely without material parts.

Tanks "KV" and T-34 rushed on the roads due to minor malfunctions. The command of the 6th Army did not carry out any work to collect materiel left on the roads. Corps forces picked up and evacuated 73 tanks,

98 tanks were blown up and burned.

The hull was also used incorrectly in combat operations. All the battles carried out by divisions of the corps were not accompanied by either artillery fire or aviation. Motorized rifle regiments assigned to tank units by the command of the 6th Army from the first day fighting were scattered in small parts, and the 202nd and 32nd regiments were detained to guard the headquarters of the 6th Army.

The command of the 6th Army did not organize the withdrawal of units. Formally, by order and on maps, the movement of units was delimited, but the main routes have always been overburdened. There were no army traffic controllers and route commanders, as for example, when leaving Lviv for Zlochev, when the 4th the mechanized corps connected with parts of the 6th rifle corps and the 3rd cavalry division and formed a multi-kilometer column, creating traffic jams on the roads"⁴¹.

Also on August 1, a special message was prepared

⁴¹ There. D. 100. L. 318-319.

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of the Special Department of the NKVD, which summed up some of the results of the combat operations of the armored forces front. "According to the report of the Special Department of the South-Western Front for the past period of hostilities tank and motorized formations at the disposal of the front command, suffered heavy material losses.

The main reasons for the large losses of the material part are:

1) The bulkiness of the structure of command posts, which hampered the tactical maneuverability of armored formations;

2) Weak tactical and technical training personnel, especially command;

3) Poor cohesion of units and subunits;

4) Frequent changes in areas of concentration, as a result, large marches took place, which led to severe wear and tear of the machines before their participation in battles (8th mechanized corps before made a march of about 500 km in battle, lost up to 45% of the vehicles during this time; The 56th division made a march of about 1000 km, lost up to 35% of the vehicles);

5) Lack of interaction with tanks of artillery, aviation and infantry and weak cover of tank formations by anti-aircraft weapons;

6) Lack of intelligence data about the enemy and the terrain, as a result of which a significant number of tanks died in the swamps;

7) Insufficiency of repair means, for spare parts and evacuation means;

8) The manifestation of alarmism and cowardice are separate our commanders.

As of July 30, G.

39 tanks remained in the 8th Panzer Division;

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in the 32nd tank division - 10 tanks;
in the 20th Panzer Division - 3 tanks;
in the 35th tank division - 24 tanks;
in the 10th Panzer Division - 6 tanks;
in the 37th tank division - 7 tanks;
in the 15th tank division - 101 tanks;
in the 43rd Panzer Division - 47 tanks;
in the 40th tank division - 3 tanks;
in the 19th tank division - 1 tank;
in the 41st Panzer Division - And tanks;
in the 34th tank division - 3 tanks;
in the 44th Panzer Division - 125 tanks;
in the 39th Panzer Division - 0 tanks.

All material remaining in parts of the front
part needs repair.

The remaining personnel of the 9th, 19th, 22nd and
24th corps participates in battles as infantry units
opinion.

The 12th Panzer Division, which is currently under
construction, received 75
tanks; in the rest of the formed regiments in total
complexity there are 270 tanks " 1.

g ..

One of the activities of the military counterintelligence was
to record various "incorrect" statements of the Red Army
servicemen.

Such materials are interesting in that they provide an opportunity
to obtain information about the existing moods. At the same
time, of course, it should be remembered that the statements
recorded by the military counterintelligence agencies were
precisely a noticeable deviation from the widely

'There. L. 315-317.

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widespread, which made them the object of mania.

June 22, 1941 by the organs of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO
The following statements were made by military personnel.
High School Tactics Lecturer Major
Mukhin believed that "now the Germans will make us a chump.
We are not ready for war. Everywhere promiscuity
and disorganization. According to listener 2
course of the Higher School of Senior Lieutenant Pavlov, "Japan
won't oppose us since we bought it. After all
Marx also said that an entire nation could be sacrificed in the
interests of the revolution. The Soviet government, probably,
promised Japan to give the opportunity to be the master in the
Pacific Ocean and give China"¹

. Red Army soldier of the 14th Rifle Corps
Southern Front Tveretinov was sure that "Germany will defeat
the Soviet Union. At the very first offensive of the Germans,
one must surrender. You will stay there
alive, and you will live well."⁴² As the driver thought
motor depot NPO Rodyukov, "the Germans will beat us. USSR
cannot fight for a long time, because economically Soviet
The Union is very weak, it's not like the Germans. Besides,
there will be great betrayals on our part, and the Germans
this cannot be. No one inside the country will help us in the war,
the peasants used to help, but now
and they won't. During the Finnish events there were many
volunteers, but now no one will volunteer in the war with
Germany, because. after the end of the war with Finland
returned from the front
were not hired back, and many of them for a long time
had no job . "

⁴² There. L. 8.

⁴³ There. L. 16.

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According to the engineer of the special department of the Main Military Construction Directorate Kosolapov: "Germany in matters of preparation for war was smarter than the USSR and therefore Germany is well formed, prepared, and may prove victorious. One

of the positive aspects in Germany is that there

with the command staff of the reserve, a preparer was and is being conducted

work, and in the USSR this important area of work is completely forgotten, NGOs in the war are counting on the young people who are in the Red Army, this is wrong" ⁴⁴. Student of the Military Veterinary Academy

Mirin declared that "the German people would never will go against his government, since all Germans live incomparably better than the rest of the working people of those states that Germany has enslaved. In Germany, almost every peasant has his own

car and other conveniences in life. A Red Army soldier of the 266th Corps Artillery Regiment of the 9th Army of the Southern Front, who was not named in the document, said: "Good Molotov said that victory would be ours, but in reality it might be on the side of Germany.

I am more confident in German technology. Then, victory remains with the one who leads the attack first. By opinion of the commander of the 1st division of the 260th howitzer artillery regiment of the Northern Front of Captain Chesnokov: "This we are not Finland, we are liquid, and Hitler is strong adversary, he can tear us to shreds .

June 23 Red Army soldier of the 9th Army of the Southern Front Selyuchenko said: "My heart feels that we we will be defeated, since the German army is strong in technical

⁴⁴ There. L. 17.

⁴⁵ There. L. 19.

⁴⁶ There. L. 44.

⁴⁷ There. L. 55.

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mental attitude and better trained. I was convinced today that Germany is fighting for justice, it is us not afraid, her planes fly freely, not afraid of our anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft. They make their deeds before our eyes, and in our newspapers there are many hype about the Red Army, but on the facts something turns out differently”⁴⁸. As the military technician of the 1st rank of the squadron of the 41st air division Fedorov (st. Luga) believed, “when such an organization as we have, I feel we are Hitler cover, smash to smithereens. Their organization is not ours. We are used to talking a lot, but on actually not at all. The bosses live, he and the bombs not terrible. There is not much hope for the people. We have a lot of prisoners and many of them are in prison never. Hitler takes this into account and may be to drop troops near the prisoner camps”⁴⁹. By According to military technician of the 1st rank of the scientific test range for small arms Olshansky, “the reports of our Information Bureau are not correct. Not so many prisoners could be taken when our troops had to retreat in some places and even surrender cities. Our losses are probably greater than the Germans - both manpower and machines.

June 24 Acting Chief

Department of the Artillery Academy N. P. Beresnev believed that “Germany is an advanced nation, the German National Socialist Party must win and will win because the German army and

the national socialists carry the advanced culture of the people du”⁵¹. According to the commander of the radio company of the Northern

⁴⁸ There. L. 45.

⁴⁹ There. L. 61.

⁵⁰ There. L. 69.

⁵¹ There. L. 41.

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front Lieutenant Tarasov, "from the first days of fighting with the Germans can see that our units do not have much success and it turns out something like "Hurrah, they are beating ours" 52 .

On June 25-26, the teacher of tactics at the Quartermaster's Academy, Major General Skvortsov, believed that "The breakthrough of tanks to Oshmyany speaks volumes. Weakly obviously we have leadership. We have a colossal number of tanks, but we do not know how to use them. We also have no air superiority over the Germans. I think the situation at the front is very unfavorable for us. The Germans have had some success. They can in the forests of Belorussia, land troops without our noticing and strike from the rear"53. According to cadet Har Kovsky Military Aviation Technical School Kurochkin, "Early the Germans started a war with us. We are currently re-equipping aviation with new materiel. The flight crew is still I have never flown on these planes and I have not been prepared for air combat on these planes"54 .

On June 26, an employee of the Personnel Department of the Red Army, Captain Malofeev, believed that "there will be a big fight, but we are still rather weak in the field of technology. The mechanized corps is not equipped with the material part, and there are still many fools in the Red Army. Besides, the Germans flew along the air route Berlin - Moscow and back. It was their intelligence. The Germans knew that we have an air division in Bialystok, which is in the air can't rise because the airfield was all plowed"55. As the Red Army soldier of the service company of the 2nd VNOS regiment of the 2nd Air Defense Corps Zaitsev believed, "Git-

52 There. L. 58.

53 There. L. 50.

54 There. L. 51.

55 There. L. 21.

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ler free from Jewish dominance. In Germany everyone
Jews were killed, now they will kill us too. Our leaders are now
finished and they can't run anywhere,
capitalist encirclement everywhere. The people are hungry
there is nothing to eat in the countryside until the new harvest,
and the government sent grits and grains to Germany and Finland and
oil"⁵⁶. According to the district engineer of the UVS of the Main
Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army engineer
1st rank Chuvilenkov, "the offensive of Germany is
in full contact with England, with the aim of completely destroying
the USSR and establishing a single capitalist system. The defeat
of the USSR in this war is inevitable, and soon the USSR will be
forced to make

Sverdlovsk as its capital"⁵⁷. brigade quartermaster
Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army
Gemizov believed that "now it is difficult to decide on whose
side will be victorious, it must be taken into account that the
German army is more organized, repeatedly fired upon and
besides, it has more experience in the war than the Red
Army"⁵⁸. According to the Deputy Head of the Department
Head of the Main Military Engineering Directorate Brigintin Danta
Zaitsev, "Hitler entangled ours. We made it possible for Hitler to
fulfill his dreams, first to defeat France and then the Soviet Union.
Where are we, with

our lack of organization to fight the Germans. If we
If we keep the Germans, then only with our gross strength. How
believed a student of the Military Academy of Mechanization and
motorization junior military technician Miroshnichenko,

"Our aviation industry produces little
aircraft, whether it's America. There is one factory per month
gives up to 1500 aircraft, and if America does not help us,

⁵⁶ There. L. 75.

⁵⁷ There. L. 78.

⁵⁸ There. L. 82.

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maybe we won't be able to deal with the Germans. And our planes worse than American. Actually, the technique of the Red

The armies are worse than the German ones, and now the outcome of the battle is decided by technology. .

June 26 at the Main Artillery Directorate

The NPO prepared a plan to send machine guns to fortified areas in Sebezh and LVO from Poltava and other places. On this occasion, Captain Krutikov said: "It turns out that the second defensive line without machine guns - the points are empty, and Hitler approaches the old border. While the machine guns are coming, the URs will be busy. Five days passed, and the General Staff did not think about it. Do you remember the second fortified line when the threat loomed. If the General Staff has the same large apparatus as the GAU, and it works the same way, then we will lose the war. Hitler took by surprise. We were unprepared. In vain they gave Finland bread, Hitler - fuel and bread, and now they are beating us with our fuel. According to an employee of the Mobilization Directorate under Colonel Rodionov, "ours overslept, the enemy

cunning, took into account even all the little things. Started a war on Sunday seigneur with the expectation of taking by surprise, since the command staff was resting that day. Our command knew that the enemy was concentrating troops on our border, but reacted favorably. This carelessness led to the fact that our units began to withdraw. In the country at we had a lot of hype, but little action. Demobilization has begun, and in some military districts there are no uniforms (PribOVO). Airplanes are missing bombs. The question is, what was our command preparing for? As the head of the 3rd department of the Military Topographic Directorate of the General Staff, Major Boda-

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Lin, "and the Germans were ahead of us in the deployment of troops and their success seems to create morale in Germany climb. They have a lot of aviation and, probably, superiority in the air, in relation to us. Especially since they use the entire military industry of the occupied countries"⁶¹ .

On June 28, an employee of the NPO car depot Tarasov believed that that "if our troops defend themselves as they do now, then Hitler will probably defeat us." In the opinion of the worker Semenov, "Hitler is well done - he knows how to fight, knows tactics, and we were left in the cold, ours clap ears and therefore the German troops advance **so** quickly and beat the Red Army. The situation with aviation is especially bad, because our aviation is much worse than German. According to the driver Makarov, "Hitler knows how to fight well, the Germans know their business, are technically literate and will win. Here, look ours with the Finns put a lot of people, and the Germans The Maginot Line was taken without loss. The command of the Red Army is thinking of taking it with a bang, but this time has passed, the Germans are not afraid of a bang, we need equipment, skill, but we don't have that." According to the teacher of the department Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, Colonel I. M. Snezhkov, "Hitler did not sets itself the goal of overthrowing Soviet power, and pursues only the goal of reaching the line of the Dnieper River or to some other frontier and offer us peace on favorable conditions. Hitler in his declaration calls the war with the Soviet Union a war of liberation, a war for the liberation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia"⁶³ .

⁶¹ There. L. 97-98.

⁶² There. L. 32-33.

⁶³ There. L. 41-42.

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On June 29, the head of the 3rd department of the UPS of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, Chuvilenkov, believed that "the war with Germany is called a war of the Fatherland incorrectly. Patriotic war can be called such a war, for the conduct of which the whole people rises, without distinction of classes, estates and status. In the Soviet-German war there is not a few defeatists." According to Kanishchev, a student of the 2nd year of the Military Veterinary Academy, "before the start of the war with Germany, and everywhere they are now declaring that our Red Army is invincible, but in fact, the results of the first battles show that that the Red Army is retreating. Obviously our army inferior in strength to the German one. Likewise, the slogan of waging war on the territory of the enemy is not confirmed, since the battles with the Germans are taking place not on the territory of Germany, but on our territory"⁶⁵ .

June 30 Piskarev, engineer of the Energy Department of the Main Military Construction Directorate of the Red Army believed that "it is easy to engage in agitation for the victory of the Soviet Union, but the bad thing is that the Soviet Union not prepared for war. Germany began to advance with impunity, taking one city after another without encountering resistance. If this continues, The USSR may be defeated and will be forced to agree to any peace conditions. Your strength Germany had already shown throughout the war with France and other countries, and now with the Soviet Union"⁶⁶ .

On July 1, Major General Pavlovich from the 1st Sverdlovsk Infantry School believed that "since we are talking

⁶⁴ There. L. 28.

⁶⁵ There. L. 71.

⁶⁶ There. L. 28-29.

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about the Berezina, which means that the fortifications were passed by the Germans ... now all the way to Leningrad is a plain... not a single obstacle. The question is about the people's militia, which means the personnel army decently suffered. Now we need think not about rebuffing the Germans, but about whether the armies will be able to The southern group to get out of the bag in which they fell in the region of Lvov"⁶⁷. According to the Red Army soldier Gorbunov N.V. from the same school, "figures about losses the enemy is inflated, where can we take into account when our the troops are retreating, and the enemy is advancing .

On July 5, Lieutenant Colonel Belai (16th Army, Western Front) believed that "our command concluded an agreement with Germany and calmed down on this, they began to hold rallies, they did not engage in cohesion of the army. Most attention was paid to the introduction new form, as a result of which we were unprepared for defense. The Germans are pressing us, no doubt, we will have many deserters and our youth little reliable and incapacitated, they will try dodge the war, start to desert, fingers cut and look for a way out. We are accustomed to only shouting in a peaceful situation, but now there is only confusion and there is no order"³ .

On July 8, an employee of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the NPO, Colonel Kovardin, believed that "the Germans are pushing our army. We must do justice: the Germans have a clearly organized army apparatus, not that what we and we need to learn from them in this regard sya"⁶⁹. According to an employee of the Combat Training Directorate, Colonel Vishnyakov, that "our

⁶⁷ There. D. 100. L. 30.

⁷There. D. 99. L. 266.

⁶⁹ There. L. 244.

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fell with the deployment, it was necessary to prepare for this earlier, and now it is not known what will happen ... German the mansian army is well organized, the discipline is much stronger, the troops have extensive experience in combat operations, and the organization of command and control of troops placed high. The presence of these facts makes it possible for the German troops to advance on our territory"⁷⁰ .

On July 11, Major General of Artillery Vnukov Paul gal that "The Red Army is being beaten hard. There are no actual data on losses in the reports. Knowing the organization time of the Finnish campaign, I can imagine that now it is happening and how ours are being beaten. The further advance of the Germans is obvious and, perhaps, Moscow is waiting for a repetition of 1812 .

July 13 Lecturer of the Propaganda Department of the Office political propaganda of the Southwestern Front senior political instructor Telichko (member of the CPSU (b)) believed that "we are retreating because our generals are mediocre commanders, therefore they cannot organize fight back and chart a strike on the enemy. I'm amazed by this. The Germans are more enterprising and cunning." According to the Deputy the head of the department for pontoon troops, Captain Khimochkin, "our retreat is nothing but the work of traitors and, of course, traitors from among the high military ranks. This is confirmed by the fact that our units on the first day of the war

fought with shovels, without weapons .

On July 8, head of the Political Propaganda Department of the 28th Panzer Division of the North-Western Front battalion commissar Tretyakov believed that "our

⁷⁰ There. L. 244-245.

⁷¹ There. L. 251.

⁷² There. D. 100. L. 91-92.

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

gallant generals in peacetime, in wartime turned into wet chickens, became confused and instilled panic in the units. An example is Lieutenant General Safronov, Deputy Commander of the Front.

The enemy was still in Ionishki, and we were retreating from Rigi and when asked why we were retreating, he replied: "Not a Mets near Mitava, we must save the army, withdraw and blow up the bridges, preventing him from further advance." opinion of the commander of the 28th Panzer Division, Colonel Chernyakhovsky, "it seems to me that about the actual Moscow does not know the situation at the front and the quantitative composition of the enemy. During the fighting I did not see well-formed units of the enemy, in no place did they put up strong forces, but separate groups are thrown out, and if they are given a fight, they run and go where there are no troops. Since July 2, our division has been retreating. So you can retreat to Moscow. I'm with I declare with all responsibility that if I were given completed division and left those troops that are in the area of \u200b\u200bOstrov and Pskov, I would drive the enemy out of our borders and further within two days. As the assistant to the chief of the 2nd part of the headquarters of the 28th tank division pointed out Captain Kozlov, "among the Red Army, when you tell them about the retreat, there is mass discontent and literally have to be pulled out of the trenches, people they want to fight, but the orders are to retreat"⁷³ .

...

Thus, military counterintelligence documents indicate the presence of a whole range of reasons failures of the Soviet armed forces in the initial peri-

⁷³ There. L. 138-139.

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od the Great Patriotic War. The most frequently reported problem of the troops in the documents was the disorganization and confusion that existed in army and in peacetime, but became a serious obstacle to organized action with the outbreak of war. This was greatly facilitated by the panic and confusion of a certain part of the personnel, which arose

as a result of both a surprise attack by the enemy, and and unsuccessful military operations of their units in the first days of the war. It can be assumed that at that time most of the personnel of the Active Army experienced a psychological breakdown, associated both with the transition from peaceful life to war, and with a clear divergence of the image of war formed in the minds of

Soviet people on the eve of June 22, 1941, and the realities military operations. Having no experience in fighting an equivalent enemy, the Soviet troops had neither psychological nor practical skills to act in

dynamic, rapidly changing situation, in conditions of a breakthrough by the enemy front, encirclements and retreats.

All this was superimposed on such a stereotype of public consciousness as disbelief in one's own strength. If in In peacetime, this feature of public sentiment manifested itself only in conversations, then during the war it became a breeding ground for the spread of

panic and instability of the troops. Actually troops

The active army, unexpectedly involved in hostilities, experienced an acute shock.

a state in which any of the most fantastic rumors and speculations were practically perceived as reliable facts, influencing the behavior of large masses of people.

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

Another striking fact is the poor professional training of certain

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part of the command staff of the Red Army. It has become yet another cause of confusion, instability and panic among the troops. Unable to organize their subordinates to carry out combat missions, such commanders only pushed the fighters to believe in the deliberate failure of any of their own actions. Certainly, the above excerpts from documents of the military counterintelligence do not give the opportunity to give any quantitative estimates of such negative phenomena, however, they fully allow us to state that in the initial period of the war, the Red Army was clearly not present was a well-oiled military instrument, ready to comply with any order of the High Command. Unorganized entry into battle, lack of reconnaissance, communications and control of formations, units and subdivisions, as well as supply and interaction of troops on the battlefield, all this, in fact, turned the Army in the field to a large extent into an armed crowd, unable to put up a serious rebuff to the enemy. Naturally, in such a situation, sentiments

regarding readiness to surrender. Of course it is does not mean that, for the most part, Soviet military personnel dreamed of surrendering, but in a situation of unsuccessful for the Red Army at the beginning of the war, when the shock of the transition from civilian life to military life and from defeats on the fronts became a breeding ground for such sentiments, the unstable fighter saw the way out of the situation in surrender or desertion. Not by chance, that by July 20, 1, operational barriers and barrage detachments had detained 103,876 people who, for one reason or another, "lost" their units, most of whom were again sent to

front. From 20 to 26 July, another 25,355

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents people, of which 1189 were arrested for espionage, cowardice, desertion and disorganization of the front, and 505 was shot down. By July 31, German troops had captured 814,030 Soviet servicemen⁷⁵.

It is clear that under these conditions, successful actions separate military formations of the Red Army were not linked into a single system and did not have a noticeable effect on the situation at the front. However, thanks to them, the enemy suffered more and more serious losses, which in the future led to the creation of conditions for the disruption of the German "blitzkrieg". Of course, for contemporaries and participants in those distant events, this result was by no means obvious. Unfortunately, the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war did not had a significant impact on the implementation of the plans of the German command. By the end of July 9, the German The troops successfully developed the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan. Army Group North advanced 450-500 km to Central Estonia and reached front Pskov - Ostrov - Opochka - Sebezh. Troops Army Group "Center" went to the front Polotsk - Vitebsk - Orsha - Zhlobin, advancing by 450—600 km. Soviet troops on the Southwestern Front From July 1, they began to withdraw to the line of the old fortified areas, but units of the enemy's 1st Panzer Group managed to overcome these fortifications before they were occupied by Soviet units. By July 9, Army Group South in Western Ukraine advanced 300-350 km. By-

⁷⁴ Yazov D.T. There was a war ahead // Military History Journal.

1991. No. 5. S. 14; Classified removed: Losses of the Armed Forces USSR in wars, combat operations and military conflicts: A statistical study. M., 1993. S. 368; Strategic essay on the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). M., 1961. S. 190-191;

Schustereit H. Vabanque. S. 70, 82-83; Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd.4. S.974; Groehler O. Starke, Verteilung und Verlieste der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg//Militargeschichte. 1978. No. 3. S. 331.

⁷⁵ Schustereit H. Vabanque: Hitlers Angriff auf die Sovj etunion 1941 als Versuch, durch den Sieg im Osten den Westen zu bezwingen. Bonn. 1988. S.73.

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The losses of the parties in the initial period of the war are shown in Table 1.

The initial period of the war in counterintelligence documents

Table 1		
	Side losses	To July 10, 1941 G.
	Red Army	Wehrmacht
Personnel	815 700	79 058
guns and mortars	21500	1061
tanks	11783	350
Aircraft	4013	826

However, despite the losses and defeats the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army was not defeated at all. Contrary to the expectations of the German leadership, and indeed of most outside observers, it turned out that the actions of the Soviet

military forces are gradually accepting all more organized and focused. This gave the most important thing at that moment - the gain in time, which in turn allowed the Soviet military-political leadership to more fully use

military-industrial potential and mobilization possibilities of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Red Army in 1941, he managed to do what none of the opponents of the Third Reich could do before - to keep front and turn the war into a protracted one, to win which Germany V those conditions Not could.

Alexander OSOKIN

JUNE 22, 1941: A NEW VERSION (excerpt from The Great Mystery Great Patriotic.

New hypothesis of the beginning of the war")

June 22, 1941 - one of the most terrible dates in life of our people, which is associated with irreparable losses in every family of our country and which Paradise forever left questions: how could this happen and who is responsible for this? Bye bye
you are not given to them ...

The main known versions of the reasons for the success of the fascist blitzkrieg against the USSR at the first stage of the war.

1. Soviet official version, not revised since the time of Stalin. Treacherously, without declaring war, violating the Soviet-German agreements concluded in 1939 (the Non-Aggression Pact and the Friendship and Border Treaty), with superior forces,

having two years of war experience and more advanced military equipment, having gathered all of Europe under its banner, Germany attacked the USSR.

2. Khrushchev's version. Stalin, having created a cult of his own personality, fearing to lose power, led

June 22, 1941: new version

policy of repression against the party and the people, destroyed a significant part of the upper and middle command staff Red Army, greatly weakening it. This became evident during the mediocre Finnish war and provoked Hitler into perjury violation of the Pact and Treaty and attack on the USSR.

3. The version about the betrayal of the highest generals. This version is the oldest one, which has been in circulation since 1937, on the basis of which monstrous pre-war repressions were carried out against the military. Somehow, despite the revelations of the cult personality and legal and moral rehabilitation of the innocently killed commanders of the Red Army, a number of books have recently appeared and even serial publications that actively support this version. Moreover, they are satisfied but transparent allusions to the highest military commanders of the Red Army during the beginning of the war - up to the people's commissar for defense Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov.

Most likely, the reason for such "discoveries" and a new round of this so familiar to the pre-war Soviet era and rather wild for today, the versions have become published in recent years (after the opening of the archives and the expiration of the prescription of documents) many incredible facts pre-war Soviet-German cooperation, which, without understanding their true cause, may well be mistaken for betrayal.

4. Version of the defector Rezun-Suvorov (about English). Stalin himself was preparing a revolutionary war of the USSR against the capitalist West, which was supposed to begin with an attack on Germany. To do this, he pulled troops to the border, increased the number

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the rank of the Red Army from 3.5 to 5 million people. Hitler, having learned about this, launched a preemptive strike against the deploying Soviet troops. Stalin was I am absolutely sure that without putting an end to England, Hitler will not fight on two fronts.

5. The official version of the Russian government, in force in 1992-2000. (something in between between versions of Khrushchev and Rezun). Its main elements are: Stalin nurtured Hitler, the fascist sword forged in the USSR (meaning post-Rapallo

Soviet-German military and military-technical collaboration 1922-1933).

6. - "Civilian" -. The main reason for the colossal losses of the first days of the war was our Russian carelessness and only putting things in order. after receiving a blow, as is almost always the case in Russia.

It should be noted that all the above explanations of the reasons for the defeat of the Soviet troops in the first days of war (as well as a number of others not listed here) sooner or later fell away or received powerful from the time of historians, writers and publicists. Consider

Rome their opinions and comments to them.

7. Version about - "spontaneous, no one controlled uprising in the Red Army (it was first cited in the book by I. Bunich - "Operation Thunderstorm". Error Stalin"). Its essence is in the presentation of I. Bunich: "... on a thousand-kilometer front, millions of officers and soldiers gave a substantive lesson to the criminal regime, starting with the opening of hostilities going over to the side of the enemy. However, as the facts testify, the mass capture in the first days of the war occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of commanders and Red Army soldiers.

June 22, 1941: new version

Quite close to the version of I. Bunich version

M. Solonin, described in the book "June 22, or When did the Great Patriotic War begin?", explaining the unheard of defeat of the Red Army in the first days of the war by the effect of

hoops." M. Solonin meant that "the most powerful blow inflicted by the Wehrmacht destroyed the old fear is a new fear, and the "revolver" of the Chekist somehow potus knelt and got lost amid the roar of tens of thousands of guns, amid the clang of tracks of tens of thousands of tanks.

8. The version that - "The Soviet government provoked the political and military leadership Germany to combat operations, and therefore did not put the troops on alert, showing an imaginary carelessness ... so that in the eyes of the world community look not like an aggressor, but a country that has been attacked" (set out in the book by R. Irinarkhov "Baltic Special").

A very similar view of this problem is presented by Y. Verkhovsky and V. Tyrmos in their book "Stalin. The secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war": "Only by becoming your Nazi aggression, the USSR could receive the support of England and America, including the main one - "Lend-Lease". To do this, Stalin supposedly had to play out a "scenario" of ignorance in preparation for the attack of the aggressor, with whom he

signed a non-aggression pact...

I would like to express my gratitude to the authors of all the above mentioned books, from which I learned a large number of the most interesting and important facts about the preparation and beginning of the Great Patriotic War, which helped me to come to a new understanding of the causes

disaster on June 22, 1941 and create a new hypothesis the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, avoiding fire

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Romnoy work with archives and primary sources. Although I do not share the conclusions and main ideas of these books, completely disagree with the version of the preparation of the strike Soviet troops against the German ones, and I consider the talk about the betrayal of the Soviet generals simply not decent.

The Surprise of Hitler's Attack

From the moment Hitler came to power, the inevitability military clash with Germany was obvious. Before that, for a decade (1922-1933) the asset of the Soviet-German military and military technology The two countries gave each other a complete picture of the state of their armies, strategy, tactics and military equipment during the cooperation. Therefore, the USSR had real opportunity to take the necessary countermeasures. All the country's resources were devoted to meeting the needs of the Red Army. Already in 1939-1940. the industry of the USSR was transferred to the military

rails, the strength of the Red Army increased. Myself the fact of direct confrontation between huge groups Soviet and German troops in 1939-1941. pointed out the possibility of their collision.

Explanation of the Soviet leadership and historians about the surprise of the German attack: our the units were just deploying, so you weren't ready to strike. Explanation of V. Suvorov-Rezun: Soviet units prepared only for the offensive, and not for defense. In 1941, everyone was waiting for a German strike, warning they gave about it, but for some reason it turned out to be unexpected only for I. V. Stalin.

June 22, 1941: new version

superior forces

And

fascist troops equipment

By now, the ratio of Soviet and German forces on the ground has become quite accurately known.

Soviet-German border June 22, 1941

Quantity	Soviet German Ratio		
Divisions	190		1.15:1
Soldiers	3 289 851	1664 306800	1:13
Tanks and Assault guns	15687	4171	3.8:1
aircraft	10743	4846	2.2:1
Artillery - guns and mortars	59787	42604	1.4:1

From this table (according to M. Meltyukhov) it can be seen that there is no need to talk about the superiority of the Germans. So, for example, heavy tanks (more than 40 tons) from the Germans did not exist at all, and in the Red Army - 564 cars (504 newest KB and 59 T-35); medium tanks (over 20 tons) the Germans had 990, and the Red Army - 1373, including 892 newest T-34s and 481 T-40s.

The resources of the USSR and Germany were incommensurable, therefore the first part of World War II (1939-1941) Hitler spent with the help of resources received from the USSR, while he could spend the second only by receiving them from France and England or by accumulating them for several months of a blitzkrieg at the expense of past supplies of the USSR, and in 1941-1944. using resources occupied territories of the USSR.

German superiority

V combat experience

Here, too, there is a discrepancy: some authors have calculated that the direct hostilities of the German troops in World War II until 22 June 1941 were driven for only 17 days (7 days in Poland and

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10 days in France). In the same two years, the Red Army fought for a much longer time (Khalkhin-Gol - 2 months, Finland -

4 months). Only the pilots of the Luft Waffe had a clear advantage, having received rich experience in fighting in the skies of England.

Objections to the version of the betrayal of the generals

The main reason for the emergence of thoughts of betrayal is unprofessional and inexplicable orders and actions of our military command in the last days before the war, which led to the catastrophe of June 22, 1941:

bans on occupying the forefield and fortified areas, issuing shells and fuel in frontier units, and shooting down German intruder aircraft;

order to concentrate near the border a huge number of military formations located due to lack of ammunition and fuel in a non-combat-ready state;

the creation in the immediate vicinity of the border of a large number of airfields and the concentration on them of the main forces of frontline and bomber aviation, as well as warehouses for the main supplies

ammunition, fuel, ammunition and much more.

It is quite obvious by whose oral instructions all these orders were issued, prohibitions, permits and orders were given. According to his oral instructions or, with his approval, the vague Directives of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 were also prepared.

June 22, 1941: new version

Objections to Khrushchev's version

Some authors believe that the pre-war repressions not only rid the country of the fifth column, but even strengthened the Red Army. Their logic is as follows: many repressed commanders of the Red The armies were participants in the Civil War and pulled back into the past, to the cavalry. Their departure even moved the young modern cadres (the author categorically does not share this opinion).

objections

And

considerations according to Rezun-Suvorov

Suvorov's version has 2 main postulates:

- Hitler is not an aggressor, he only preempted the aggressor - Stalin.
 - England has nothing to do with the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR. And in general, the Second World War was started by two aggressors - Hitler and Stalin, who then quarreled. (On "objectivity"
- Suvorov can be judged at least by the fact that in his fundamental book "Icebreaker" the name "Hess" is not even It is never mentioned that 1.5 months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Hitler's first deputy in the party did not end up in England. Why would it?)

For all its sensationalism (at the time of its appearance), Suvorov's version is nothing more than a pro-English version of the Goebbels-Ribbentrop explanation of the reasons for the German attack on USSR, set out, among other things, in a note that, as it turned out in recent years, after all, was awarded German ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg Moloto-

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in Berlin to the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov Ribben on the path in the early morning of June 22, 1941.

Our domestic disorder

Of course, it also took place then, but in unusually weakened, in comparison with any other period, form. Stalin's tough order, where even for laxity one could become "enemy of the people" Operated independently of each other other several strict controls - party, state, security and internal cases ... So I think that in 1941 there was much less disorder in our country than in any other time.

Objections to the "spontaneous O uprising" version

The main objection is a mental rejection Russian man of betrayal in principle. Whatever, even with the loftiest ideas, it explained - no understanding, no forgiveness of the people traitor or defector in our country never was getting. Historical examples of this are Svyatopolk, Prince Kurbsky, False Dmitry I, Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich, Hetman Mazepa, and others.

people in the future never used. The mass betrayal of the Russians is an incredible suggestion!

Another very strong evidence of the inconsistency of the version of I. Bunich - the author of the incorrect conclusion about the "spontaneous uprising of the Red Army"

June 22, 1941: new version

lies in the fact that even with millions of Soviet
prisoners of war and finding the main traitor - General Vlasov, ready to
lead the anti-Stalinist
Russian liberation army, the Germans did not
created this army, and when they created it, they left it
without weapons, did not trust it and used it mainly in the West, and in the
East - only at the very end
war.

Millions of Soviet soldiers in 1941, traitors, and commanders,
captured in rather they Not were
were betrayed, knew the secret plans of the highest
for not
country leaders, and therefore did not understand
background of what is happening before the war and in its first
days

Regarding the soloninskaya "crumbled barrel",
from which the "hoops of fear" flew off. bright image,
however inaccurate. It refers to June days
1941, when the rolling "hoops" of fear of
the Stalinist regime were replaced by others - "hoops" of captivity and
occupation, where fear was immeasurable
more. In Russia during the war with the invaders
patriotism is manifested, which in peacetime is almost
imperceptible, which does not scatter the people and the country, but
solder together. So, in 1812 Russian serfs
did not respond to Napoleon's promises to give them free rein,
but fought to the death with foreigners in the same ranks with their
masters. It is no coincidence that Stalin repeated in the name of the war
with Germany the word born back in 1812 - "Patriotic".

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Objections to the versions "Provoking
the Germans to attack" "Imaginary carelessness is a victim ^{And}
in the name of
receiving lend-lease assistance"

The first objection is the blatant disproportion
casualties suffered and assistance expected.

The second is the inevitability of applying in this case
Red Army of a new heavy defeat, which
after the unsuccessful Finnish campaign, finally
would undermine its morale and authority, with which
The chief couldn't agree.

These versions seem very far-fetched and have only one goal - to
somehow explain Stalin's completely inexplicable intolerant attitude
towards
warnings brought to his attention and facts testifying to Hitler's
preparations for an attack on the USSR. They look a lot like a folk tale:
"I'll gouge out my eye - let my mother-in-law, the reptile, have a crooked
son-in-law!"

All of the above versions are aimed at
to somehow explain the unexplained so far
the hitherto unheard-of defeat of the most powerful army in the world on
June 22, 1941. In one of his last articles
V. Suvorov-Rezun wrote: "The correctness of any theory is measured
by its explanatory power... My opponents do not need to either expose
me or convict me. Then
you need to find another - simple, understandable, logical
explanation of what happened in 1941. As long as they
they won't come up with another theory, the Icebreaker will continue its
victorious voyage.

did not, although one important thing she really

June 22, 1941: new version

did - broke the unshakable ice of the official version of the beginning of the war, which, to put it mildly, is not very matched the truth. However, explanations for everything what happened in the first days of World War II the "icebreaking" version did not give - after all, if Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany, the Soviet troops should have been pulled up to the border and had full a set of ammunition and fuel, they were also pulled from it for 30-100 kilometers and did not have any ammunition, no fuel. She still does not explain a few important things - why she suddenly turned out to be postponed Operation Sea Lion, why did Hitler released 400 thousand enemy soldiers from Dunkirk to England, why the materials about Hess's stay in England classified for 25 years over the established the law of the term (in some publications, even more terrible figure is indicated - for 50 years!), why Suvorov-Rezun in his numerous books neither he didn't even mention the name "Hess" once, why the first bombing of Soviet territory on June 22 began one and a half to two hours before the deadline appointed by the Fuhrer, why in the last days before the start of the war in the border strip of the USSR, the width of the railway was changed gauge from Russian to European? Why June 22 1941 Hitler, against his will, immediately violated two commandments of their great predecessors - started a war against Russia and waged a war on two front?

The author will try to answer all these questions. this article.

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New version of the
beginning of the Great Patriotic War (hypothesis)

On May 5, 1941, Stalin delivered a speech to graduates of military academies at a reception in the Kremlin.

In it, without naming the enemy, he unexpectedly announced that the USSR would wage not a defensive, but an offensive war, for which the country was ready. **the 6th of May**

In 1941, it was announced that Stalin had been appointed chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. officially accepted for the first time all the power to himself. Not a single event inside the country and outside it, for the sake of which he could go to

such a serious step, was not. It remains to be assumed that it was intended. Such an event could be a war. With

whom? With Nazi Germany? But at that time, Stalin was afraid of even minor provocations that could cause discontent in Germany, and then suddenly something like this. So, **for**

some reason, he was not afraid that Hitler will misunderstand the fact of his appointment by the Soviet prime minister. Most likely because *it meant another war, the one that Stalin could promise Hitler to fight together, and this war could only be against England.*

England had done much before to direct spearhead of aggression of fascist Germany to the East, about as evidenced, for example, by the Munich Agreements signed without the USSR, the policy of non-intervention in Spain, the "strange war" of 1939-40, which led to the defeat of France, the withdrawal of British troops from the mainland and the occupation of most of Europe by German troops.

A few facts to support this conjecture:
our latest MiG-3 fighters had a "ceiling"
7 kilometers, but not a few flew at such an altitude

June 22, 1941: new version

German, and English bombers; on Stalin's orders, a large number of Soviet transport ships (first of all, until recently belonged to the three Baltic republics)

was handed over to Germany to participate in the landing in England (Operation **Sea Lion**).

On May 10, 1941, a sensational event took place, tangled cards on the political table of Europe: **First Deputy Fuhrer for the Party Rudolf Hess ended up in England!** He was reported to have flown to her in a Me-110 single-seat fighter and jumped off parachuting over Scotland. Berlin claimed that this is the act of a lunatic. Moscow seriously feared that Hess was carrying out a special assignment from Hitler, flew to England with a draft treaty on joint military operations against the USSR and, possibly, spoke about the consent of the USSR to carry out, together with Germany, a landing in England. It is possible that Churchill, in response to this, deceived the Germans, signed this treaty and sent it to Hitler. And when Hitler hit the USSR, in fact, opening a disastrous second front, Churchill no action against The USSR did not undertake, but, on the contrary, immediately offered Stalin an alliance and all possible assistance.

It is known that until his last days, Hitler in to a circle of comrades-in-arms he admired Stalin, under whose leadership Germany was defeated, and cursed Churchill, whose armies made an incomparably smaller contribution this time. **Perhaps precisely because Churchill outplayed him in 1941 and pushed Germany against the Soviet Union, which was the beginning of its collapse?**

The mystery of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War bro casts a shadow on many, it is possible that it is

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mu in the late 80s, when the leadership of the USSR for the first time began to lean towards an agreement on release from life sentence for a 93-year-old man named Rudolf Hess, he was killed - strangled in prison Spandau - with imitation of suicide.

Being recreated today on the basis of various published materials, for I confirm directly
There are no documents supporting it yet, **in the author's opinion, the history of the beginning of the Second World War is as follows.**

After the lightning defeat by Germany in May June 1940 of France, Stalin realized that he needed immediately enter World War II what later will have to deal with an enemy not exhausted by a long war, but strengthened from victories and capture of raw material bases. Therefore, within a month, he occupied the Baltic states, recognized under the treaties with Germany in 1939 as the sphere of interests of the USSR, taking a surplus - Bessarabia. He was not yet ready to fight against Hitler; moreover, Hitler, having captured France in June 1940 after the surrender of France, documents on the intention of England and France during the Soviet-Finnish "winter" war to join it on the side of Finland, probably presented them Stalin. Maybe that influenced the decision.
Stalin to participate together with Germany in its main strategic operation - landing in England. In my opinion, Stalin with this landing operation played win-win for himself strategic option: his fleet, parachute de sant and mechanized corps participating in the landing, with the help of Germany carried far west to the North Sea. At the same time, Stalin got a chance or really landed landing in England, or to negotiate with the British-

June 22, 1941: new version

mi and hit Germany from the West and form there instead of the Anglo-French front with its "strange war" a very hot Soviet-German front, those. take Hitler in pincers. He would explain his consent to a landing in England with the help of the Germans as cunning maneuver (something like the Odyssey Trojan horse) that would allow him to get, in the end, the moral and material support of the West and America and defeat Hitler, energy attacking him from two sides.

But Stalin greatly miscalculated in assessing the ability of Western countries to resist Germany for a long time. on the European continent, as he expected that the forces opposing sides are approximately equal, due to why the war will turn into a long and positional one, how this happened during World War I. Hitler, on the other hand, defeated France in a matter of days and was preparing for a landing in England ...

Why did Hitler let the British Expeditionary Force go?

At the end of May 1940, Hitler suddenly made the mysterious decision to stop his successfully advancing tank formations a few kilometers away. from the port of Dunkirk., where the English were surrounded expeditionary force in Europe and the remnants of the French army. A few days of this stop made it possible for a variety of English ships - from ocean liners to private yachts and longboats - to transport almost all of their soldiers across the English Channel, to as a result, in England, where the troops were nothing at all (its main troops were scattered over the colonies), there were an additional 340 thousand shelled

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soldiers and officers (German aviation and fleet of this for some reason, they did not particularly interfere with the evacuation).

Hitler explained to his generals that the tank units were stopped by the alleged desire to save tanks for wars in Russia. For the British, it was a hint about Hitler's special attitude towards his Anglo-Saxon kindred. In the opinion of the author, the reason for this was quite another: **Hitler already knew then that the landing not Germany, but her ally (or not Germany alone, but together with her ally), and he really wanted the ally to**

suffered the most losses. Such an ally in that the moment could only be the USSR, which has powerful airborne formations and released to the original positions for the landing operation, occupying the Baltic states with its ports from where sea vessels could depart and transports with equipment and infantry.

This understanding of the Dunkirk riddle explains and constantly mentioned by Stalin before the war "two years", which he did not have enough for complete readiness for this unique landing operation, which, if it took place, would be significantly would have surpassed the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944 (by the way, it was being prepared for exactly three years).

It is impossible not to notice that the hostilities of fascist Germany in Europe at that time directly contributed to the exit of the USSR to England: the capture Denmark gave full control over the straits, through that you can get out of the Baltic, and the occupation Norway opened the shortest route to England for the Soviet Northern Fleet. Yes, and the Soviet-Finnish war was fought primarily because of the Baltic ports. So much is indirectly confirmed

gives the author's version.

June 22, 1941: new version

Summer 1940

Throughout the summer of 1940, Hitler and Stalin were preparing a landing operation. Autumn is coming, time is running out, Hitler is nervous - the landing can be postponed for a whole year, and during this time a lot can change, Churchill, on the other hand, is pursuing an extremely active and cunningly clever policy, primarily drawing against Hitler the USSR and America. Hitler excellent understands that a war with England is also a war in its colonies, from where manpower and resources will be supplied to the mother country. To conduct it, he completes the creation of the Tripartite Alliance on the basis of the former Anti-Comintern Pact (the former was, obviously, directed against the USSR, to the delight of the West, the new one could turn in any direction and gave possibility of the USSR to enter it). Create an axis "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo" has significantly changed the situation in the world, now the war is really turning into a world war. Agreements between Germany and the USSR August-September 1939 were mostly implemented, it is clear to Hitler that in this new situation The USSR will again begin to look for its place and may swing towards England. So September 27th 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan sign the Pact of the Three, and on October 15 Ribbentrop asks the Soviet leader for a meeting on behalf of Hitler. Stalin, who had time to understand that in front of world public opinion, Hitler personally needed to distance themselves, sends a Soviet government delegation to Berlin in November 1940 led by Molotov. It included several people's commissars and first deputy leaders and the response of workers from the main people's commissariats.

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Molotov delegation

✓ Berlin

Already by the size of the delegation (65 people) it is clear that the program of the meeting included the creation of some kind of serious joint document. If we take into account that one of those who met her at Field Marshal Keitel, the highest (after the Fuhrer) commander of Germany, was at the station in Berlin, the military aspect of these negotiations is obvious.

There are several sources of information about the stay of the Soviet delegation in November 1940 in Berlin - stories of Molotov himself to F. Chuev, memoirs translator V. Molotov and I. Stalin V. Berezhkov, the story of the manager of the Council of People's Commissars Chadaev G. Kumanev about Molotov's report on this trip to Council of People's Commissars, memoirs of Ribbentrop, Hitler's translator P. Schmidt and others. The most interesting source is Molotov's handwritten notes of instructions given to him by Stalin for this trip, recently introduced into scientific circulation by L. Bezymensky in the book "Hitler and Stalin before the fight."

Summarizing the information from all these sources, we get the following picture of these negotiations. During the first major meeting between Molotov and Hitler, the latter talked a lot about the collapse of the British empire, about the need to divide its inheritance and offered the USSR part of Iran and India. He also invited the USSR to join the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo pact. Molotov allegedly indignantly refused. After that, the next day, Molotov again had negotiations with Hitler, and the next morning the Soviet delegation left. What did the other 63 members of the Soviet delegation do during 48 hours?

vaguely unclear.

June 22, 1941: new version

On the content of the negotiations give some presentation of the already mentioned instructions of Stal to Molotov on the purposes of the trip to Berlin dated November 9 1940. Their title: "Some directives for the Berlin trip." It contains the following main tasks assigned by Stalin to Molotov.

1. Find out how Hitler proposes to divide the world according to the pact being concluded (in these notes it is called the "Pact of Three").

2. Designate the sphere of interests of the USSR (Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Iran). The USSR cannot be aloof from making decisions on Greece, Yugoslavia, the neutrality of Sweden. Needed up to be an honorable peace for China (with Chiang Kai-shek).

3. Do **not sign anything**, meaning the organization of the continuation of negotiations in Moscow, where Ribbentrop must come.

According to the author, the November dog is buried here. negotiations in Berlin: Hitler most of all wanted

record on paper the accession of the USSR to the axis, which would break the inflexibility of England, led by Churchill. Stalin seemed to be ready participate in the division of the world with Hitler, but did not want to advertise it. Most likely, this is where you should look. result of the Berlin talks: **the parties agreed, but did not publish the agreement**. Perhaps they even played a reticence, for example,

Hitler did not show up for a reception at the Soviet Embassy. And they could agree, most likely, only on one thing - **on the participation of the USSR in the landing operation in England**. For Hitler had a very limited choice: either to the West or to the East. He couldn't for long to keep idle under arms their mobilized divisions, but was not going to fight on two fronts.

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Molotov took to Moscow the German version of the "Pact four, "but **Stalin neither in Berlin nor in Moscow to • I did not officially join the "Pact of Three" - I did not want to be with the aggressors and warmongers in the same company. But he still formed an alliance with them, concluding a separate agreement with each** - with Japan

Non-aggression pact signed on April 13, 1941

Matsuoka in Moscow, with Germany, there already existed a Treaty of Friendship of September 28, 1939, and perhaps there was signed and new. With Italy on June 26, 1940 was an agreement was signed extending the validity of the Soviet-Italian Pact of Friendship, Non-Aggression and Neutrality of September 2, 1933. Therefore, Stalin and Molotov could believe that they **had deceived everyone.**

On November 25, 1940, Molotov invited the German Ambassador Schulenburg and announced the readiness of the USSR to sign the "Pact of the Four" on the political and economic cooperation with amendments; in particular, it was proposed to make five secret protocols. The text was transmitted, but there was no response from Hitler. In general, after that until June 22, 1941 between the USSR and Germany there were no negotiations formalized by documents, except for the one signed in Moscow **on January 10, 1941** of a secret protocol on Germany's renunciation of an unspecified region of Lithuania and monetary compensation paid to her for this by the USSR in the amount of 7.5 million gold dollars. Only in 2006 did a publication appear stating that **this was the Suwalki region.** The author believes that Stalin paid such a huge amount (equal to the price for which Russia once sold Alaska to the United States) for the opportunity use **the Augustow Canal** to transport their barges to the North Sea through the rivers and canals of Poland and Germany in the preparation of the landing in England.

June 22, 1941: new version

Next to "Frenemies"

The Soviet Union begins to actively prepare for entry into the war - an increase in the number Red Army, industry is transferred from a six-day to a seven-day week, the working day is increased by an hour, a law is introduced on criminal liability for being late and absenteeism, etc. In serial samples of outstanding military equipment are launched: the latest aircraft, tanks, Katyushas and etc. Troops are drawn to the western borders. Some authors explain all this by preparation for application preemptive strike against German troops. But what then explain the maximum concessions and cooperation of the USSR with the Germans in everything during the same period?

And the admission of German **military** commissions to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia annexed to the USSR allegedly for registration of locals traveling to Germany Germans and the search for burials of the period of the First World War, etc.? And what about the continuous violation of the air borders of the USSR by German planes without any consequences for them? (Our planes, it turns out, also flew over German territory then, and in the ports of Germany there were Soviet military representatives.) Some publications indicate that deliveries made from Germany to USSR in 1939-1941, were not only informational, but also **innovative**, to a large extent ensuring the change of generations of technology and technologies in a number of branches of the Soviet industry. That is, **the Third Reich made a significant contribution to development and improvement of the defensive power of its main enemy in World War II.** Why?

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And what about the demonstration by the Germans to the Soviet delegations of absolutely everything, including the latest secret aircraft? (By the way, the German delegation of aviation specialists, which arrived in Moscow shortly afterwards, almost everything was shown.) And the transfer by Germany of the newest cruiser Lützow, even if it was unfinished?! And the creation in the North on the Soviet territory of the Nord base, which German submarines used until 1941?! And the wiring through the Northern Sea Route on the personal instructions of Stalin Papanin, head of the Main Northern Sea Route, with the help of three Soviet icebreakers disguised as a civilian ship of the German raider "Komet" in Tikhiv ocean in 1940?! And the use of the signals of the Minsk radio station during the German bombing of Polish cities to guide their bombers to 1939?! This is no longer neutrality, this is cooperation and coordinating the actions of the allied states. And the uninterrupted, scrupulously carried out by the USSR deliveries of raw materials and food to Germany (the last trains proceeded to Germany on the night of June 22 1941)?! And what about the dismantling of the weapons of the fortifications on the old border of the USSR just before the war?!

On the border of the clouds go gloomy ...

Now let's move on to the most important thing - and not no one explained the fact of concentration during two years on the Soviet-German border of two colossal armies. Well, let's say that the beginning of this concentration was more or less plausibly explained by the official social point of view in Soviet times: the Germans captured Poland, the USSR could not remain indifferent to the fate of the Ukrainian and Belarusian brothers, and in view of

June 22, 1941: new version

the collapse of the Polish state annexed native
Russian lands - Western Ukraine and Western
Belarus (restoring the borders of tsarist Russia).

The German official point of view of those years:
the Germans prevented the attack of Poland on Germany,
"liberated the original German lands" - Pomerania, the Danzig
corridor, defeated the poten
social aggressor and annexed part of its territory. But after
that, it was necessary to shoot
divisions from the border and transfer them to where they are
needed: Hitler to the Western Front, Stalin to
East, demobilize the superfluous. However, nothing of the
kind happens. Troops in place.

Hitler's explanation: "strange war" in the West
does not yet require new military units; at Stalin's
who started the war with Finland: this is supposedly a
strategic reserve for her (at the beginning of the summer of
1940 it turns out that not only for her - the Soviet troops
are introduced into the Baltic and constitute a new military
district - the Baltic).

For some unknown reason, the number of troops
concentrated near the border on both sides continues to
increase. Explanation of each side for
pada: they confront the most feared aggressor
in Europe and act as a guarantor of peace. Explanation
Hitler for Stalin: this is a maneuver, he concentrated
here he calmly trains German troops out of the reach of
British aviation; for the British: they are preparing to attack
the East. Stalin's explanation for
British: he is concentrating troops on the western border of
the USSR in view of the German threat; Hitler's explanations
for Stalin and Stalin for Hitler: **they are linking up their
troops, preparing for a joint landing in England.**

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The most interesting thing is that for various situations, all these options were developed and prepared at the same time, a significant part of them for the purpose of disinformation. For some reason, **Stalin ruled out the possibility of only one single scenario for the development of events - sudden German attack on the USSR.** explain it Stalin's unshakable faith in the Soviet-German the non-aggression pact is just ridiculous since Stalin knew perfectly well that Hitler would violate anything and everything without a twinge of conscience. Many attribute this to the impossibility the simultaneous waging of a war by Germany on 2 fronts due to the negative experience of the First World War, and also because of the need for it to receive raw materials from outside - either from Russia or from the British Empire, because Germany clearly did not have enough of its own.

Why did Stalin exclude the possibility of this option? For one reason: he knew that this option cannot be implemented until Hitler needs the USSR as an ally to defeat England. That is, first the war with England, and only then from the USSR...

On May 15, 1941, the German Junkers-52, flying unhindered from the western border of the USSR to Moscow, landed at the Tushino airfield. What meant this flight was never explained. However in recent years, the text **of Hitler's letter** has been published **Stalin on May 14, 1941**. It begins like this: "Dear Mr. Stalin, I am writing this letter to you on that the moment when I finally came to the conclusion that it is impossible to achieve a lasting peace in Europe, neither for **us**, nor for future generations without **a final crushing England** and destroying her as a state. And it ends like this: "About **June 15-20** **I plan to start** a massive deployment of troops

June 22, 1941: new version

to the west from your border ... **I ask you not to succumb to any provocations** ... If provocations ... do not manage to avoid, I ask you, show restraint, **do not take retaliatory actions and immediately report what happened to me** via a communication channel known to you (*here is the answer to the question: "What did Stalin do June 22, 1941?" Yes, he acted on the instructions of his "sincere" colleague Adolf, not listening to anyone else! — Approx. auth.*). Only in this way can we **achieve our common goals**, which, it seems to me, **we have clearly agreed upon**. **I** thank you for the fact that you went halfway with me in a matter known to you (*most likely, this means consent to participate in Operation Sea Lion. — Approx. auth.*) and please excuse me for the **method that I chose to deliver this letter to you as soon as possible**. I continue to hope for **our meeting in July**. Sincerely yours

ADOLF HITLER. MAY 14, 1941.

Judging by the date, the main purpose of the letter is to explain the appearance of Hess in England, in a letter about this only a few words: "... Mr. Hess, I believe - in addicted to insanity due to overwork, flew into London, in order, as far as I know, to induce the British to common sense ... "By the way, it is quite possible that Hess did not fly anywhere, but he was stolen by the English intelligence in order to quarrel between Stalin and Hitler and disrupt a joint landing. Then, having learned from their agents in Germany about this letter, Churchill could start through Hess in absentia negotiations with Hitler (persuading him of that Stalin did not believe his letter and was preparing a strike on the German armies), to agree on a "cross campaign against Bolshevism" and a joint attack June 22 in the USSR. And on the appointed day did not fulfill their obligations, leaving Hitler in a position

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when he has to fight a war on two fronts. But Churchill miscalculated in another way - he was convinced that clash of two giants - the USSR and Germany - will be brutal and lengthy. It never crossed his mind the possibility of a catastrophe for the Soviet armies in the first days of the war. For **he did not know the true degree of allied relations between Stalin and Hitler, which had developed over the last 2 years of their "friendship".**

Start

Sudden German attack on the USSR on June 22 1941 - **a preventive strike by Germany not on an enemy who was preparing to attack, but on an ally, together with whom, coordinating their actions, they were preparing to strike at a third country** - England. And according to ally, practically **unarmed** - having no ammunition and fuel in parts, disarming (probably also in accordance with the agreement) fortified areas on old border.

June 22, 1941: new version

In addition, psychologically, the Soviet troops were absolutely not ready for a deadly battle with yesterday's allies. So the first order was: "do not open fire" (or maybe that's why it was given this order that ammunition in the border units was not in accordance with the previously given order, and it is necessary it was time to pick them up). In the first hours we are fierce resistance to the perfidious aggressor provided only by border heroes who had ammunition nicknames who fought to the last bullet, and even then not a large number of military units, commanders others, risking their lives, violating the order of the highest chicanery, brought their parts into a state combat readiness and had ammunition in them. That's why

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thanks to the brave Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov
The Navy did not lose a single ship on the first day of the war,
the tank division of I.D.

having received an order to return, broke through back, and
the immortal garrison of the Brest Fortress heroically
defended for over a month! Of course there were others
commanders who violated the instructions of the top leadership,
whose formations and units gave worthy
repulse the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. The Red
Army soldiers and commanders everywhere showed mass
heroism, however, having no ammunition, fortifications, air and
artillery cover, our troops were forced to retreat from the border.

This alone explains the unimaginable losses of the USSR
at the beginning of the war: equipment, territory, and, most
importantly, army personnel. It's hard for myself even
imagine - with the size of the Red Army 5 million
people in 1941 alone, 3.8 million Soviet
fighters and commanders! And if we add the dead and
wounded here?! There is evidence that by October 1941.
of the personnel of the Red Army, only
8% and it existed only due to the daily replenishment of newly
called up recruits and a reserve
nicknames.

And destroyed by fascist aircraft in the first
day of the war, 1200 Soviet aircraft (of which 800 aircraft were
on the ground) gave the Nazis at least
one and a half years of undivided dominance in the sky.

Only our people could withstand such a blow.
Our fathers and grandfathers managed to get out of this terrible
war winners, without even suspecting any
intrigues in the highest spheres, and at the cost of their blood and their
lives, having defended the independence of our Motherland.

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The correctness of the new hypothesis is confirmed by the "Generalissimo"

In 2002, the publishing house "Veche" Moscow, published a book by a participant in the war, Hero of the Soviet Union, former First Secretary of the Board of the Union of Soviet writers V. Karpov "Generalissimo", in which he cited a number of documents by I.V. Stalin, never before not published. In particular, it reports that **on February 20-27, 1942, in the occupied by the Germans in Mtsensk, on Stalin's instructions, a meeting of emodads was held; representatives of the Soviet and German hung on the issue of the immediate conclusion of a truce with the Germans (similar to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 1918).** I.V. Stalin personally drafted theses for the head of the Soviet delegation, the first deputy commissar of internal affairs of the USSR, Merkulov, which V. Karpov cited in full with a facsimile signature

leader.

Paragraph No. 3 of these theses is as follows: **"AFTER THE ARMY'S REDISTRIBUTION ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR TO THE END OF 1943 YEAR READY WILL START JOINT MILITARY ACTIONS WITH THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES AGAINST ANG**

LILAND USA. V. Karpov calls it "tactical move in order to gain time "...

The author of this publication does not agree with him and considers this is the first powerful documentary confirmation of the correctness of his new hypotheses of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Igor Pykhalov

1941: the myth of the fled Red Army

In the 1920-1930s. in the West it was fashionable to consider
The Soviet Union is a "colossus with feet of clay". Sta

Should the Russians really resist in the event of external
aggression? More recently, Russia has gone through yet
another troubled time. Rebellious mob Osme
poured out to encroach on the most sacred - power and
privileges of the nobility. left without
with proper leadership, the country is doomed to destruction
and decay. Here is what the future ruler wrote while sitting
in a prison cell after the suppression of the "beer coup"
"Third Reich" Adolf Hitler:

*"Fate itself points to us with a finger. Having extradited Russia
into the hands of Bolshevism, fate deprived the Russian people of that
intelligentsia, on which until now its
state existence and which alone served as a guarantee
of a certain stability of the state.
It was not the state gifts of the Slavs that gave strength
and a fortress to the Russian state. All this Russia
was indebted to the Germanic elements—a most excellent
example of the enormous state role which the Germanic
elements are able to play, acting within a lower race.
That's how they were*

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many powerful states have been created on earth. More than once in history we have seen how peoples of lower culture, at the head of which the Germans stood as organizers, turned into powerful states and then stood firmly on their feet,

as long as the racial core of the Germans was preserved. During For centuries, Russia lived at the expense of precisely the German nucleus in its upper strata of the population. Now this nucleus has been completely and completely exterminated. The place of the Germans was taken by the Jews. But just as the Russians cannot throw off the yoke of the Jews by their own efforts, so the Jews alone cannot able to keep this vast state under its control for a long time. The Jews themselves are by no means an element of organization, but rather a dezorg enzyme - downgrading. This gigantic eastern state is inevitably doomed to destruction. Everyone is ripe for this background. End of Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. Fate destined us to witness such a catastrophe, which, better than anything else, will definitely confirm the correctness of our racial theory.

Many Russian emigrants shared similar opinions. Losing the Civil War former masters of life have found refuge in the West, looking in impotent rage at how Russia manages without them. Now, now, a little more, and those who imagined the boors themselves will understand what they have done. Realize repent, crawl on their knees, begging the former gentlemen have mercy and return. Worth coming liberators in foreign uniforms, whether English, French or German, like peasants exhausted by the Stalinist regime, will immediately rush slaughter the hated Bolsheviks.

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*"But no matter how one evaluates the chances of a "peaceful evolution",
peaceful growth of socialism into the kulak (it can be argued that from afar it is more visible), one fact remains for me absolutely beyond any doubt. About it
Trenin glimpsed in Latest News: the country is waiting for a war for an uprising.
defense of the "socialist fatherland" by
the masses of the people are out of the question. On the contrary, with whom
no matter how the war is waged and no matter what the consequences of a military defeat, all the bayonets and all the pitchforks that
can only be stuck in the back of the red army,
will be bound for sure. Every man knows
it is exactly the same as every communist knows it! Every muzhik knows that at the very first heights of war, he will first
of all cut with his
nearest chairman of the village council, chairman
collective farm, etc., and these latter know quite clearly that in
the very first days of the war they will be slaughtered,
like sheep*

One can understand I. L. Solonevich, who wrote these lines in 1935. Recently escaped from the USSR, taking advantage of the arrogance of the camp authorities. Equals as well as the "kraskoma", to which Ivan Luk Yanovich refers. P. N. Trenin - Soviet pilot who fled from the USSR in the early 1930s, during the Great Patriotic War, he found an inglorious death in the ranks of the Vlasov army⁷⁶. Traitors always hate those who they betrayed.

The ruling circles of the Western democracies also assessed the USSR's chances of holding out in a future war as very low. In addition to the moral and political state of Soviet society, they also put forward the technical

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some considerations. And already far behind in industrial development from the leading countries of the West, as a result of the revolution and the Civil War, our country lost another ten years. The forced industrialization of the 1930s made it possible to make a powerful

leap forward, but Western "well-wishers"

accustomed to treat Soviet achievements with skepticism

Czech.

So, in the instructions dated August 2, 1939 for the British delegation at the negotiations of the military missions of the USSR, Great Britain and France were told zano the following.

with Another difficulty is the state of Russia's internal communications. Railways currently operating at maximum load and cannot bear any additional burden. If during the first weeks of the war they could fulfill their role in mobilizing the army, then industry and other important branches would be more or less paralyzed. After two or three weeks, military mobilization should have been stopped, or at least suspended in order to avoid complete paralysis of industry and the whole life of the country .

Indeed, in the Russo-Japanese War, iron the roads could not ensure the timely transfer of troops and military cargo to the Far East. In the years The First World War, again, it is transport turned out to be the most vulnerable point of the Russian military economy. Why should it be different now?

⁷⁷ Instruction for the British Delegation at the Military Negotiations missions of the USSR, Great Britain and France dated August 2, 1939 // Documents and materials on the eve of World War II. 1937-1939. Vol. 2. January-August 1939. Moscow, 1981. S. 172.

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However, the cautious Britons immediately make a big fuss:

"On the other hand, although all the rules of logic lead us to believe that the Russian transport system must collapse under the pressure of needs war, we should not forget that all Russian vehicles and industry are actually still

have functioned for a long time despite the fact that they have long been would have to suffer a complete collapse, if we proceed

from generally accepted principles. Therefore, it should be remembered that one cannot judge the potential forces of Russia based on Western ideas.

However, the unexpected happened. Slave Bolsheviks and Stalin personally, the Soviet people did not only survived, but also won. Moreover, the USSR introduced decisive contribution to the defeat of Germany. Contrary to the Hollywood movie concoction, it was on the Eastern Front that the lion's share of German troops was destroyed, it was the Red Army that took Berlin in May 1945.

This fact does not at all fit into the concept of the accusers of the "crimes of Stalinism". However, they found a way out. If one cannot deny the Victory itself, one can present it as the result of a wrong German policy. Say, in

Germany's defeat is Hitler's fault. Exhausted by "communist slavery" the peoples of the USSR were ready to meet the Germans as their liberators. Alas, obsessed with Russophobic ideas, the "possessed Fuhrer" did not live up to expectations. Seeing that instead of freedom, the aliens brought terror and genocide, the citizens of our country were involuntarily forced to take up arms and fight back the invaders.

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"I if the aliens were not so hopeless stupid and arrogant, would not save for Great Germany convenient state-owned collective farm administration, if they hadn't thought of such a vile way as to turn Russia into a colony, then the national idea would not have returned there, where it was always strangled, and we would hardly have to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Russian communism, laments the author of The Gulag Archipelago.

And here is what V. E. Sproge, who voluntarily remained in Kharkov occupied by the Germans, writes:

"Open up! Open! The city is busy

the Germans!

These were the Shchetkins. We ran out hugging and kissing them, excited with joy.

Thus ended the Soviet period of our life.

Only those who have experienced the oppression and horror of the communist yoke can understand what liberation meant.

from him.

But, alas, we were wrong. This was not the end of our misadventures. The liberation from the Bolsheviks was followed by bitter disappointment in the "liberators" themselves. New "brown" atrocities replaced the old ones "Reds". Even the horror of starvation that threatened us in

besieged Kharkov pales before the fact that created "brown" management.

This was followed by the loss of relatives and dear ones, of all property, painful separations, adventurous flight, bombs and fires in Berlin .

⁷⁸ Krieger-Voinovsky E. B. Notes of an engineer. Memories, impressions, thoughts about the revolution. Sproge V. E. Notes of an engineer. M., 1999. S. 514-515.

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The "proof" of such a thesis is the "unwillingness to fight for Stalin", which allegedly took place in the first months after the Nazi attack. Sweetly savoring the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, today's accusers try to present them as an unheard-of catastrophe.

"The resistance of individual outposts, units and garrisons could not hide from the command completely incredible behavior of the army. Such a history of wars dont know.

One and a half million people went over to the Germans with weapons in their hands. Some whole compounds, under sounds of divisional orchestras.

Two million people surrendered, throwing down their weapons. (The word "weapon" means not only a rifle or a pistol, but everything up to a tank and an airplane inclusive.)

500 thousand people were captured at times personal circumstances.

1 million people openly deserted (from 657,354 of them were caught, 10,200 were shot, the rest disappeared without a trace).

800 thousand people were killed and wounded.

Approximately a million people scattered through the forests .

Of course, the reason for all these defeats lies solely in the unwillingness of the army to fight for the cannibalistic Stalinist regime.

"When the Soviet-German war began - 10 years after the murderous collectivization, through 8 years after the great Ukrainian plague (six million dead and not even noticed by neighboring Europe),

⁷⁹ Bunich I. L. The Five Hundred Years' War in Russia. Book three. SPb., 1997. S. 564-565.

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4 years after the demonic revelry of the NKVD, a year later after the shackled laws on production, and all this - with 15 million camps in the country, and with the entire elderly population still having a clear memory of pre-revolutionary life, the natural movement of the people was

breathe and release, natural feeling - disgust for his power. And not "taken by surprise" and not "the numerical superiority of aviation and tanks" (by the way, all the numerical superiority had Red Army) so easily closed catastrophic boilers - 300 thousand each (Bialystok, Smolensk) and 650 thousand armed men each (Bryansk, Kyiv), collapsed whole fronts and drove into such a swift and deep rollback of the armies, which Russia has not known for all 1000 years, and probably not a single country, not in a single war, - but momentary paralysis of an insignificant power, from which the subjects recoiled as from a hanging corpse .

"Being in full confidence that the ongoing since 1917, educational measures with the Russian people, the main of which was the constant mass extermination of this people, finally turned it into a brainwashed, dumb mass, suitable only for grinding into a camp, and now and trench dust, Comrade Stalin was shocked by surprise that his beloved army gave him.

The perverted psychology cultivated in the communist anti-world forced the leader himself to believe that the Red Army soldiers and commanders (among whom it is practically impossible to find a person who would not have shot, tortured, dispossessed, exiled, arrested or one of the relatives, friends or relatives disappeared without a trace friends) so lost all normal people

⁸⁰ Solzhenitsyn A.I. The Gulag Archipelago. 1918-1956. T. 3. M 1989. pp. 30-31.

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cal feelings and emotions, so mutated on terrible path from an ordinary person to a Soviet person, who no longer have any other desires, except to go on a campaign to win world domination for the criminal regime.

To the great honor of the Russian people it must be said that That did not happen. The events of the summer of 1941 can be no exaggeration to call it a spontaneous uprising of the army against the Stalinist despotism"

"From the morning of June 22, the Stalinist nomenclature of the eye not even between two, but between three fires.

The Nazis were advancing from the west, their intentions in relation to the communists did not hide.

From the east, from the Kremlin and from the Lubyanka, orders flew, one shot more than the other. The most numerous enemy was nearby - and that reckless determination with which the Bolsheviks once burned all the bridges between themselves and deceived, muzzled by the people, has now turned against them. So their wives had to grab a pot of figs and run in a panic wherever your eyes look.

The consequences of the exodus of leaders were fatal. Any system fails after the destruction of the control center. Any army temporarily (or even permanently) loses combat capability in case of loss of commanders. But we didn't have "any", but a very specific system: a system sealed by terror and controlled by terror.

Together with the runaway bosses, he left fear - and the Red Army, great and terrible, began to rapidly and uncontrollably fall apart.

Like a barrel from which the hoops were knocked down .

⁸¹ Solonin M.S. June 22, or When the Great Patriotic War began. M., 2006. S. 479.

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However, let's put aside howls and see how things really were. Of course, the transition Red Army soldiers on the side of the Germans "*whole formations, to the sounds of divisional orchestras*" took place only in the inflamed imagination of today's home-grown detractors and accusers. However less the results of the combat operations of the Soviet armed forces in the initial period of the war cannot be called too successful.

So, from the first day of the war until the end of September 1941, our troops lost killed, died of wounds and diseases that died as a result of accidents 430,578 people missing and missing captured - 1,699,099 people. October-December 1941 respectively 371,613 and 636,383 people⁸² .

Attention is drawn to the ratio of dead to prisoners: from June 22 to the end of September, for every killed Soviet soldier, there were almost 4 missing or surrendered in action.

captured, in the last three months of 1941 this ratio decreased to 1 to 1.7. However, not all missing missing should be considered surrendered. According to the calculations of G.F. Krivosheev, out of 5 million Soviet about 500,000 servicemen who went missing during the war years were not captured, but died or, being seriously wounded, remained on the battlefield, occupied by the enemy .

Whatever you say, the losses are heavy. However, before than to expose the mistakes and crimes of "Stalin's regime", let's see how successful other countries were at war with Hitler.

⁸² Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study. M., 2001. S. 250.

⁸³ There. S. 461.

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As you know, World War II began
September 1, 1939 German attack on Poland.
Already on September 28, the Warsaw garrison capitulated,
and the Polish armed forces were by that time
completely destroyed. The million-strong Polish army ceased
to exist. At the same time, on the German front, the Poles
lost 66.3 thousand killed.
and missing, 133.7 thousand wounded and 420
thousand prisoners 84 .

On September 17, 1939, after the Polish leadership
shamefully fled the country, Soviet troops entered Poland. In
battles and skirmishes with them
The Polish army lost 3,500 killed, 20,000 wounded and
missing, and 454,700 men.
prisoners 85 .

So, in the course of hostilities against the German
troops, for every killed Polish soldier, there were 6.3 captured
by the Germans. If
but to look at the results of clashes with the Soviet troops,
the picture becomes simply blatant: for one killed, 130
prisoners of war. Gentlemen, accusers, hysterical about the
mass surrender of the Red Army in 1941 - this is how

looks like an army that really does not want to fight!

However, the situation is not at all surprising. Barely
born, "the ugly brainchild of Versailles
Treaty" immediately unleashed armed conflicts with all
neighbors, seeking to expand its borders as much as
possible. In 1920, using
civil war going on in our country, Poland

⁸⁴ *Meltyukhov M.I.* Stalin's missed chance. Soviet Union in
struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 2nd

ed., corrected. and additional M., 2002. S. 108.

⁸⁵ There.

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occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Having become second-class citizens in the revived Rzeczpospolita, the population of these territories was subjected to many years of abuse and humiliation. When in 1939 the Soviet Union took its

conversely, the Ukrainians and Belarusians mobilized into the Polish army were by no means eager to die for an "independent Poland" that treated them like with a helpless bastard. Their attitude to the outbreak of the war can be judged by the then ditty:

*Don't you think, they're scorching
You will not be a lamb,
We will sit down at the akopah
1garelku we will pshch.*

But if fair claims can be made against the Polish state, then France at that time could undoubtedly be considered a bulwark of freedom and democracy. Its industrial and military power also could not be compared with the Polish. Few moreover, unlike Poland on September 1, 1939 or USSR On June 22, 1941, by the time of the German attack, France had already been in a state of war for more than eight months. The French army managed to mobilize, take up defensive positions, and wait for the arrival of the British allies. Tem
However, the result was more than disastrous.

On May 10, 1940, the German units launched a decisive offensive. A few days later, the situation at the front became catastrophic. It revealed, that the French soldiers are not at all eager to die for the motherland. As Cher writes in his memoirs
chill:

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*"Eyewitnesses spoke of crowds of French prisoners who marched alongside the Germans, and many some of them still carried their rifles, which from time to time they were collected and destroyed under tanks. I was shocked by the utter helplessness and rejection from the fight against German tank units, which, having several thousand machines, carried out full destruction of powerful armies; I was no less struck by the rapid collapse of the French resistance immediately after breaking through the front. All German movement was carried out along the main roads, and not in they were not stopped in one place"*⁸⁶.

On June 14, German troops entered Paris without a fight. On June 22, 1940, France shamefully capitulated. During the fleeting military campaign, the French army lost 84,000 killed and 1,547,000 captured. Thus, for one killed French

soldier accounted for over 18 who surrendered in captivity.

But this is not boastful Polish panism. This French, winners of the First World War. These are those the most French soldiers who stood to death under Verdun that fearlessly went to the German machine guns. As Churchill rightly writes: *"France led the war and bore the brunt of the heavy ground fighting from 1914 to 1918.*

She lost 1 million 400 thousand people killed .

Now, under the blows of the German army, the former winners in the blink of an eye turned into cowards

⁸⁶ Churchill W. S. World War II: In 6 vols. T. 2: Their most glorious hour / Per. from English. ed. A. Orlova. M., 1997. S. 37.

⁸⁷ History of World War II 1939-1945. T. 3. The beginning of the war. Preparation of aggression against the USSR. M., 1974. S. 115.

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howl herd. For four long years, German troops tried to break France at that time, but all to no avail. And now they did it in a little over a month.

So, gentlemen of accusers, explain what bloody dictator brought the unfortunate French people to such a state that the proud Gauls began to surrender en masse, not wanting to fight for their country? What mass repressions have undermined the command staff of the French army?

Or maybe the advancing German army had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and technique? Here Churchill writes:

Therefore, Hitler was able to carry out attack on France with 136 divisions, using all the formidable power of his ten armored divisions consisting of almost three thousand tanks, including of which there were at least a thousand heavy

lykh

"Dive bombers and tanks almost impenetrable by gun shells, which showed themselves from such an advantageous side in Poland, although on a smaller scale, once again formed the tip of the main group"⁸⁸.

What are these caterpillar monsters "impenetrable by rows of cannon shells"? Are those very T-IV armed with a short-barreled 75 mm gun and weighing only about 20 tons⁸⁹, over which so like to mock Rezun and his followers? Yes and those in the advancing German army number

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it was by no means a thousand. On May 10, 1940, there were only 278 of them on the Western Front. Plus 349 T-III medium tanks. The rest are mild TIs (523 pieces) and T-II (955 pieces), yes captured Czechoslovak 35(t) (106 units) and 38(t) (228 units)⁹⁰ .

As a participant in those events rightly noted French General F. Gambiez:

"The French defeat in 1940 was an event extraordinary. We now know that, in the general balance of forces, the Franco-British troops had the advantage in tanks and artillery, and their weakness in aviation was not such as to be predictable. such a quick rout . "

We have to admit that in the early World War II Germany's other adversaries fought with the German troops much worse than the Red Army.

But maybe this behavior is acceptable. for other powers, but absolutely unusual for the Russian army? So, the author of the recently published series "Life of Remarkable People" biographies thrice Hero of the Soviet Union A.I. Pokryshkin, quoting Solonevich's prediction I have given above, adds meaningfully:

*"This prediction did not come true, but still the scale of the betrayal and the number of those who surrendered are unprecedented in Russian history..."*⁹²

Alas, in Russian history, this event is by no means unique. In order not to plunge into the depths of centuries,

⁹⁰ Müller-Hillebrand B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945

Moscow, 2003, p. 267.

⁹¹ History of World War II 1939-1945. T. 3. S. 89.

⁹² Timofeev A. V. Pokryshkin. 2nd ed. M., 2005. S. 147.

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Let us recall the shameful defeats of the tsarist army at the beginning of the 20th century.

Russo-Japanese War. Japan, which was three times smaller than the Russian Empire in terms of population, only a few decades ago emerged from feudal self-isolation, almost miraculously avoiding the fate of becoming a colony or semi-colony of the great powers.

The more unexpected is the outcome of the military confrontation.

Of course, the underestimation of the enemy, the remoteness of the theater of operations from the European part of Russia, and the low capacity of the railway network played a significant negative role. However, the Russian forces assembled in Manchuria were completely

enough to, if not win the war, then at least

bring it to a "draw".

February 6 (19) - February 25 (March 10), 1905

Battle of Mukden took place. Russian troops counted over 300 thousand bayonets, 16 thousand sabers and up to 8 thousand sappers, 1219 field and 256 heavy guns, 56 machine guns⁹³. The number of Japanese reached 335 thousand people. people, their troops were armed with 892 field and 170 heavy guns and up to 200 machine guns⁹⁴. The forces of the opponents were approximately equal. Despite this, Russian the army suffered a crushing defeat.

8.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, 51 thousand were wounded, 21 thousand were captured and more than 8 thousand were missing. Japanese casualties in killed, wounded and missing according to foreign sources amounted to 67.5 thousand people, the Japanese themselves determine their losses in the open press at 41,000 people⁹⁵.

⁹³ Sorokin A. I. The Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Military IS toric essay. M., 1956. S. 255.

⁹⁴ There. S. 256.

⁹⁵ There. S. 280.

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Thus, the number of prisoners and missing missing more than three times the number of those killed. One more unpleasant moment should be noted. In previous battles in the Manchurian theater of military operations, out of 3,630 servicemen of the Russian army captured by the Japanese, 1976 were taken prisoner by the wounded. In the battle of Mukden, out of 21,100 Russian prisoners, only 2,537 were wounded, the rest surrendered unharmed to Japanese captivity .

Moreover, the Russian army turned into a stampede. Here is what he reported to Nicholas II about this infantry general N.P. Linevich, appointed after the battle, the commander-in-chief took the place of the displaced general A.N. Kuropatkin:

"... to the utmost regret, during the panic that took place at Mukden, a stream flowed from the army to the rear to the north partly with carts, and partly just singly and even in groups of about sixty thousand lower officials, of which many were detained in Theline and at other stations. But, undoubtedly, a lot of them went even further to Harbin ... There is no doubt that some part of the lower ranks went further than Harbin ... The lower ranks leaving the army for the rear say that

They

they leave because they cannot fight . "97

Fortunately, the Japanese army did not have maneuverable formations to complete the encirclement of the fleeing Russian troops in a panic. The time of the panzer divisions come only thirty years later.

The Japanese themselves surrendered extremely reluctantly. But. Japanese prisoners were counted literally by units.

"5a each captured Japanese soldier was promised to pay 100 to the one who took prisoner, and 300 for an officer

96 Russia and the USSR in the wars... S. 35.

97 Sorokin A. I. Russo-Japanese War... S. 280-281.

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rub. But the number of prisoners remained negligible, and all of them either refused to report anything, or gave incorrect information .

In total, during the war in Japanese captivity was 74 thousand Russian servicemen⁹⁹, while Japanese in Russian captivity - a little more than 2 thousand¹⁰⁰ .

As a result of constant defeats, moral the spirit of the Russian troops fell greatly. By the end of the war, while standing on the Syngai positions, the acting The Russian army in Manchuria numbered about 800 thousand people, surpassing the Japanese almost twice¹⁰¹, one She didn't even try to attack.

Unlike World War II, during World War I, the Eastern Front was secondary to Germany. Despite this, the Russian troops repeatedly suffered heavy defeats.

So, during the East Prussian operation in August-September 1914, the 2nd Russian

an army commanded by a general of cavalry A. V. Samsonova, who lost 6739 people killed, 20.5 thousand wounded and 92 thousand prisoners⁵ .

The summer campaign turned out to be especially difficult.

1915 In early August, almost without resistance, there was Novogeorgievsk fortress surrendered.

"On August 6 , the commandant of the fortress, the despicable General Bobyr, who had lost his head, ran over to an enemy and, already sitting in German captivity, ordered surrender to the still holding stronghold. In a huge garage

⁹⁸ There. S. 190.

⁹⁹ Russia and the USSR in the wars... S. 51.

¹⁰⁰ There. S. 52.

¹⁰¹ There. S. 36.

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neither General Kondratenka, nor Mayor Shtokvich, nor Captain Liko was found in the nison ... And on the morning of August 7 the Prussian Landwehr drove the human herd into inglorious captivity. The strength of the Novogeorgievsk garrison was 86,000 people. About 3,000 were killed, and 83,000

(of which 7000 wounded) surrendered, including 23 generals and 2100 officers. The banners of the garrison were safely delivered to the Active Army by pilots. 1096 fortress and 108 field guns were lost in the fortress, a total of 1204. In their haste to capitulate, they forgot to put most of the guns into disrepair. The Germans equipped their Alsatian-Lorraine front with these guns, and the French, having won the war, put these Russian guns in Paris, on the Esplanade of the Invalids, on desecration of their former brothers in arms

In total, from May 1 to November 1, 1915, the tsarist army lost 976 thousand people as prisoners¹⁰², while her losses in killed and dead from wounds amounted to only 423 thousand³.

The total number of Russian soldiers and officers who were captured during the First World War is also quite impressive. According to the Central College of prisoners and refugees (Centroplenbezh), it amounted to 3,911,100 people, of which 2,385,441 was a prisoner in Germany, 1,503,412 - in Austria

¹⁰² Golovin N. N. Military efforts of Russia in the World War. M., 2001. S. 143.

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Hungary, 19,795 in Turkey and 2,452 in Bulgaria¹⁰³. However, the emigrant historian N. N. Golovin believes this number is substantially inflated. According to him Based on German and Austro-Hungarian documents, there were approximately 1.4 million in Germany, 1 million in Austria-Hungary, and 10,000 Russian prisoners in Turkey and Bulgaria .

In turn, from the beginning of the war to September 1 1917 the Russian army captured 159,390 German, 1,736,764 Austro-Hungarian, 64,509 Turkish and 670 Bulgarian military personnel

As we can see, the results of hostilities against the German troops are by no means encouraging: for each A captured German accounts for almost 10 Russians in German captivity. As for the huge number of Austro-Hungarian prisoners, this is quite understandable.

The army of the "patchwork empire" was distinguished by its low combat readiness due to the unwillingness of the Slavic population to fight for the House of Habsburgs. Hence the mass desertion and flight to the Russians. By the way, gentlemen accusers who love to howl about the transition to Great Patriotic War of the Red Army to the enemy "to the sound of divisional orchestras", with indispensable comments, they say, "the history of wars has never known such a thing." Here is a real, not a mythical case for you: on February 3, 1915, on our side with with deployed banners and regimental music, the 28th infantry regiment of the Austro-Hungarian army crossed into

chapter

Czech officers¹⁰⁵ .

¹⁰³ Golovin N. N. Military efforts of Russia in the world war. M., 2001. S. 130.

¹⁰⁴ There. S. 135.

¹⁰⁵ *Tinchenko* Y. Birth of Schweik // Kiev Vedomosti. August 6 2002. No. 168.

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When it comes to betrayal. Today we actively suggest that mass cooperation with occupiers of the inhabitants of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War is a unique and unprecedented phenomenon both for the history of our country and for world history. This is, to put it mildly, not true.

Alas, whenever the territory of Russia is second the enemy was fighting, among our compatriots find There were traitors or simply cowards who offered their services to the enemy. Here you can remember and the events of the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century, and from the menu of Hetman Mazepa during the Northern War.

During the Patriotic War of 1812, the Orthodox clergy of the Mogilev diocese, headed by Archbishop Varlaam, found themselves in occupation, in full force swore allegiance to Napoleon and served prayers for the victory of French arms

During the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Crimean Tatars massively cooperated with the landed on the peninsula by occupiers¹⁰⁷. During the First World War, the Germans and Austrians in the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland, numerous units were formed from Poles - former Russians under the data. Units from Finnish emigrants.

But it may be that such a phenomenon is characteristic only Russia? During the Second World War, in the countries of Western Europe occupied by the Germans, cooperation with the occupiers was almost universal. Moreover, if service to the Germans was perceived in our country, in

¹⁰⁶ *Sergeev A. N.* Oath to Napoleon and prayer for him in Mogilev

diocese in 1812 // *Russian antiquity*. 1908. T. 136. S. 577-588.

¹⁰⁷ *Pykhalov I.* Steppe Punishers of Europe // *Special Forces of Russia*. 2006. No. 11. pp. 16-17.

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including in the public mind, as a betrayal, then in the West it was in the order of things - the police and local governments continued to work properly function under the occupiers. You can also remember the influx of volunteers in part C C from all ends of Europe.

As for the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, the accusers forget a simple thing: military failures can be caused by both own weakness, and the strength of the enemy. And the power of the army is expressed not only in the number of tanks kov and aircraft, not in the length of the barrels of tank guns and the thickness of the armor, which Rezun's fans love to talk about so much. This is, first of all, the level of organization and training of troops. German Army 1939-1941 was very strong, easily smashed everyone opponents. And she stumbled in Russia, and in largely due to the resilience of the Red Army. Yes, by according to the head of the operational department of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Germany, Colonel-General A. Jodl:

"The encircled Russian armies offered fanatical resistance, despite the fact that the latter 8-10 days were deprived of any supply. They literally fed on the bark and roots of trees, as retreated to impenetrable forests and were captured already so exhausted that they were hardly able to move

The defeat of Poland cost the Germans 16,343 killed and 320 missing¹⁰⁸, offensive in the Western front and the defeat of France in May-June 1940 - about

¹⁰⁸ Müller-Gillebrand B. Land Army of Germany 1933-1945 M., 2003. S. 182, 716.

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about 45 thousand killed and about 630 missing¹⁰⁹ .
Meanwhile, the very first week of fighting against the USSR cost the German troops 22 thousand killed and 900 missing, which exceeds their losses for throughout the Polish campaign. By the end of August 1941, losses on the Eastern Front exceeded the total German losses suffered since the start of World War II. on all other fronts .

Already at the very beginning of the war, the leaders of the Third Reich were in for a severe disappointment: contrary to the assurances of Russian emigrants, the peoples of Russia want to fight and will fight for Soviet power. The Red Army did not run away, did not turn the bayonets against Stalin. And after the defeats came the turn of victories, after June 1941 - May 1945.

¹⁰⁹ There. S. 263.

¹¹⁰ There. S. 716.

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Unknown Smolensk battle

In modern historical science and society in Recently, there has been increased interest in history of the Great Patriotic War. Appears there are many scientific and journalistic works considering various episodes of that war. However, it should be noted that various pages of the Great Patriotic studies are now far from being equal degree. Against the background of increased attention to the events of the pits in the Leningrad direction, Stalingradskaya and the battles of Kursk, the Vyazemsky encirclement, the problems of Smolensky are practically not being developed. battles. Degree of scientific study and understanding this colossal in scale and aftermath The effects of the battle are still at the level of the beginning of the 80s. the last century. Suffice it to say about the fact that in the national historiography there is no monographic study devoted to this most important event of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Such "inattention" as from official science, and independent

But

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nyh modern researchers, it is difficult to explain.

Most likely, the attention of researchers in the first place the queue is attracted by the so-called "white spots", and the Battle of Smolensk, "about which so much has been written," is considered a worked-out topic. However, this is not the case. The battle of Smolensk is far from being an unambiguous and contradictory page of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind.

Smolensk region, where the main events of the battle, was not a border, but already three weeks after the start of the war, hostilities were taking place on its territory. Enemy offensive developed rapidly. Parts of the Red Army, resisting the enemy, retreated. At the end of June fighting was already going on in the area of the old border. On June 26, German troops occupied Minsk, on June 30 they entered Lvov. In the first 15-18 days of the war, enemy troops advanced in the North-West direction. to a depth of up to 450 km; in the West - at 450-600 km; in the South-West - up to 350 km¹¹¹. Parts of the Red Army suffered huge losses.

The Hitlerite command considered the central direction, the Moscow direction, to be the main direction of the offensive. It was here that the enemy concentrated his main forces. Of the total manpower and equipment concentrated to attack the USSR, Army Group Center included 40.2% all divisions (including 48.2% of motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet Luftwaffe. They had 36% of the total personnel, 53% of tanks, 41% of guns and mortars and 43% of aircraft deployed from Chernoy to Barents-

¹¹¹ See: *Gareev M.A. Ambiguous pages of the war (essays on problematic issues of the Great Patriotic War). M., 1995. S. 141.*

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on the sea¹¹². Parts of this group were to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District located in the Belostok ledge, and after their destruction, develop an offensive against Smolensk and Moscow. The main blow of the Nazi troops passed through territory of the Smolensk region. It was here that a grandiose confrontation of the opposing forces unfolded on the central sector of the front in the initial period of the war, which went down in history under the name of the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - 10 September 1941).

The battle of Smolensk is the first a major defensive operation during the initial period of the war, in which the enemy's advance was halted for two months. The enemy suffered significant losses, and in some areas was forced to retreat (the Yelninskaya offensive operation). If failures in border battles with the enemy can was to a certain extent justified by the fact of surprise, unpreparedness, then the battle of Smolensk developed in completely different conditions. It is no longer necessary to talk about surprise, the main ideas of the enemy and tactics are clearly indicated actions of enemy troops, the country turned on its mobilization, political and economic resources at full capacity, from the rear areas units and formations were pulled up, a great patriotic upsurge reigned in society.

The battle of Smolensk was a complex set of interconnected offensive and defensive actions of the Soviet troops on fire

¹¹² Calculated from: *Müller-Gshpebragi*) B. Land Army of Germany.

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romny section of the front in 650 km and in depth up to 250 km. This battle extended to the territory Smolensk and nearby regions. It was attended by units and formations of four Soviet fronts - Western, Reserve, Central and Bryansk. The main direction where they turned the main hostilities became the Smolensk-Moscow direction, and the city of Smolensk. Due to geographic features, this the district received the code name "Smolensk gate" (interfluvium of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper). Exactly the possession of these "gates" opened the way to Moscow.

Enemy successes in breaking through the state borders and in Belarus in the first two weeks of the war instilled confidence in the German command that in the rear of the Western Front there are no reserves capable of pose serious resistance on the way to advance to Moscow. After the defeat near Minsk, our troops retreated to Mogilev and Zhlobin, and on the Soviet German front in the Sebezh-Mogilev sector, a "gap" was formed, where the troops aimed their strike.

Army Group Center. Von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, determined the forces of the Western front in the Smolensk-Moscow direction in total in 11 divisions. In this regard, the German command considered the defeat of parts of the Western Front as a fait accompli and planned further actions. Chief of the General Staff Halder

As early as June 30, he noted: "When we force the rivers Zapadnaya Dvina and Dnieper, then we will talk not so much about the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy, how much about to take away industrial areas from him, "after the destruction of the Russian army near Smolensk

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com ... cut the railways leading to the Volga,
and take possession of the whole territory up to this river .

The general plan of the enemy's actions in the Smolensk direction was to cut the defense of the Western Front into three parts, to encircle and liquidate his Nevelsk, Smolensk and Mogilev groupings and thereby create favorable

conditions for an attack on Moscow.

The enemy troops in this direction were opposed by the practically re-created Western

front under the command of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, whose troops were to create a defensive line: r. Zap. Dvina to Vitebsk, Orsha, r. Dnieper

to Losev. Front command by this period

had scattered and weakened divisions of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies, which withdrew from the border areas and were withdrawn for reorganization and

understaffing. At the same time, the forces of the fresh 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd

armies included in its composition and arriving at the

beginning of July from the rear areas and other sectors

front. In total, by the beginning of the Smolensk battle,

seven armies were operating in the Western Front, five

of which (13th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd) were allocated to the first echelon. The second echelon was to be

parts of the 4th and 16th armies. Understanding the

complexity of the situation in the Western direction, the

Stavka makes a decision in the rear of the Western Front, 100 km east of

Smolensk, deploy the front of the reserve armies, which

included six combined arms armies,

¹¹³ "Top secret! Only for command! Strategy

Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR. Documents and materials. M.:

Nauka, 1967; Halder F. Military diary. T. 3. book. 1. M., 1971.

pp. 76,101.

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a large part of which was staffed
militia formations.

For a long time in Soviet historiography, as an explanation and justification for the catastrophic defeats of the initial period of the war, including the unsuccessfully started Battle of Smolensk, they referred to the superiority of the enemy in manpower and technique. To show this "superiority", the authors resorted to a variety of methods - from open falsifications to "original" methods. For example, the total number of troops on the Western Front by the beginning of the enemy offensive was 579,400 man¹¹⁴. However, in official science, not all the combat power of the Western front, but only the forces of the first echelon, which amounted to 24 divisions, 145 tanks, about 3800 guns and mortars and 389 serviceable aircraft¹¹⁵. For each division of the first echelon accounted for 25-30 km front line of defense, and in some areas - up to 70 km. Army Group Center, by the beginning of the offensive, had 29 divisions (12 infantry, 9 tank, 7 motorized and 1 cavalry), 1040 tanks, over 6,600 guns and mortars, and over 1,000 aircraft. With such a comparison, at the beginning of the enemy offensive on July 10, the ratio the forces that entered the battle were in favor of the enemy: in men - 1.5:1; in artillery 1.7:1; in tanks - 7:1 .

As a rule, a description of the complexity of the situation in which the practical

¹¹⁴ Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: a statistical study. M., 2001. S. 272.

¹¹⁵ History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945: In 6 vols. M., 1959-1965. T. 2. S. 65.

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the re-formed Western Front.

Our troops did not have time to prepare defensive lines in engineering terms, often the defense was organized under the fire of the advancing enemy.

The command did not have clear intelligence information about the location, forces and plans of the Nazis.

Many divisions did not have time to turn around on the indicated lines before the start of the enemy offensive and on the way they were brought into battle: in the Polotsk direction - parts of the 22nd army, in the Lepel direction - of the 20th army, at the crossings across the Dnieper at Bykhov and Rogachev - 21st

missions.

Of course, all these facts took place, but bringing them without analyzing the state of enemy troops on the eve of the offensive is contrary to scientific principles. Firstly, not all the forces of the army group could take part in the offensive "on Smolensk"

"Center". The offensive began when the battle between Bialystok and Minsk was not over. Secondly, the enemy has largely lost his

penetration ability. Tank units of Army Group Center were badly battered by the resistance of the Soviet army and impassability. Only in the 3rd

tank group in the first days of July tank losses amounted to 50 %¹¹⁶. The losses in manpower were tangible. So, the 9th Army Corps from June 22 to June 28 suffered losses of 1900 soldiers and officers (killed and wounded), the 78th infantry division lost 340 people in Belarus, the 137th - 700, 263rd - 650, etc.¹¹⁷ Oche visible is that at the beginning of the offensive, the central group of German troops did not have that superiority, which was attributed to it in the Soviet

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Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. M., 2006. S. 50.

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There. S. 46.88.

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historiography. On the contrary, we can agree with German historian W. Haupt, who noted that "for the first time during the campaign it turned out that the Soviets stronger"¹¹⁸.

From the very beginning of the war, the Nazi command did not hope for a numerical superiority of its troops, especially against the backdrop of mobilization opportunities Soviet Union, the huge superiority of the Red Army in tanks, aviation, etc. The German command de laid a bet on swiftness, preparedness and coherence of the military mechanism. The haste in the offensive was caused primarily by the desire to prevent the creation of a solid defense by the retreating armies from Belarus and the newly arrived Soviet units at the front.

For a swift breakthrough of our defenses, The Mansk command in the zone of main attacks created a significant superiority in forces. The concentration of tanks in the places of breakthrough reached 30 units per front kilometer. So, in the offensive zone of the 18th tank and 29th motorized divisions of the enemy (offensive front 37 km) 350 tanks. The 18.53rd and 110th Soviet Rifle Divisions opposing them had no tanks at all. Against six divisions of the 22nd Army, defending in 280 km strip, 16 enemy divisions operated¹¹⁹.

On July 10, 1941, the Nazi troops in the central sector of the front went over to the offensive. Main the Germans struck a blow in two directions - from the district of Vitebsk towards Dukhovshchina (in order to bypass Smolensk from the north) and from the Orsha-Mogilev region to

¹¹⁸ There. S. 51.

¹¹⁹ Battle of Smolensk: Collection of articles for the 25th anniversary. Smolensk, 1966, p. 15

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Yelnya (to bypass Smolensk from the south and thereby encircle the main forces of the Western Front). At the same time, in the north, on the right flank of our Western Front, the enemy launched an auxiliary strike.

in a northeasterly direction towards Nevel and Velikiye Luki, and on the left wing - to the southeast in the direction of Krichev. With these blows, the Nazis planned to isolate the flank groupings of the Soviet troops of the Western Front.

At the beginning of their offensive, the Nazis achieved significant success, but then the situation began to change. Instead of a swift victorious operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were involved

chickpeas in a bloody two-month battle on Smolensk borders.

Even in the Soviet period, periodization developed Battle of Smolensk, considering this grand confrontation in the central sector of the front in four stages: the first - from July 10 to 20; second - from July 20 to August 7; the third - from 8 to 21 August; fourth - from August 22 to September 10. The very isolation and determination of the boundaries of these periods (when taking based on the nature of hostilities, the setting of goals and the results achieved) seems to be quite legitimate, however, many conclusions from the standpoint of achieving modern science seem to be very controversial.

Let's try to analyze the steps Battle of Smolensk from the standpoint of a set of documents and materials that are currently available to modern Russian researchers.

The first stage was characterized by a successful start offensive for the German army, especially on the right wing and in the center of the Soviet Western Front.

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Our troops were forced to retreat to the east.

The 22nd Army of General F. A. Ershakov, who fought in region of Polotsk, was divided into two parts, and its divisions were fighting in the environment. General's 19th Army I. S. Koneva, who did not have time to concentrate and turn around at the indicated line, could not hold back the enemy's pressure and retreated to Smolensk, where, together with The 16th Army of General M.F. Lukin and the 20th Army of General P.A. Kurochkin fought in almost complete encirclement. The 13th Army of General V.F. Gerasimenko was also dissected, one part of it fought in the encirclement in the Mogilev region, the other in the Krichev region.

On the southern flank of the Western Front, the situation developed differently. Here is the 21st army of the general F. I. Kuznetsova on July 13 went on the offensive in the direction of Bobruisk and drove the Germans out of the cities Rogachev and Zhlobin. This blow for the German command turned out to be a complete surprise, and it hurriedly began to transfer mechanized units from near Smolensk to the breakthrough area.

A difficult situation developed directly in the Smolensk direction. The enemy was looking for weak points in our defense and sent strikes there their motorized units. So, for example, meeting stubborn resistance on the main road to Smolensk from Orsha, which was provided by units of the 20th Soviet army, the invaders changed direction the main blow, rushing to Red. By July 14 1941 tank divisions of the 39th German motorized corps made their way to Rudna and Demidov, 47th motorized corps rushed to Smolensk through Krasny, the 46th Corps covered Smolensk from the south. A catastrophic situation developed - on the fifth day of the offensive, the enemy was at the gates of Smolensk.

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On July 14, the commander of the Western Front gave order, according to which the defense of the city was assigned to the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General Luka, and all Soviet troops who were in the defense sector of the city and arrived from rear and from other directions.

It should be noted that General Lukin received this order a day and a half before the capture of Smolensk by the enemy. The right question to ask is whether Does Lukin have the opportunity to prevent the capture of Smolensk? In our opinion, the answer is obvious - the command of the front before General Lukin was given an already impossible task. At the disposal of the commander at that time there were only two divisions - the 46th Major General Filatov and 152nd Colonel Chernyshev, who occupied the defense north of the Moscow-Minsk highway (the rest of the army divisions either were transferred to other armies, or were on approach to Smolensk). The only thing that the command of the 16th Army could do in this situation was create mobile mobile groups to cover the most dangerous areas with them. One of these groups, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

P. I. Bunyashin near the village of Khokhlovo on the Krasny-Smolensk road, an ambush was set up: ditches were dug, blockages, guns and machine guns were made between the houses were arranged so that they could cross fire. This ambush was hit by an enemy motorcycle regiment, which was almost completely destroyed. Subsequently, the Nazis made three attempts to take Khokhlovo, but each time their attacks were repulsed. courageously defending Soviet soldiers. Only after the fourth assault did the detachment begin to retreat to Smolensk.

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Of course, the heroic resistance of individual units and formations could weaken and delay the offensive of the Nazi troops in certain directions. At the beginning of the Smolensk battle, the soldiers of the 127th Infantry Division showed themselves courageously, which already on July 11 entered the battle 30 km from Rudnya with advanced units of the 3rd Panzer Group enemy. A swift and unexpected blow the soldiers of the division attacked the rearguard of the enemy and put him to flight. Pulling up the main forces, the enemy attacked the positions of the division, and he succeeded surround one of her battalions. The encircled battalion under the command of Captain M.S. Dzhavoev, having felt a weak spot in the enemy's defense, quickly broke through from the encirclement. During the first days of the battle, this battalion alone destroyed more than a hundred Nazis and 20 enemy tanks¹²⁰. A bright example of heroism and martial prowess is a blow 57th Panzer Division under the command of Colonel V.A. Mishulin. The division was moved from Smolensk to the Krasnoy region and immediately entered into oncoming battle with the 29th motorized division enemy. The enemy, having suffered significant losses, was forced to suspend his offensive. But the fate of the city, which did not have sufficient forces for defense and found itself under a concentrated attack motorized groups of the enemy, was already before resolved.

On the evening of July 15, enemy mobile groups from the side of Roslavl, Kyiv highway and Krasninskoe Bolshak they entered the southern part of Smolensk. During July 16, the Nazis managed to capture most of the city. Resistance to the enemy

¹²⁰ Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. M., 1977. S. 214.

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the Smolensk garrison was provided directly in the city, the most combat-ready part of which was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Bunyashin. In addition, from a number, the battle on the streets of Smolensk entered: a brigade P. F. Malysheva, a detachment of the city police under the command of G. N. Odintsov, cadets of the police schools headed by F. I. Mikhailov, a fighter battalion under the command of E. I. Sapozhnikov and others. Stable, organized resistance

these semi-regular formations cannot be organized could. First, the defenders retreated to the center city, then to the park of culture and recreation and to the square Smirnova. At night, blowing up bridges behind him (July 15 in 24.00 was blown up a new bridge across the Dnieper, July 16 in 2-3.00 - old¹²¹, however, there is some information that the railway bridge was not destroyed, which the enemy immediately used¹²²), the defenders of the city crossed to the other side of the Dnieper.

Post-war historiography has developed a certain pattern within which these fights. The central place is occupied by the heroic examples shown by the defenders of Smolensk during the defense of the city. In the battles on the streets of the city, the brave G. N. Odintsov and F. I. Mikhailov fell to death. At Home specialists, a heroic feat was performed by policeman G. I. Poddubny, who threw himself with a bunch of grenades under an enemy tank. The defenders of the northern part of the city showed particular stubbornness, about whom the German sources say the following: "In the northern parts of the city, in the industrial suburbs police and the workers' militia fought stubbornly. Every home

¹²¹ Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). F. 208.0p. 2511. D. 1475. L. 150.

¹²² Information from the personal archive of the author.

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each basement had to be stormed separately, knocking out the defenders from there with small arms, hand grenades and bayonets"¹²³ .

Undoubtedly, those Soviet armed forces that took part in the defense of the city showed heroism and determination, but these facts should not obscure the magnitude of the catastrophe that occurred - almost immediately, the Nazis captured the most important stronghold of our defense, which had a huge strategic and political importance. The swift capture by the enemy of Smolensk is an indicator of that level of organization and command of troops in the western strategic direction. Upon the capture of Smolensk, a special "Military expert commission on the question of the abandonment of Smolensk by our troops on July 15-16 1941", headed by General I.P. Kamera¹²⁴ .

Of course, working with the documents of this commission, it is necessary to take into account the conditions in which it worked, and the pressure from the Headquarters, and personally from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but at the moment the materials of the commission are one of the few official documents that summarize and analyzed significant material on the capture Smolensk. Already in the very name of the commission, which worked in "hot pursuit", it was indicated the phrase "abandonment of Smolensk". The definition of military operations in the Smolensk region as "defense of Smolensk" will appear much later. The results of the work of this commission were summarized in November

¹²³ *KareIP*. Eastern front. Book. 1. Hitler goes to the East 1941—1943. M., 2005. S. 73.

¹²⁴ For the full text of the conclusion of this commission, dated December 1941, see: TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 1475.

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1941. According to the data collected by the commission, units of the with a total number of 6.5 thousand people", and in the garrison "there were no personnel units, but only spare and special. Regarding the battles directly outside the city, the commission draws an unambiguous conclusion: "Fights directly outside the city of Smolensk on July 15, 1941 continued extremely transiently"

Both the command of the garrison and the command of the 16th Army, which were entrusted with responsibility for the defense of the city, did not take effective measures to ensure a stable and effective defense of Smolensk: "instead of an organized resistance to the enemy, in the southern part of the city available forces ... the defense of the city resulted in the form of scattered battles with the enemy", "from the side of 16 A, who knew about the difficult situation of the city¹²⁵ , no real measures were taken, and the entire fight against the advancing enemy was handed over to only the head of the garrison. With regard to those units that covered the southern part of the city, the conclusion of the commission, based on the conclusions of the Military Council of the 16th Army, sounds unequivocal: "they turned out to be extremely unstable and during the first clash with surrendered the city to the enemy without any armed resistance"¹²⁷ .

As you can see, the commission made a conclusion that is not quite consistent with the scale of the events that took place. The capture of Smolensk by the enemy was a cul-

¹²⁵

It should be noted that by the time the activities were completed, 169

mission, the commander of the 16th army, General Lukin, was in hard captivity.

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TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 1475. L. 156,157.

¹²⁷

There. L. 57.

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mination of a large-scale operation of the German Army Group Center, deployed at the front in several hundred kilometers and almost 200 kilometers deep into our defenses. Such scales cannot be the area of responsibility of the army command (in our case, the 16th army). In addition, the responsibility for the defense of the city was assigned to General Lukin just a day and a half before the invaders will enter the southern suburbs of Smolensk. The rapid capture of Smolensk by the enemy is a clear indicator of the level of organization and command of troops in the entire western strategic direction (both the scale of the front and the General

headquarters, and Headquarters).

The conclusions of the commission about the rapid capture of the city without the staunch resistance of its defenders are also confirmed by the documents of the German side. So, in the report of one of the units that took part in the capture of Smolensk, it was noted: "When we entered this dead city, a ghostly picture opened before us. No shots were heard. Separate appearing Soviet soldiers rushed to their heels. All bridges across the Dnieper were destroyed"¹²⁸. "Seeing" breakthrough of the mobile German group to Smolensk, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction S. K. Timoshenko and the commander of the Western Front took action to defend the northern part of the city and return Smolensk under their control. As early as July 16th Lukin's command received the 129th, 12th and 158th rifle divisions. These forces significantly outnumbered the enemy troops, who had captured almost the entire city. But time was lost, the enemy was firmly entrenched on the achieved lines. Our Parts

¹²⁸ *Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. S. 58.*

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moved to the defense of the northern part of the city along the river Dnieper.

As is known, the capture of Smolensk aroused anger on the part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Subsequently, the Soviet troops, in pursuance of Stalin's order, will carry out constant attacks in order to return

Smolensk. So, on July 20, soldiers of the 127th and 158th rifle divisions crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and started fighting with the enemy, liberated part of the city, but could not gain a foothold on the captured lines.

It is sad to realize that almost the same, but without any opposition, the Nazis are more than two months later they will take possession of Vyazma, thereby completing the creation of a huge "Vyazemsky cauldron". Moreover, it should be noted that our troops were not able to effectively use in defensive

battles, natural barriers: in Smolensk - the Dnieper, in the Vyazma direction - the Dnieper, Vopets and others rivers. But on the other hand, these same barriers cost huge blood to our soldiers during the liberation of the region in 1943.

Very often, especially in Soviet historiography, one of the main reasons for the capture of Smolensk called the absence of engineering and defensive structures. But in the initial period of the Smolensk battle, a similar situation developed in other sectors of the front, where there were defensive structures. For example, in a summary of operational

department of the headquarters of the 24th army, parts of which defended the city of Yelnya, on July 18 it was noted that the construction of defensive lines in the city area was completed by 85%. However, despite the existing time for the preparation and arrangement of defensive lines, the presence of artillery, the city of Yelnya was

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taken by the enemy during a short battle

July 19, 1941

It can be concluded that the Soviet high command did not develop effective measures to combat mobile formations of the enemy. The enemy, using them, broke through the line of defense, entered the operational space, made large-scale movements with deep coverage of tens and even hundreds of kilometers. Moreover, according to the commander of the 3rd tank group G. Goth, Smolensk was captured on July 16 forces of only one 29th motorized division¹²⁹.

Based on the above materials, it can be argued that the numerous Soviet historiography, testifying to the facts of the feat and heroism in the battles for Smolensk, is associated with individual, isolated facts of manifestation of heroism 15-16 July 1941 in battles for the city (but not mass heroism and perseverance), which is quite traditional. As you know, very often fearlessness, courage and heroism individual soldiers just compensate for the massive panic, irresponsibility, and sometimes open betrayal. In separate works, considering "heroic defense of Smolensk", the authors focus on the facts of heroism and courage, about revealed by the Soviet soldiers during the period of numerous attempts to return the city, but not during its obscure enough one. seems expediency of mastering Smolensk by troops, who themselves were almost completely surrounded and before which sooner or later there will be the task of breaking through to the main forces of the front was set. But such was the demand of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

¹²⁹ Got G. Tank operations. M., 1961. S. 115.

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At the first stage of the Smolensk battle, the Nazis achieved the main goals of the initial stage of the offensive operation. They managed to break through front line, advance 200 km, capture Smolensk, Yelnya, Velikie Luki, Yartsevo and practically encircle the units of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies. However it was in these first days of the battle of Smolensk that the Lerov's strategy gave a crack.

First, the Soviet troops stopped the enemy some resistance, which the enemy did not expect, thinking that our troops, due to the threat of encirclement, will retreat to the east. So, in the report on the hostilities of the 2nd tank group from 12.07 to 10.08.1941 it was noted: "When, in front of the 2nd Panzer Group, wives of a very large enemy force to the east Dnieper and south of Smolensk, the command of the 3rd Panzer Group did not believe that the enemy would risk abandoning them into a decisive battle near Smolensk. As seen from document, the enemy expected that our troops, due to the threat of encirclement, would retreat to new defensive positions, and the creation of the "Smolensk cauldron" by them , was not planned. But the fighting began to develop according to a different scenario. And, as it turned out, the strength for the rapid defeat of the Soviet troops in the current situation at the front was clearly not enough.

Our troops not only put up serious resistance, but also inflicted a significant damage. For example, the surrounded units of the 13th army of General V.F.

less than 1 thousand Nazis¹³¹. Troops of the 20th Army under

¹³⁰ TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 159. L. 77.

¹³¹ In the flame of battles: The combat path of the 13th army. M., 1973. S. 27.

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by General P. A. Kurochkin to the east Orshi inflicted significant losses on the enemy's 27th motorized corps. The enemy lost 35 tanks and 25 motorcycles and was forced to for three days fight in the area. Even taking into account the postscripts characteristic of Soviet military statistics, one can assert that the enemy in the Smolensk direction suffered losses (German statistics will be given below), which were not equal during the entire previous period of the Second World War.

Here, near Orsha, the first blow was dealt to the enemy with BM-13 rocket launchers. The volley, which lasted only 15 seconds, inflicted significant damage on the enemy.

Parts of the Red Army managed to carry out a number of counter offensive operations. Greatest Success reached the offensive of the corps of the 21st Army under the command of F.I. Kuznetsov, some parts of which managed to break through into the depths of the enemy defenses on 80 km. In total, the troops of the army chained up to 15 fascist divisions, which significantly weakened the pressure of the enemy in the main direction¹³³.

Secondly, after the capture of Smolensk, the enemy failed to launch a further attack on Moscow. On July 17, the path to enemy units blocked formed battle group commanded by General Rokossovsky, as part of the 38th Rifle Division and the 101st Tank Division, and the active actions of the encircled Soviet units did not give the Nazis the opportunity free up enough troops to foot advance in the Moscow direction.

¹³² TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2454. D. 29. L. 375.

¹³³ *Bazhenov A.N., Shevchuk V.P.* In the battles near Smolensk. M.: Moskovsky Rabochiy, 1984. P. 21.

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The troops of K.K. Rokossovsky not only stopped the opponent, but also carried out a swift and unexpected offensive operation for the enemy. 19-20

July 1941, having crossed the river, struck at the enemy who did not have time to gain a foothold, liberated the city Yartsevo (almost two months before the liberation of the city of El Ni, recognized as the first of those liberated in the years wars).

In addition, as noted above, the German command expected that in connection with the threat of envelopment, our troops would retreat. However, our units located in the semi-encirclement organized an active defense

Well, they made constant attempts

return Smolensk. The enemy clearly did not have enough forces to defeat this grouping. German troops resembled a boa constrictor that swallowed prey that was not could digest. In the future, the lessons of the "Smolensk cauldron" will be used in the preparation of the operation. "Typhoon", when the enemy has concentrated the necessary amount of forces not only for a swift breakthrough and encirclement, but also for rapid destruction surrounded troops. "Vyazemsky cauldron" was cleaned enemy in less than ten days.

Thirdly, the enemy could not achieve full encirclement and isolation of parts of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies from the main forces of the front. In part, the presence of a corridor connecting the Soviet troops located in the Smolensk region with the main forces of the front is explained by the inconsistency in the actions of the German army and tank groups (troops of the 2nd German tank group and the 4th army, operating from the south, "We were late with reaching the planned milestone")¹³⁴ . During almost the entire period of combat

¹³⁴ TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 159. L. 86.

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surrounded by Soviet armies behind enemy lines

there was a crossing across the Dnieper near the village of Solovyev (15 km south of Yartsevo), which provided the surrounded

The 16th and 20th armies are in contact with the main forces of the front.

If in the first period of the Smolensk battle the Soviet troops fought mainly defensive battles, then in the subsequent part of the Western and Reserve fronts (within the Smolensk region) they conduct offensive operations.

The second period of the Smolensk battle is characterized by the transition of parts of the Western Front to the offensive with the aim of returning Smolensk and destroying the enemy's Smolensk grouping. His excellent

teas widespread use of active methods

hostilities on both sides, which led to a sharp increase in tension on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. And exactly

at this stage of the Smolensk battle, tension confrontation between Soviet and German troops in the western strategic direction has reached its climax - the German command will pass on the central sector of the front to the defense.

On July 19, the Stavka decided to hold counteroffensive on the Western Front . the next day, July On 20, negotiations took place Stalin and Zhukov with the front commander Timoshenko, where the Supreme Commander, in his characteristic manner, set the task for the marshal to create strike groups of 7-8 divisions: "I think it's time for us to move from

pettiness to action in large groups"¹³⁵ .

¹³⁵ Russian State Archive of Socio-Political history (RGASPI). F. 558. On. 11. D. 487. L. 1-2.

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In pursuance of the order of the Headquarters of 20 divisions front of the reserve armies, 5 army operational groups, consisting of 3-4 divisions each, which became part of the Western Front. These groups of troops, which were led by Generals V.A. Homenko, S.A. Kalinin, K.K. Rokossovsky, V.Ya. Kachalov and I.I. Maslennikov, was to deliver simultaneous strikes from the northeast, east and south in the general direction to Smolensk. After the enemy had broken through, they were to join up with the main forces of the 16th and 20th armies .

Planning the actions of our task forces, with the vet command set before them grandiose tasks that testified to errors in assessing the operational situation in the Western direction and underestimating the enemy. So, for example, on July 24, the group of General Khomenko was given the following task: "... the main task of this group is to defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region and reach the line of the river Dnieper to restore the situation and expel the enemy from the Orsha region "(information of negotiations on BODO between Zhukov and Timoshenko on July 24)¹³⁷ .

In order to increase the strike power of these groups, each division assigned to the offensive received a tank battalion (21 tanks), and General Kachalov - 104th Panzer Division¹³⁸. For support and cover for strike groups from the air, three aviation groups were allocated, each consisting of to a mixed aviation division. In addition to this, given the protracted communications of the enemy and the backlog of his rear units, it was decided

¹³⁶ TsAMO RF. F. 48-A. Op. 1554. D. 91. L. 60-61.

¹³⁷ RGASPI. F. 558. On. 11. D. 487. L. 2.

¹³⁸ TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2454. D. 2. L. 631.

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send a cavalry group (consisting of three cavalry divisions), concentrated in the zone of the 21st Army, into a raid behind enemy lines.

The situation was not favorable for going over to the offensive, but its necessity was also obvious. It was impossible to give the Nazis the opportunity to use be called achieved in the Smolensk direction results. It was necessary to force to spray his shock groupings and pull the enemy troops to secondary directions. In addition, an important task was to remove the threat of a complete encirclement of the 16th and 20th armies.

The fact that 20 divisions of a certain number of armored vehicles and aviation were allocated to strike groups indicates that at that time the troops of the front and all the armed forces had the necessary reserves and forces to carry out major offensives telny actions. In Soviet historiography, attention is focused on the insufficiency of forces and weaknesses of these operational groups, but this is not the main problem in our opinion. It should be recalled that enemy troops captured Smolensk in total with only one division. The main issue of the effective use of these forces lies in a calculated and competent strategy for using these forces. troops, in determining the most vulnerable areas defense, in coherence and coordinated action and skill of the troops.

The offensive of our troops, in the 20th of July, fell with active offensive operations and enemy troops seeking to expand and strengthen the outer ring of encirclement¹³⁹. The battles of the second period were distinguished by a counter character and fierce

¹³⁹ See: *Haupt W. Battles of Army Group Center*. pp. 62-65.

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ness. However, it should be said that to achieve the goal in the course of the offensive of parts of the Western front at the end of July 1941 failed. Forces for inflicting effective strikes on the enemy turned out to be obviously not enough, besides, the troops acted in isolation from each other and had too little time to prepare the operation. In some directions our troops managed to achieve a certain success. So, the shock group of troops of the 30th army

acted in the direction of Dukhovshchina and advanced with battles for 20-25 km, pinning down large enemy forces¹⁴⁰. The offensive of other parts of the Western front was not successful. For example, a group of general Kachalova, who went on the offensive on July 23, was surrounded and suffered significant losses.

By July 27, the divisions of the group in the course of continuous fighting lost: 104 TD - 1540 people killed and wounded; 143 sd - 966 people killed and wounded;

145 sd - 2241; in the whole group only 45 guns of all calibers remained, etc.¹⁴¹ When breaking out of the encirclement General Kachalov also died. Almost the entire operational group of Kachalov was destroyed and captured by the enemy. In the operational report of the GA "Center" dated On August 8, 1941, it was noted that in the Roslavl region, 38,561 Red Army soldiers, 250 tanks and reconnaissance vehicles, 359 guns of all calibers, etc., were taken .

and the 20th Army, which stormed the outskirts of the city with July 20, weakened the flanks. To the enemy on July 26-27

¹⁴⁰ *Kalinin S.A.* Reflections on the past. M., 1963. S. 141-142.

¹⁴¹ TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 208. L. 119.

¹⁴² There. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 132. L. 99.

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managed to strike at the rear of these armies and surround them north of the city¹⁴³.

In addition, the simultaneous strike did not work operational groups. For example, a group of troops of General Rokossovsky could not go on the offensive at a set time, reflecting the numerous enemy attacks. But it is this group, stopping enemy, delivered a blow that ensured the rupture of the enemy ring, in which at the end of July they found themselves parts of the 20th and 16th armies north of Smolensk.

Despite heavy, ongoing fighting and heavy losses, including in the environment, units of the Red Army, according to the German military commanders themselves, fought "fiercely and fanatically." The fierce resistance of the Soviet troops under Smolensk weakened the offensive power of the German Army Group Center. She got shackled on all sectors of the front. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, wrote in those days: "I am forced to bring into battle now all my combat-ready divisions from the reserve of the army group ... I need every person on the front line ... Despite the huge losses ... the enemy daily in several areas attacks in such a way that until now it has not been possible to regroup forces, to bring up reserves. If in the near future, a crushing blow will not be dealt anywhere, then the task of their complete defeat will be difficult to complete before the winter comes. Exactly at during the battle of Smolensk, the miscalculation of the Nazi command in assessing the ability of the Soviet troops to resist was clearly manifested.

As a result of stubborn and bloody defenses

there. D. 159. L. 82.

¹⁴⁴ Cit. Quoted from: *Reinhardt K.* Turn near Moscow. M., 1980. S. 52.

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nitrous battles near Smolensk and other areas

kah of the Soviet-German front offensive

the pace of the enemy weakened, parts of the Wehrmacht were exhausted

we suffered significant losses, and, most importantly,

noe, the enemy could no longer attack all

three main directions.

Based on the current situation, Hitler signs Directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941, according to which the troops of Army Group Center were to go on the defensive. By order of the Fuhrer, the main efforts of the Wehrmacht from the center were transferred to the flanks. In August, it was planned to continue the offensive, primarily with the aim of encircling and destroying the Soviet troops in Ukraine, as well as together with the Finnish troops to block Leningrad. tank groups, that were part of the Bock troops were withdrawn from the battles for urgent restoration of combat readiness and their subsequent use on the flanks of the Eastern Front (the 2nd Panzer Group of General Guderian went over to subordination of the commander of Army Group "South", 3rd Panzer Group of General Hoth supported the offensive of Army Group North), This decision was final point in a long dispute between Hitler and the German General Staff on the direction strategic strikes in the war with the USSR. Many prominent military leaders of Nazi Germany (Halder, Jodl, Guderian, Tippelskirch and others) considered the decision to turn forces to the south to "seize Ukraine" as one of the tragic decisions in the course of the war with Russia¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁵ Guderian G. Experience of the war with Russia // Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished. M SPb., 1998. S. 119; Tippelskirch C. Operational decisions of the command at critical moments on main land theaters of the Second World War // Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished. M., SPb., 1998. S. 74; Projector D.M. Aggression and disaster. M., 1972. S. 331.

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Thus, the heroism of the Soviet soldiers in the central direction and other sectors of the front forced the German command to reconsider its original plans and in August-September change the direction of the main attacks. Among the Germanic

generals at that time, more and more often expressed doubts about the "possibility of achieving decisive success" in one direction or another, for the stubborn

the resistance of the Red Army "leads to a critical aggravation of the situation in certain areas" ¹⁴⁶. According to the German side, from June 22 to

On August 13, 1941, the losses of the entire eastern front amounted to 3,714 officers, 76,389 soldiers and non-commissioned officers; wounded - 9161 officers and 264,975 soldiers and non-ter-officers. These figures amounted to approximately 10% of the total number of troops on the eastern front.

Compared with the losses of the Wehrmacht in Poland and France, they were extremely high ¹⁴⁷.

However, the Soviet troops suffered significantly big losses. For example, only for August 1941.

the troops of the western front lost 138 thousand people ¹⁴⁸.

Researcher L. N. Lopukhovsky, using the example of separate opposing parts of the Soviet and

German armies attempted to determine

the ratio of losses during the period of defensive battles

this period to the west. Comparing

19th Soviet Army, whose losses amounted to

¹⁴⁶ Quoted from: *Prozhtor* D. M. Decree. op. S. 325.

¹⁴⁷ All German armed forces during the period of the Polish campaign 1939 lost 10.6 thousand killed, 30.3 thousand wounded and 3.4 thousand missing, in the victorious war against France in 1940 - 27,047 killed, 111,043 wounded and 18,384 missing without a trace. See: *Tippelskirch* K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 28.93.

¹⁴⁸ TsAMO RF. 208. Op. 2511. F. D. 213. L. 284.

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August 1 to September 10, 1941 45 thousand people, and the losses of the German 8th Army Corps opposing it - about 7 thousand people supporting his 7th tank (about 1 thousand people) and 14th motorized (about 1 thousand people) divisions, he received a ratio of 4.4: 1 in favor of the enemy¹⁴⁹.

The third stage of the Smolensk battle arose from the peculiarities of the operational-strategic situation, formed at that time in the Soviet-German front. In the period from 8 to 21 August, the Soviet commando The government made a new attempt to seize the initiative. With the turn of a significant part of the group's forces armies "Center" to the south of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts went on the offensive with the aim of defeating the Yelninskaya and Dukhovshchinskaya enemy groups. It should be noted that in the first half of August, the epicenter of military events moved to the south, in the zone Central (created by the Stavka on July 24 with the subordination of the 13th and 21st armies to it), and then the Bryansk fronts (created on August 16 as part of the 13th and 50th armies).

On August 8, the 2nd enemy tank group crossed on the offensive and broke through the defenses of the Central front in the zone of the 13th army. At the same time, the 2nd Field Army deeply enveloped the 21st Army from the east. Simultaneously with the blows of the enemy troops, units of the Western Front also resumed offensive operations. The troops, in accordance with the order, were to "firmly holding the front lines with the left wing the Dnieper River and repelling enemy attacks on your right wing, the center to crush and destroy the spirits Schinskaya grouping of the enemy"¹⁵⁰. Main role

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in solving the assigned task, it was assigned to the formations of the 19th and 30th armies.

On August 8, the troops of these armies went on the offensive, for several days parts of the armies unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy positions. The Germans organized a dense defense and put up effective resistance. One of the few positive results of our attack on Dukhovshchina was a breakthrough in the zone of the 19th army from the enemy rear. General Boldin's group, which made a 500-kilometer raid behind enemy lines. On August 15, the front command gave the order to continue the Dukhovshchinsky operation. This stage of the Dukhovshchina operation was more carefully prepared, provided troops and weapons. On August 17, the 19th Army attacked the front, and then the 30th and 29th army. The troops broke through the enemy's defenses, but failed to develop further success. Offensive armies were exhausted. But as a result of offensive actions, the enemy was forced to transfer the 57th mechanized corps from the 3rd tank group to the Dukhovshchin direction .

The offensive by the forces of the Reserve Front on Elninsk direction was less successful. Parts of the 24th Army did not complete the task - destroy the Elnin ledge. But it is the active offensive actions led to the fact that the strike group, which the enemy was concentrating in the area of the Elnin ledge, was bled to death. Yes, in telegram-report of the headquarters of the 46th tank corps the commander of the 2nd German tank group was noted: "In the area of the Yelninsk bridgehead, there are

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rolling battles. The fighting capacity of the corps, especially SS divisions and infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" daily decreases so much that their further combat use raises serious doubts .

The data at our disposal allow us to assert that offensive operations on

Elninsk and other sectors of the front were one of the most important reasons for the cancellation by the German command of a large-scale offensive in the Moscow direction. So, in the telegram of the army group "Center" No. 725/711 dated 08/14/1941 tank group Guderian was ordered: "The high command ground forces ordered to cancel the planned offensive across the Dnieper River. A special order will follow about the possible abandonment of the Yelninskaya arc ... "153 . Subsequently, in the second half of August, the command of Army Group Center had to withdraw from near Yelnya "shabby" 2 tank, 1 motorized divisions and a motorized brigade and replace their five infantry divisions .

The Soviet command was aware that in order to solve such a complex task as the liquidation of the Yelninskaya group, a carefully planned operation was needed with the involvement of additional forces. The liquidation of this strategically important parade ground became the central episode of the fourth and final stage of the Battle of Smolensk.

In the 20th of August on a vast territory (with a length of 600 km from Toropets to Novgorod Seversky) fierce battles unfolded. Smolensk

The battle has entered its final stage.

¹⁵² TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 762. L. 12.

¹⁵³ There. D. 159. L. 18.

¹⁵⁴ 'Anfilov V.A. Blitzkrieg failure. pp. 517-518.

TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 214. L. 261.

¹⁵⁴ Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. T. 2. S. 121-122.

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On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy in the zone of the 22nd and 29th armies broke through the defenses and pushed back Soviet troops on the left bank of the Western Dvina. But to the Soviet command with the active use of engineering units and the creation of mine-explosive barriers managed to stop the advance of the enemy.

As mentioned above, by this time the German command changed the direction of strategic strikes and did not have sufficient forces for a large-scale offensive on the Western Front. Not having managed to build on the initial success, the German troops were attacked by units of the Soviet 30th Army. On August 29, units of this army broke through the enemy's front and launched his pursuit. A cavalry group under

command of General L. M. Dovator. It was already the second experience of introducing a mobile group into the enemy rear during the battles in the Western strategic direction. To protect their communications, rear facilities and fight the Soviet cavalry, the command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht was forced to allocate from its reserve 3 infantry divisions¹ .

On September 1, units 16, 19 and 20th army. But weakened during previous battles armies in nine days of stubborn fighting managed to advance only a few kilometers. The armies suffered enormous losses. So, in the combat log Western Front for September 1941 was noted: "... for five days of fighting (from September 1 to September 6) only 16 And the loss of 12 thousand people killed and wounded and almost all tanks"² . Due to the futility of attacks and heavy losses the offensive of these armies was stopped.

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The situation in the Moscow strategic direction at the beginning of September 1941 can be characterized as a kind of temporary parity of forces, which arose as a result of incessant fighting, heavy losses and the movement of significant forces.

the German army to other sectors of the front, in which none of the opposing sides was able to turn the tide and seize the initiative; the epicenter of the fighting has shifted to the south Soviet-German front.

Despite the failure of the general September offensive by units of the Western and Reserve fronts in the band of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front was carried out on the Yelninskaya offensive operation, which became the first major victory of the Red Army at the beginning Great Patriotic War.

The inability of the enemy to carry out major offensive operations in the Moscow direction, the Soviet command decided to use to eliminate the Yelnin ledge, which in the future could be used

by the Nazis as a springboard for a further attack on Moscow.

In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters, "the troops of the Reserve Front were to go on the offensive on August 30 with the left flank armies of the 24th and 43rd armies. tasks: to defeat the enemy's Elninsk grouping, to seize Yelnya and, inflicting further strikes in the direction of Pochinki and Roslavl, by September 8, 1941, reach the front of Dolgie Niva - Hsila Vichi - Petrichi ... "1 .

In pursuance of this directive, the command of the Reserve Front (since the beginning of August, the front of the command

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Doval G.K. Zhukov) developed a plan for the Elninsk offensive operation. It was supposed to be applied simultaneous strikes on the flanks of the salient, coordinated with an offensive from the front, cut through the German troops apart, surround and destroy them, in plan operation included the creation of external and internal encirclement rings in order to frustrate the enemy's attempts to assist the blockaded units .

The main blow under the base of the wedge should have been on carry two strike groups consisting of five divisions - northern (two rifle and tank divisions) and southern (rifle and motorized divisions). The remaining divisions of the 24th Army were to conduct an offensive along the front from east to west, cutting through the enemy troops. The weak link of the planned operation was the inability to provide advancing troops from the air, since all aviation to At the beginning of the operation, it was transferred by order of the Headquarters from the Bryansk Front. The command sought to compensate for this by concentrating artillery units. The strike groups were included all available tanks and about 70% of the artillery of the 24th army. Density of artillery in areas breakthrough reached 60 guns and mortars per 1 km front¹⁵⁶ .

On August 30, 1941, units of the 24th Army went on the offensive. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, and in a day our troops managed to penetrate into 1.5 km deep into enemy territory, and not at all plots¹⁵⁷. The stubborn fighting continued for four days. this time, largely thanks to the courage and self-

¹⁵⁵ Order of Lenin Moscow Military District. S. 220.

¹⁵⁶ TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2526. D. 22a. L. 407.

¹⁵⁷ There. F. 219. Op. 679. D. 38. L. 53.

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loyalty of Soviet soldiers, northern and southern groups that struck at the base of the Kli on, managed to narrow the neck of the Elninsk ledge to 6-8 km. In this situation, the German command decided to withdraw its troops from the territory Elninsk bridgehead. Simultaneously with the 24th Army, the 43rd Army also launched an offensive in the general direction of Roslavl. And although parts of the army failed to break through the front, their actions diverted the enemy forces, which contributed to the successful development of the situation in the Elninsk direction.

On September 6, Yelnya was liberated, and on September 8 the Elny ledge ceased to exist. Repeated attempts to break through the enemy's new line of defense along the Novye Yakovlevichi-Novo-Tishovo-Kukuevo line were unsuccessful. Given the heavy losses and exhaustion of the troops, the Stavka ordered stop advancing.

The Elninsk operation was by no means the first of the offensive operations in the initial period of the war. On time, the attack from the Soviet mechanized corps on June 26, 1941 in the Dubno region stopped the enemy's offensive. July 13-15, 1941 General's 64th Rifle Corps Petrovsky delivered a swift blow to the enemy and captured the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin. Troops under command of General Rokossovsky in the 20th July 1941, the enemy was driven out of the city of Yartsevo. In these and other battles, Soviet troops smashed individual Nazi units and forced them to retreat in various sectors of the front in June-September 1941.

However, the Elninskaya operation has a number of features that distinguish it from all previous ones. offensive actions of the Red Army, which were swift counterattacks on the offensive

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the enemy and his rear. Under Yelnya our troops attacked already fortified positions against the nickname, which went on the defensive and had as its goal hold the front line. Execute in full the tasks assigned to the 24th Army failed.

The enemy was not surrounded and destroyed, and it was also not possible to develop a further offensive. But the results achieved were of great importance. Despite lack of numerical superiority, poor support tanks (the German troops did not have tank units on the Elnin ledge), lack of air support, limited experience in conducting effective offensive operations and interaction between military branches, units of the 24th Army inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy. The dangerous foothold in the Moscow direction was eliminated. Five suffered serious losses. enemy divisions, but it should be noted that none of them was sent to reform, and all took part in the attack on Moscow.

For a long time in Russian science, when analyzing losses on this sector of the front, the information indicated by G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs was used. According to him According to data, the enemy lost 45-47 thousand people in killed and wounded during the Yelnin operation¹⁵⁸. Modern studies show that the losses of the Wehrmacht were almost two times lower and amounted to about 25 thousand killed, wounded and missing¹⁵⁹.

As you can see, in the battles on the Yelnin ledge, two full-blooded divisions of the Wehrmacht were defeated. Such the Wehrmacht has not yet suffered losses in one sector of the front for the whole period Second World War.

¹⁵⁸ Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. T. 2. S. 127.

¹⁵⁹ Kavalерchik B. K. Battle for Yelnya // Military History archive. 2006. No. 7. P. 76.

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In Soviet historiography, a cliché has developed that limits the chronology of the Yelnin operation to the period from August 30 to September 8, 1941. However, the latest works devoted to this page of the war¹⁶⁰ show that this does not fully correspond to the actual course of events. In many respects, the specified stamp was adjusted to the personality of G.K. Zhukov, who directly at that time took an active part in the development and implementation of the climactic finale of the Yelnin epic. The battles for the El Ninsky bridgehead with unrelenting fierceness were conducted from July 19, i.e. almost 7 weeks before the official start date of operations. Even before September 30 1941 in the battles at the Elninsk line were exhausted and bled nine enemy divisions. In the German literature devoted to the battles near Yelnya, this the episode of the war is characterized as "Yelninsky hell", "meat grinder" ¹⁶¹. These and other circumstances give reason to expand the chronological framework of the Elninsk battle, and not limit it only to the period of active offensive operations on August 30 - September 8, when the Soviet shock groups launched an offensive against an exhausted and bloodless enemy with weak artillery and no tanks. The victory near Yelnya was given to our troops

expensive price. In the report of the political department to the headquarters of the 24th army, it was indicated that during the battles near Yelnya, the army, according to rough estimates, lost 77,728 people killed, wounded and missing. The 19th Rifle Division suffered the greatest losses. - 11 359 and 6th division of the people's militia, in which from the original

¹⁶⁰ See: *Lubyagov M.D.* Decree. op.; *Lopukhovskiy L.* Decree op.; Cavalier Chik B.K. Decree. op. and etc.

¹⁶¹ See: *Karel P.* Eastern Front. Book one. S. 79.

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initially available 9791 servicemen in the ranks to
On September 20, 1941, only 2,002 people remained¹⁶² .
In divisions that will later be converted into guards (100.127,

153, 161), up to 80% of the personnel left (killed,
wounded, shell-shocked, prisoners, etc.). After the fights under
There were 200-400 active bayonets left in them with spruces¹⁶³ .

Despite significant political and moral significance, the
acquisition of experience in offensive
actions, it must be recognized that the strategic
the significance of this operation was relatively small
shim.

First, the danger of using Yelninsko
th ledge as a springboard for an attack on
Moscow existed only theoretically. In the future, the German
troops and without the Elnin ledge
they will prepare and carry out a grandiose operation, as a
result of which the Western and Reserve Soviet fronts will
be practically destroyed. Secondly,
the victory near Yelnya and its results were practically not
used by our command and
did not make any changes to the overall strategic alignment
of forces in the western direction. But
country, people, Stalin needed a victory, and she
has been reached.

It should be noted that our troops will be able to prepare
the next major offensive operation.
and to carry out only two and a half months later: near
Tikhvin, the offensive will begin on November 10
1941, and near Rostov - November 17 (November 21, the
Nazis will take Rostov, but on November 27, under pressure
our troops will leave the city and retreat).

¹⁶²

Lopukhovsky L. Ya. Decree. op. S. 72.

¹⁶³

TsAMO RF. F. 378. Op. 11015. D. 13540. L.1.

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When analyzing the development of the situation in the central section of the front in the Yelnya area becomes obvious the desire of the German troops to the last opportunity to hold the Elninsk bridgehead. Fights under Elney riveted attention to this sector of the front

Soviet command and allowed the enemy secretly transfer and redirect mobile formations to the south in order to destroy the main forces five Soviet armies near Kiev.

The battle of Smolensk occupied a special place in the history of the Great Patriotic War and especially on its initial stage. For the first time, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive. Our troops got a bloody experience not only defensive, but also offensive operations. If during the fighting in Belorussia, the Soviet command practically did not provide any assistance to the encircled units near Minsk and Bialystok, limiting themselves to creating only a new

lines of defense, then in the battle of Smolensk everything looked different. The troops and fresh units that escaped encirclement not only created a new line of defense, but also actively attacked the enemy in order to unblock the Soviet troops surrounded north of Smolensk troops. The commander of the 3rd tank group of the Wehrmacht ta Goth noted: "The encirclement and defeat of many enemy divisions near Smolensk did not provide the 3rd tank group of freedom of operational maneuver to the east, as happened near Minsk"¹⁶⁴ .

The experience of war with a strong enemy was given to us at a high price. In the battle of Smolensk, it was clearly manifested sad feature of warfare on Western strategic direction - huge

¹⁶⁴ Goth G. Tank battles. S. 120.

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losses in manpower and equipment, both in defensive and offensive battles. During the Battle of Smolensk, according to official statistics, the irretrievable losses of the Soviet army amounted to

486171 people, and sanitary - 273 803 people (however, it should be borne in mind that this figure includes the losses of the Central and Bryansk fronts, the front the line of which goes beyond the limits of the Smolensk region)¹⁶⁵. The losses in equipment and weapons were colossal, they amounted to 1348 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9290 guns and mortars, 903 aircraft².

But the enemy troops were also dealt a serious blow. damage. Only for the period from August 17 to September 13 1941 by six armies of the Western Front, according to our data, it was destroyed: 39,861 soldiers and officers enemy, 194 guns, 108 mortars, 170 tanks, 9 aircraft, etc.¹⁶⁶ According to the Germans themselves, to end of August motorized and tank divisions lost half of the personnel and material parts, and total losses (irretrievable and sanitary. - *Note. auth.*) on the entire eastern front, according to the traditional estimates of Soviet historiography, amounted to about half a million people¹⁶⁷.

Comparative analysis shows that during Smolensk battle, our troops lost such the same amount of manpower as the entire German army on the entire eastern front from the beginning of the war until September

¹⁶⁴ The seal of secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts: A Statistical Study. M., 1993. S. 169.

¹⁶⁶ TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 214. L. 98.

¹⁶⁷ The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Military historical essays in four books. M., 1998-1999. Book one. S. 184.

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1941. This clearly shows the level of preparedness of the opposing armies. Despite the fact that our troops acted on the defensive, had prepared fortified lines and fortified areas, they suffered greater losses than the advancing units of the Wehrmacht. However, it should be noted here that during Smolensk battle the main number of losses our troops suffered during offensive operations (attack by operational groups in July 1941, almost two-month attacks of the Elninsk bridgehead, etc.), carried out taking orders from the command to defeat the enemy.

In fact, offensive actions in July-September 1941 led only to the fettering of the Nazi troops and the liberation of individual territories.

In the official interpretation of domestic science and in the public mind of the majority of citizens of our country, the battle of Smolensk is presented as heroic page of national history, when the enemy was detained for three whole months. It was during The battle of Smolensk cracked Hitler's the plan of a blitzkrieg and the Soviet Guard was born. These final conclusions of almost three months of confrontation in the central Moscow direction hardly anyone can doubt it. However intermediate conclusions about individual events and phenomena during the battle are not so unambiguous. And they also need to be considered. For example, when we talk about the creation of the Soviet guard, it is necessary to note the fact that the well-known order Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army No. 270 of August 16, 1941 "On Responsibly sti military personnel for surrendering and leaving to the enemy of weapons" arose just in the period of Smolensk

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battles and contained unpleasant facts (some of them, like information about General Kachalov, were not confirmed), marked in the strip of the Western Front.

Also, the assertion that it was as a result of the Battle of Smolensk that the enemy's blitzkrieg strategy collapsed is not entirely legitimate. The troops of the Army Group "Center" were detained on

Smolensk land, first of all, not as a result of effective actions of Soviet troops in the western direction, and as a result of the resistance of the Red Armies on the entire Soviet-German front. Exactly this resistance thwarted the lightning-fast plan time strike in all strategic directions, and the German command was forced

remove a significant amount of their strike forces from the central sector and transfer or reassign them to the flanks of the Soviet-German front. Another reason for the disruption of the blitzkrieg plan is the adventurism of the Barbarossa plan itself, which was formed on the basis of an underestimation of the forces Red Army and reassessment of their capabilities.

The July operation of the Germans in the direction of Smolensk is a classic expression of German military thought, aimed at a lightning breakthrough and the encirclement of significant enemy forces with mechanized pincers. During

Smolensk battle to the Nazi command failed to fully implement their plans.

Despite the fact that Smolensk was taken almost from on the move and surrounded (at first in a semi-encirclement) were significant forces of the Western Front, Hitler The Russians did not succeed in completely defeating the encircled Soviet troops and developing further

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attack on the Moscow direction. The Soviet troops surrounded near Smolensk, despite heavy losses, managed to organize a stable defense, hold the corridor connecting with the main forces of the front for a long time, and even conduct an active offensive with the aim of capturing Smolensk.

The fighting of our troops in the western direction in July-August 1941 is a most valuable experience, in including the experience of fighting in the environment.

Unfortunately, we have the right to say that at the beginning October 1941, when units of the Red Army had significant forces, several defensive lines, time to prepare and arrange positions,

intelligence data, etc., this experience was not used both the command staff of all levels, and the rank and file.

At the same time, the German side during the period

The Vyazemsky operation took into account the experience of the battles near Smolensk. She took measures to prevent mistakes made during the battle of Smolensk, and by October 7, she firmly slammed the "Vyazma cauldron", skillfully blocked, dissected and destroyed our encircled

troops.

In addition, it was during the fighting in the Smolensk region our army received the first experience of successfully conducting offensive operations, albeit in separate sectors of the front - the liberation of the city of Yartsevo

troops of the army group of General Rokossovsky.

In early September, the troops of the Reserve Front liquidated the Elninsk bridgehead and inflicted a significant defeat to the enemy. It is in this operation that was a tragic, characteristic feature of all subsequent offensive operations of the Red Army on

western strategic direction - large

loss in manpower. Yelninskaya offensive operation

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the walkie-talkie was bloody, after its completion, the divisions, which received the name of the guards, were taken out for reform.

At the same time, it should be noted that in As a result of this operation, it was not possible to surround and destroy enemy troops (infantry), they were squeezed out from the territory of the Elninsk ledge. The victory at Yelnya had more political and moral than strategic significance. Further events - the defeat (destruction, capture and scattering) in the Vyazemsky defensive operation of the main forces of the Western and Reserve fronts showed that that the German army and without a favorable configuration front and bridgeheads is capable of operating effectively, encircling and destroying our troops.

In general, it should be noted that offensive the actions of the Soviet troops were ineffective. Thus, a strike by five army operational groups, each of which was a numerous and sufficiently reinforced formation,

did not achieve the target. The subsequent offensive actions were also unsuccessful.

our troops. The constant attacks of the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts in August - September 1941 were not prevented the German command not only hold the front line (except for the "Yelnin ledge" supposed to be abandoned in advance), but also withdraw two armies from Army Group Center and use them on another sector of the front.

True, it should be noted certain tactical successful actions of our troops during the period of defensive battles in July-August 1941. They were the result of talented, non-standard decisions of the Soviet command in a rapidly changing

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environment. Such operations can be carry:

- counteroffensive of the 21st Army on July 13-15, 64th whose corps captured the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin with a swift blow and created a threat to reach the rear the enemy in the Mogilev-Smolensk direction;
- the introduction of cavalry units and formations into the breakthrough in weak areas of the German defense, as it was on the 20th of July in the zone of the 21st Army (in rear of the enemy was sent 3 cavalry divisions) and at the end of August, when a cavalry group of General Dovator (consisting of two cavalry divisions) made a swift raid on the enemy's rear;
- swift and effective counterstrike of troops under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky in the early 20s numbers of July, as a result, the Nazis were driven out of Yartsevo 168 .

These strikes were contrary to formulaic tactics and put the enemy to a standstill, but in terms of their scale these operations could not bring about serious changes in the state of affairs at the front.

The study of the correlation of forces and means of the opposing sides shows that here, on Smolensk direction, the Red Army had everything necessary for in order not only to repulse the enemy, but also to inflict serious defeat. During the entire Smolensk the enemy did not have a decisive superiority in troops and equipment. However, throughout throughout the battle of Smolensk, the strategic initiative was wholly owned by the German army.

An objective description of the state of our army and the Soviet command in the initial period of the war was given by G.K. Zhukov, who noted in his memos

¹⁶⁸ Rokossovsky K. K. Soldier's duty. M., 1985. S. 35.

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arah that "our command, both in tactical and
and in operational and strategic terms, did not yet have
comprehensive experience in conducting combat operations and war
as a whole ... our pre-war operational-strategic methods of armed
struggle have entered into some
contradiction with the practice of war, with reality"¹⁶⁹.

Miscalculations in the overall strategy of the Armed Forces
USSR in the pre-war period and the training of troops
(orientation towards offensive actions to the detriment of working out
actions on the defensive), extermination of command
personnel, lack of initiative of commanders, etc. gave
their disastrous results.

Under such conditions, the main stake of the Soviet command was
placed on the courage and perseverance of the Soviet soldier, and often
on coercion and threats.
repression. Further colossal losses of our
army in the fight against the prepared and inspired
enemy successes were inevitable. It was the huge human losses that
compensated for all the miscalculations and
mistakes of both the country's leadership and the command.

However, it would be wrong to link tragic mistakes, unrealized
opportunities and
heavy losses during the battle of Smolensk
only with stereotyped, stereotyped and in a number
cases of illiteracy of the Soviet command,
more often guided in his actions not by an analysis of the current
situation, but based on the opinion of the Headquarters. It should be
noted that the command
made decisions, fully aware of the level of training the Soviet troops had
at that moment.
We can distinguish the following features of the state

¹⁶⁹ *Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. T. 2. M., 1992. S. 325, 327.*

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yaniya of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, reducing its military power:

- lack of experience in combat operations (only a small number of parts and connections had experience of participating in real combat operations, and not always successful (war with Finland);
- lack of fighting traditions (the ideological component of the Russian army, which had been developing until 1917, was almost completely destroyed).

"Heroic landmarks" of the Civil War and about

letarian values, artificially created and more often

forcibly imposed, could not compensate for this loss);

- the army, as a mirror of society, was reflected in all social contradictions that developed in society throughout the Soviet period. We have the right talk about the colossal distance between private stave, consisting mainly of peasants, and commanders, especially political workers. Most this will clearly manifest itself in the environment, when the soldiers pointed out to the Nazis the commanders and political instructors¹⁷⁰.

The Red Army on the eve and at the very beginning of the war lagged behind the level demanded by the conditions of modern warfare. And first of all, this concerns not the technical equipment of the troops, which was (contrary to the stamps of Soviet historiography) at a fairly high level, but the training of the troops, the quality of training command staff of all levels, the ability to conduct offensive operations and fight on the defensive, etc.

Not the last place in the organization of the army is

la ideological cohesion of personnel.

In the absolute majority, the rank and file of the Red Army is

¹⁷⁰ Information comes from analysis of participants' memories events. From the personal archive of the author.

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He was a representative of the Soviet peasantry that had survived collectivization, the Holodomor, and did not even have passports.

Serious problems in Krasnaya

There were also armies in military discipline. Famous

order of People's Commissar K. Voroshilov in December 1938

"On the fight against drunkenness in the Red Army" did not arise on an empty place, but was a forced measure designed to stop this phenomenon in the troops. as a necessary measure

there was also a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council

USSR of July 6, 1940 "On strengthening the responsibility for

unauthorized absences and desertion." At a meeting with the new

people's commissar of defense, Semyon Timoshenko, in May of the

same year, it was stated that "this kind of talkativeness and low level of discipline is not in

one armies, How at us"¹⁷¹ .

¹⁷¹ *Chuprin K. V.* The myth of the ideological cohesion of the army // Independent military review. 2005, June 17.

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It was the moral, moral state of the Soviet army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War is the most closed and unexplored problem of national history. Template stamps from Veteran historiography about patriotism, fearlessness and self-sacrifice of the Red Army at the beginning of the war do not quite correlate with the actual course of development events. A comprehensive study of all the phenomena and processes developing in the army and society at the beginning of the war is necessary. However, due to the secrecy of a significant amount of archival materials, it is extremely difficult to conduct such studies. Even taking into account the "liberal" order of the Minister of Defense in April 2007 to declassify documents and materials of the Central Archive of the Ministry defense in the Great Patriotic War is necessary. It can be noted that the documents remained in closed access

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cops of "political departments", Headquarters, etc. It is precisely in political reports that the information necessary for an objective and balanced analysis is contained.

Determining the total number of losses of our troops in Smolensk battle, it should be noted that more than half of the servicemen who were among "irretrievable losses", were captured. According to according to German data, only until August 5, during the battle of Smolensk, the German army captured 309,110 soldiers and officers of the Red Army¹⁷², according to other German sources, the number of prisoners is 348,000¹⁷³. Captivity, and often unjustified surrender, with the possibility of further resistance, reached colossal proportions in the first months of the war. According to the same German data, during the first five months of the war the enemy 2,465,000 Soviet servicemen were captured¹⁷⁴.

The problem of the mass capture of Soviet servicemen is one of the most complex issues in the general problematics related to the Great Patriotic War. This phenomenon was the result of the development of the Soviet social-state model, on the one hand, and the direct actions of the invaders, on the other.

In our opinion, the main reason for the mass captivity is a whole complex of contradictions between the people and the political authorities in the USSR. The deepest roots of the causes of mass captivity and the subsequent participation of Soviet prisoners of war in treacherous formations were designated by Anton Denikin. Observing the scale of collaboration

¹⁷² TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462. D. 132. L. 58.

¹⁷³ *Streit*K. Kaine Kameraden. Stuttgart, 1978. S. 83.

¹⁷⁴ *Streit*K. Kaine Kameraden. S. 83.

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ma and the process of attracting Soviet citizens to the armed forces of Germany, in his diary on November 14, 1943, he noted that: "... So risky experience became possible as a result of the separation of the Russian people from power, which perverted its accursed politics are the clearest foundations of national self-consciousness"¹⁷⁵. In addition, the demoralizing influence of the pre-war doctrine "fight with little blood and on foreign territory."

At the same time, during the initial period of the war the Germans actively released representatives from captivity individual nationalities, thereby stimulating refusal of resistance and surrender. Only Ukrainians until November 1941 "the Germans released from captivity home" from 600 to 900 thousand people¹⁷⁶. Action Data had a significant effect, especially in those parts of the army, including the troops of the Western Front, where a significant percentage were military personnel, called up from those joined two years earlier territories of Ukraine and Belarus.

We also have the right to consider the surrender of hundreds of thousands of military personnel in the summer and autumn of 1941 - as the desire to survive against the backdrop of the superiority of the enemy and, as it seemed, the inevitable death of the Soviet state. Another form of salvation and preservation of one's own life was mass desertion.

In a message from the Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank S. Milyptein to the People's Commissar of Internal cases of L.P. Beria on the actions of the Special Departments and barriers

¹⁷⁵ Diary published in: *Lekho*^{205D}. White versus red. Judge
ba of General Anton Denikin. M., 1992. S. 340.

¹⁷⁶ *Lysenko A. E.* The contribution of the people of Ukraine to the victory over Hitler
Germany // Russia in the XX century. War of 1941-1945. Modern approaches.
M., 2005. S. 61.

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for the period from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941, it was noted that "Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments

troops of the NKVD for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 military personnel who had fallen behind their units and fled from front ... From among the detainees, Special departments 25,878 arrested, 632,486 others formed into parts and again sent to the front ...

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and according to the sentences Military tribunals shot 10,201 people, from they were shot in front of the formation - 3321 people ... ".

Compared to the total number of Soviet Vooru military forces, the number of deserters and stragglers from their units is an insignificant number - about

4%. However, upon a detailed consideration of this phenomenon, with reference to a specific territory and period, the situation is fundamentally changing. Only in the Smolensk region during the period of retreat from Belarus and at the beginning During the Battle of Smolensk, 50-60 thousand servicemen¹⁷⁷ were detained, which corresponds to the average strength of the combined arms army of that time.

Despite all the criticisms expressed in the article regarding the Soviet troops, it is undeniable that the battle of Smolensk

is a manifestation of the culmination of potential capabilities of the Red Army at that time. Proy bloody months and years are blowing before our the army in its skill will first be compared with the enemy gom (the advantage in armament and numbers will already be achieved in 1942), and then it will become capable of
his crowd And destroy.

¹⁷⁷ State Archive of Contemporary History of the Smolensk Region (GANISO). F. 6. On. 1. D. 740. L. 15.

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"Pincers" Stalin

Suvorov's challenge

Disputes about the tragedy of June 22 will probably go on forever. The tragic picture of the events of this summer strikes with the seemingly incredible behavior of the actors and the scale of the devastating consequences. She demands an explanation. And every explanation

associated with a whole fan of ideological assessments.

N. Khrushchev in his report to the XX Congress proposed universal cause of the tragedy of June 22: in everything Stalin is to blame. We trusted the leader, but he is badly prepared for defense. One hundred Linists also have a variant of this version: Stalin was poorly informed. However Stalin's critics in the main continued to strengthen just his version - we were preparing for the defense and only for the defense.

In 1992, V. Suvorov's book "The Ice Dokol" was published in Russia, in which it was stated that Stalin was preparing strike on Germany in 1941, but almost missed it. Suvorov's version attracted attention and sympathy a significant part of readers with a fresh look. The Soviet Union ceased to look like a country of fools,

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led by a fool. Stalin considered the threat and found my answer. And I was wrong a little. With whom can not be.

While this conclusion follows naturally from "offensive" version of V. Suvorov, the author himself first pursued other ideological goals, which gave the dispute additional polemical sharpness. What V. Suvorov didn't say, "inflating" the meaning of my discovery: "I swung at the most sacred ... "In memory of the war. And to the place of the USSR in World War II. Because the Soviet Union its main culprit and its main instigator .

Stalin also lost World War II. (this is in another book, The Last Republic). True, in The Icebreaker, V. Suvorov stated the exact opposite: "Many books have been published in the West with the idea that Stalin was not ready for war, but Hitler was ready. And on my mind, ready for war is not the one who talks about it loudly declares, and the one who wins it, dividing his enemies and pushing their foreheads"² .

To win the war, Stalin (according to Suvorov) himself and brought Hitler to power, making him the "Icebreaker of the Revolution". Allegedly even armed him. Apparently for in order for Hitler to throw the forces of a united Europe against the USSR. Stalin signed a pact with Hitler non-aggression specifically to provoke Hitler's conquest of Europe. When Hitler Europe almost united, Stalin was preparing all this seize the inheritance.

Not only for specialists, but also for publicists, it is not difficult to prove that the idea

¹⁷⁸ Suvorov V. Icebreaker. Who started World War II? M., 1992. S. 5.

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but the political arguments of V. Suvorov are not worth paper on which they are written.

V. Suvorov's helplessness in the field of politics does not eliminate the need to consider the merits his arguments of a military-strategic nature. These arguments are divided into two parts: first, in technical evidence of the benefits of advice Russian weapons and their specially offensive character (consequently, Stalin planned an offensive war and therefore was not ready for a defensive one) and, secondly, the "reconnaissance operation" (V. Suvorov, aka V. Rezun - a professional intelligence officer), which the author conducted through open sources (memoirs, Soviet literature, etc.). The skills of a scout who analyzes print materials with in order to reveal hidden preparations for war, allowed V. Suvorov to conclude: Stalin moved a powerful group to the borders with Germany troops, which was superior in strength to the German, was of an offensive nature and could not but hit the enemy as early as 1941.

The merit of V. Suvorov is that he provoked very productive discussion about the situation in 1941. Historians studying this period have divided into three camps. The former, on the principle of "not one step back", continued to defend the old concept - the USSR was preparing only for defense. But I didn't prepare well. Then we We will conditionally call them "defencists". others with those or other reservations supported the main thesis V. Suvorov - In 1941, Stalin was preparing to be the first to strike at Hitler and advance on Berlin. We will conditionally call the supporters of this concept "offenders". The third has not yet decided, ssy

barking at the lack of sources for the final

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conclusion - some of the archives are still closed, and the problem
ma perishing very all-encompassing.

First of all, specialists in the field of the history of military
technology subjected technical arguments

V. Suworov to captious shelling. very many

his claims are lightweight, and many of them

are clearly redundant to prove the Icebreaker version.

They are simply conspicuous, such as the statement that the
letter "A" stands for "highway" tank,

although we remember from childhood: even the prototype

T-34 had the same letter, meaning experimental development.

V. Suworov has a lot of poetic

comparisons that also do not lend credibility to his books: "BT
is an aggressor tank. In all its characteristics, the BT is similar
to a small, but extremely mobile cavalry warrior from countless

horde of Genghis Khan"¹. But the BT model has an American
origin. Were the Americans inspired?

image of the cavalry of Genghis Khan, or at least warriors from
Apache tribe? Ah, the fact is that the tank has removable

tracks! Just like the horsemen of Genghis Khan

(removable hooves, or something). These tanks must quickly

flow around the fortifications of the enemy and break into the

German highways, where it is necessary to throw off the

caterpillars and roll by car even as far as Berlin. But here's

the catch: to the German motorways you need

still crawl through Poland, which obviously cannot be done

immediately, at the moment of the first blow. Well, all this time

Will BTs be cooled in reserve?

This example shows that V. Suworov every now and then

takes technology as a purely offensive weapon

dual purpose (which should be good military

equipment) - you can attack, you can

¹ Suworov V. Icebreaker. P.29.

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drop. You can "flow around the defense nodes", or you can and launch counterattacks.

Suvorov had the same situation with other types of "weapons of victory". Firepower

I-16 is superior to Messerschmitt-109E and Spitfire-1.

But the speed is inferior. And the TB-7 aircraft, filmed according to Suvorov from production for his "defensive"

character, was not as good as the scout is sure.

And the Su-2 turns out to be not a purely offensive weapon and was produced in the wrong mass quantities. Yes

and new models of tank technology - the famous

T-34 and KB were not at all superfluous in defense, although

they also knew how to attack.

"Defenders" pretty battered V. Suvorov's version of the exceptional aggressiveness of the Soviet

armaments, about Stalin's refusal from effective

defensive weapons, etc. We will not

further delve into the disputes of historians of military

equipment. The solution to the problem lies not here.

Numerous mistakes of Suvorov (as well as his opponents) in marking designations, speed numbers, etc.

only sometimes affect the outcome of the dispute between the

"offensives" and the "defensists". It is obvious that the

characteristics of the armaments of the USSR and Germany

are quite comparable (they did not use machine guns with spears). Means,

what matters is where these weapons and troops are sent. On

defensive lines or in an open field closer

to the border, and even into the ledges, deeply cutting

into the territory of a potential enemy. When

Suvorov exaggerates the tactical and technical data of the

technique, this compromises his version, everything

other errors speak only of negligence, but

cannot be recognized for fraud, which

designed to deceive the reader.

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So, S. Isaikin corrects Suvorov, who mentioned the cruising range of the BT-7 tank at 700 km: "correct: 600 km for the BT-7M with a diesel engine (on tracks)." And then he tells (refuting another phrase of Suvorov) that in the Khalkhin-Gol region the BT-7 and BT-5 brigade passed mainly on wheels 800 km¹⁷⁹. In fact, Suvorov's reasoning about the use of BT tanks against Germany just keeps

on their ability to overcome distances of several hundred kilometers using a wheel drive. Such examples of "unconstructive criticism" from There are a lot of "defencists" that can be cited. As a result of this discussions, not only V. Suvorov suffered losses, but also the myth of the technical backwardness of the Red Army on the eve of the war.

An important trump card of the "defencists" is superiority the enemy is strong. By the beginning of the war, the balance of power in terms of numbers was 1 to 1.3 in favor of Germany and its allies. But this was Germany's only numerical advantage. The USSR was superior in guns 1 to 1.4; for tanks 1 to 3.8; for aircraft 1 to 2.2. On land, the military-technical superiority of the USSR was more than serious. If the military mechanism conceived by Stalin were assembled, superiority in the infantry it was unlikely that the Wehrmacht could have been saved if he had under "preemptive" attack.

Traditionally, the failure of the Soviet army, which had such an advantage, was explained not only outside zapnosti attack, but also low-quality advice Russian technology, which for the most part was "obsolete". However, comparative studies military equipment give different results. "The course of combat actions in 1941 showed that if the Soviet

¹⁷⁹ Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion. M., 1995. S. 48.

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roaring "tanks approximately corresponded to the German technology, the T-34 and especially the KB significantly outperformed all types of Wehrmacht tanks .

At the same time, the Red Army had 501 serviceable KB and 891 serviceable T-34s. For comparison, the best among the Germans the medium tank T-4, which was noticeably inferior to the T-34, was present in the amount of 572 serviceable copies.

According to Krupp, expressed in the wake of German successes in 1942, "the basic principles of armament for tanks and the design of the tower were developed back in 1926... Of the guns used in 1939-1941, the most advanced were developed as early as 1933. So the best samples of German ground equipment, according to her creator, were at the level of engineering 1926-1933 before the war in Spain.

The situation with aircraft was more difficult. New Soviet aircraft made up a quarter of the Soviet Air Force and were poorly developed. The training program should was to be completed by autumn (that is, by the end of August). This, of course, does not mean that on the new technology in general no one could fly. For 1540 new aircraft concentrated in the west of the USSR, there were 208 trained crews. The rest were getting ready. In during the war, pilots will be trained quickly, and they will fly relatively well. It is even easier to train a pilot who already knows how to fly an old aircraft. So at the end of the summer the situation would be better than in the middle.

The problem of both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was the heterogeneity of the equipment they had - old and new.

¹⁸⁰ *Meltyukhov M.* Stalin's missed chance. Soviet Union and struggle for Europe: 1939-1941. M., 2000. S. 485.

¹⁸¹ *Shearer W.* Rise and fall of the Third Reich. T. 1. M., 1991. S. 322.

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howl. In 1939, a technical revolution took place in Soviet armaments. If in 1938 domestic technology was inferior to German, then its new models of 1939-1940s began to surpass German technology either (in some cases) at least not yield to her. However, numerically new samples in the total mass Soviet aircraft and tanks have not yet prevailed. This an offensive strategy would also solve the problem.

Stalin explained this side of the matter to his officers and generals in a speech on May 5, 1941: "We have in sufficient numbers and are producing in mass quantities aircraft that give a speed of 600-650 kilometers per hour. These are first line aircraft. In case of war these aircraft will be used first.

They will clear the way for our relatively outdated I-15, I-16, I-153 (Chaika) and SB aircraft.

If we started these cars first,

they would have been beaten." ¹⁸² This is important. It turns out that in May 1941.

Stalin understood: with the existing correlation of forces on new and old aircraft, an offensive strategy of war helps to solve the problem that has arisen to this moment. Therefore, the collision time

Still, it was not Stalin who chose. I would arrange it as best as possible a later date of the clash, when the rearmament would have been completed, say 1942. An important part of the arguments of the "defencists" is based on this: a new the equipment has not yet been mastered, the re-equipment has not been completed. Why would Stalin attack? But Hitler preferred to start the war better prepared. And he began, obeying political logic, when the readiness was

¹⁸² Brief recording of the speech of comrade. Stalin at the graduation of the students of the Red Army academies in the Kremlin on May 5, 1941. // Vishlev O.V. On the eve of June 22, 1941. Documentary essays. M., 2001. S. 177.

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inadequate. Realizing that war could break out already in 1941, and we are not yet ready for a full-fledged defense, Stalin could have chosen a "preemptive strike" as a way out of the situation.

Speaking of Stalin's unpreparedness for an offensive, "defencists" refer to the situation that has developed on June 22, 1941 "Contrary to what Su vorov claims, neither the mechanized troops of the Red Army, nor its air force was on standby."¹⁸³

, - G. Gorodetsky asserts, thus informing the reader that he has familiarized himself with Suvorov's work only briefly - after all, Suvorov did not claim that the Red Army was ready for war on June 22. Suvorov's explanation of the catastrophe of the Red Army is based on the fact that the army "was in the wagons" and so she was taken by surprise.

What could change in two or three months? studied pilots, tankers and paratroopers. There was a redeployment of troops. The production of new tanks continued, aircraft and other weapons. Fuel and ammunition were frantically procured.

The German attack on June 22 really thwarted Stalin's plans, at least those that he spoke on 5 May. When, from June 22, the Germans were able to impose their entry order on Soviet aviation aviation into battle, both old and new aircraft fell under the first blow. Not all of them died at the airfields, but those that survived entered the battle chaotically, completely not in the order that Stalin thought. As a result, the new planes could not cover the old ones, and the inevitable defeat awaited the Soviet aviation. This had many disastrous consequences.

¹⁸³ *Gorodetsky G. Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the German attack to the Soviet Union. M., 2001. P.345.*

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In the meantime, the accumulation of the most important types of new technology in the USSR proceeded faster than in Germany. In 1940 in The USSR produced 10,565 aircraft and 2,793 tanks, and in Germany, respectively, 9869 and 1975. In the first half of 1941 the USSR produced 5958 aircraft and 1848 tanks, and Germany - 5470 and 1621. Time worked for the USSR, hence the hopes that the war would still will begin in 1942. Only in the spring of 1941 there were no such hopes left, and Stalin had to come from a more difficult situation. But every month gave Stalin new advantages.

Thus, here again the technical side of the matter secondary to the strategic side. An analysis of the parameters of the technique does not allow one to prove that Stalin always adhered to the strategy of the first hit. But this analysis cannot refute the offensive intentions of Stalin either. So let's leave technology aside and turn to the "intelligence operation" of V. Suvorov.

Reading the literature about the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, V. Suvorov discovered in the actions of the Red Army just those signs of an impending attack that he was taught to look for in the actions of the enemy, when V. Suvorov was V. Rezun and worked in intelligence. "A country that is preparing for defense places its army not on the very border, but in the depths of the territory"¹⁸⁴. Stalin is pushing masses of troops to the very border, concentrating the most powerful groupings in the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, which run deep to the west. From point of view defense is madness, since the ledges in the event of an enemy fall will be immediately surrounded. From an offensive point of view, it makes perfect sense. If *Stalin*

¹⁸⁴ Suvorov V. Icebreaker. S. 73.

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If there was a Hitler attack, it would be necessary to withdraw the main forces to the rear in order to fend off the blows of the enemy with powerful reserves. If Stalin was terribly afraid of an attack, then it was necessary to strengthen the defensive line on the old border with all his might.

Suvorov's version explains many well-known paradoxes: the disarmament of the old defensive lines, "parachute psychosis", that is, the buildup of airborne forces unsuitable for defense, but useful in a sudden strike, the creation

Danube and Pinsk flotillas, which can only to advance, but which have nowhere to retreat, the removal of border barriers, etc. All these actions from the beginning of the war should have been regarded as a minimum of sabotage, but under the impact of repressions. neither the Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov hit, no other strategists, except for the command of the Western front. Measures similar to those taken Stalin and his generals on the eve of the war are carried out during other offensive operations from Khalkhin Gol to Barbarossa. "They say that Stalin wanted to attack Hitler in 1942. Such a plan really existed, but then the deadlines were moved. If Stalin prepared the "liberation" for 1942, then the border the wire could have been cut in 1942"¹⁸⁵.

An important argument of Suvorov is the sharp growth of the Soviet army. But it was already provided by the military reform of September 1, 1939, by the introduction of a general military duties. The decision to reform was taken on June 16, 1939, that is, at a time when rapprochement with Germany was still in the future. The reform allowed a plausible excuse depending on the situation then increase, then reduce the size of the army. In race-

¹⁸⁵ There. S. 87.

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Stalin's orders were millions of recruits, opportunity to constantly call masses of people to Large training fees (BUS). V. Suvorov believes that the reform of 1939 meant nothing more than covert mobilization—the army grew to 5 million.

This is because Stalin already in August 1939 conceived attack Germany. If Germany is not attacked, then "the unprecedented call of 1939 will have to be released home"¹⁸⁶.

Suvorov did not know that the 1939 draft was dismissed according to houses after the Polish campaign. Upon completion Soviet-Polish war, the army was reduced from 5,284,000 people up to 3,273,400 people. And then again increased during the Winter War to 4,416,000 people. And again it was reduced in July-August 1940.

up to 3,423,499 people. "Defenders" "catch" Suvorov on the fact that the army has been repeatedly reduced since 1939. And Suvorov himself admits that, according to Stalin's plan, real mobilization should have begun after entry of the USSR into the war: "to fight even before all divisions will be fully staffed. By

the fact that if all this is completed, then the economy collapse immediately." This argument counters the assertion of the "defencists" that Stalin even on June 22

at first he did not dare to announce mobilization. That's right, full mobilization - after the start of the war. In the meantime hidden. And it really started, but not

in 1939, and in the spring of 1941. In the summer, the army reached the mark of 5,774,211 people. But she was still outnumbered by the armies of Germany and her allies. Upon completion of full mobilization, the Armed Forces

¹⁸⁶ *Suvorov V. Den-M. When did World War II start? M., 1994, p. 150.*

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid. S. 137.*

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USSR were to be 8.9 million people, which outnumbered Germany. But such mobilization, in order not to ruin the country, could be carried out only after the start of the war, to resupply the already existing divisions of the second echelon. and formation of strategic reserves.

"The German invasion caught the Soviet Union at the moment of creating an unprecedented number of drums armies. The skeletons of these monstrous mechanisms were created, and the process of completion, fine-tuning, debugging was going on," summarizes his reading of war memoirs

V. Suvorov. Despite the fact that when calculating the forces He is fond of Stalin and exaggerates in places, the picture is still impressive. But not "defensists":

"The advance of additional units of the Red Army to the west, which began in May 1941, was the answer

volume on German military preparations and by no means did not indicate the intention of the USSR to attack

"Third Reich"¹⁸⁹. This is a very important link in the concept.

"defencists": if Stalin acted in response to Hitler's military preparations, then he did not prepare for attack. This is a psychologically understandable assumption: "in response" Stalin could only defend himself. But it's still must be proven.

The first proof: for the offensive, Steel has few forces. A. N. Mertsalov and L. A. Mertsalova, refuting the possibility of delivering the first strike by Stalin, ask themselves the question: "Was the Soviet troops ready for this, has a three-fold superiority been created for the offensive?"¹⁹⁰ It would be nice to ask the same question in relation to the Wehrmacht. Then Mer-

¹⁸⁸ Suvorov V. Icebreaker. S. 145.

¹⁸⁹ Vishlev O. V. Decree. op. S. 34.

¹⁹⁰ Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 42.

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The Tsalovs could prove that Hitler did not plan an attack on the USSR either. After all, he was not even close to having a threefold superiority. Initially, there was no threefold superiority even during the war in Finland. The Wehrmacht did not have it either in Poland or in Western front.

Moreover, Stalin and his generals somewhat exaggerated the quality of their troops and underestimated enemy. The same disease also affected the German military command. Although the training of the Wehrmacht was better, the resistance of the Soviet units was higher than the generals expected Hitler, and their technical equipment is incomparably higher than German expectations.

Suvorov's important argument is the vulnerability of Germany's energy communications. There is no evidence that Hitler seriously considered

the likelihood of a surprise Soviet attack on the Romanian oilfields. But this does not mean that such a threat did not have.

V. Suvorov draws attention to the exercises of the Black Sea Fleet on June 18-19, 1941, when the landing of a division on the enemy coast was practiced. At the same time, exercises of the 3rd Airborne Corps were conducted in the Crimea. 14th Rifle Corps studied landing in the Danube Delta. Together they represented a threat to Romania. "Romania is the main source of oil for Germany. The blow to Romania is the death of Germany is the cessation of all tanks and aircraft, all machines, ships, industry and transport. Oil is the blood of war, and the heart of Germany. Oddly enough, it was in Romania. A blow to Rumania is a direct blow to the heart of Germany. Suvorov again exaggerates a bit. He forgot that "blow

¹⁹¹ There. S. 150.

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in the heart of Germany" the Soviet army really struck in August 1944. After that, the Wehrmacht resisted for another eight months. Already in 1941, Germany there were reserves of energy resources (about 8 million tons), it produced oil on its territory (1.3 million tons), produced synthetic fuel (more than 4 million tons). However a smaller share of Germany's needs for oil was covered by imports (about 5 million tons), mainly from Romania and the USSR. Therefore, the capture of Rumania by the Red Army dealt Germany, although not a mortal blow, but very great damage.

Suvorov shows that simultaneously with the blow Romania was also planned to strike along the Carpathians, which cut off the oil supply channels from Romania. For this, units specially trained for operations in the mountains were being prepared - and after all, the mountains were not on our territory, but abroad.

Soviet troops lined up precisely in an offensive grouping (although, of course, they did not line up completely by June 22), and the scale of troop movements was such that to deploy this colossus in going back was next to impossible.

At the same time, "the Soviet troops stopped caring about how they spend next winter...

Stalin was no more. First, he could not return

their armies back ... Secondly, Stalin could not leave their armies to winter in the border forests ... If

The Red Army could not go back, but it could not stay long in the border areas, what

What else could she do?"¹⁹² Conclusion: the clash was planned precisely for 1941.

Towards the Soviet troops to the border moved German. "The actions of the two armies are a mirror

¹⁹² There. pp. 254,259.

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image. The discrepancy is only in time .

The Germans were able to quickly transfer own forces - less distance, better network of railways. The Wehrmacht also lined up in an offensive grouping and therefore was also not ready for defense. The reserves are weak - the main forces are at the border.

The most powerful groupings moved forward and vulnerable to the environment. Ammunition, headquarters, aviation - everything is near the border and can be covered by a preventive strike. A blow to troops ready to attack is the most crushing for them. In that -

explanation of the catastrophe of the Red Army, which gives Suvorov. She was preparing to attack Germany and because it was not ready for defense. "The surprise of the attack is stunning. Suddenness is always

leads a whole chain of catastrophes, each of which pulls the others along with it: the destruction of aviation on airfields makes troops vulnerable from the air, and they (not having trenches and trenches in the border areas) forced to leave. Departure means that at the borders thrown thousands of tons of ammunition and fuel. waste means that airfields are abandoned, on which

Nick immediately destroys the remaining planes.

Withdrawal without ammunition and fuel means inevitable death. The same fate would have threatened the Wehrmacht: "If the Red Army had struck a day earlier, then losses on the other side would have been no less .

V. Suvorov claims: "The experience of the war showed that in the case when the Soviet troops were tasked defend, ... it was not possible to break through such a defense"¹⁹⁶ .

¹⁹³ There. S. 255.

¹⁹⁴ There. S. 335.

¹⁹⁵ There. S. 331.

¹⁹⁶ Suvorov V. Day-M S. 145.

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Suvorov is ruined by the unambiguity of statements. Generally in 1941, the Soviet troops defended poorly. Not managed to contain the detour of Kyiv. With the defeat of the defense Soviet troops began the battle for Moscow. Gone many months before the offensive Red the army learned the art of defense.

The strategic arguments of V. Suvorov convinced a large number of authors. B. V. Sokolov claims:

"It can be unequivocally stated that Suvorov's hypothesis about Stalin's planned attack on Hitler on July 6, 1941, acquired the status of scientific truth"¹⁹⁷. Oh

I really like this certainty! What's happened? Found plan with a deadline - July 6? No, not found. Even if Stalin was planning a strike on Hitler, then how we we'll see, not July. V. D. Danilov did not fail to tie the success of the Icebreaker concept with the victory over the Soviet historical science: "the main conclusion of V. Suvorov about elaboration and practical training as directed Stalin's preemptive strike against Germany is true.

As far as Soviet historiography is concerned, until recently it was as straightforward as Nevsky Prospekt"¹⁹⁸. However, as you know, Nevsky Prospekt has a bend near the Moscow railway station. Similarly, Soviet historiography is not so straightforward.

The fact is that the honor of advancing an offensive concept in our country does not belong to V. Suvorov, but to D. M. Proctor. In his book, published in 1989, he wrote: "And here we return to the question: didn't Stalin prepare all this mass of troops not only for defense, but also for the offensive? There are many signs that yes . "

¹⁹⁷ Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 24.
¹⁹⁸ There. S. 83.

¹⁹⁹ *Proactor* D. M. Fascism: the path of aggression and death. M., 1989. S. 311.

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Summing up this discussion,
O. Vishlev rightly notes that Khrushchev's opinion that Stalin did not believe in Hitler's attack and did not properly prepare the army for war, nor did Suvorov's opinion "about the "armed to the teeth", equipped with the latest technology, countless "red hordes" that were ready to attack Germany in the summer of 1941" do not correspond to reality²⁰⁰. However, reality may not be strictly in the middle between extreme points of view Khrushchev and Suvorov.

Damocles sword of pincers

Both the "defensists" and the "offensives" agree that that before the war, Stalin committed the greatest mistake in your life. That's just what? "Stalin, seemed to drive away any thought of war."²⁰¹ , — considers the "defencist" G. Gorodetsky. This "fatal self-deception" of one person became the reason for the absurd the behavior of the Soviet leadership in the face of the military threat to Germany. The war is on the nose, and we are on the defensive we do not prepare and we scold everyone who warns about the war. Moreover, intelligence trumpets that Hitler planned unkind, and Stalin drives away the thought, like an ostrich, burying his head in the sand. Expanse for psychological and even psychiatric reasoning on

the theme of the madness of leaders.

The idea of war Stalin, apparently, "chased away" and on meetings of the Politburo, where they constantly discussed and new types of weapons were approved, where

²⁰⁰ Vishlev O. V. Decree. op. pp. 17-19.

²⁰¹ Gorodetsky G. Decree. op. S. 344.

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there were measures that enslaved the workers, squeezing of which seven pots, just to increase the volume of military production. Stalin "driven" this idea from himself and at meetings with the military, where the results of military campaigns were discussed to the smallest detail, measures to eliminate shortcomings before decisive battles with main opponent.

Yes, it's more logical to assume that it's not Stalin, but some historians "drive away the thought" that Stalin was preparing for war.

V. Suvorov and other "aggressors" explain Stalin's mistake is more logical: "Until the very last moment, Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attacks. It follows from this that all the actions of Stalin and all his subordinates are preparations for repelling aggression cannot be explained"²⁰², - says Suvorov. Stalin was preparing for an offensive war and therefore did not prepared for the defensive. But he did not notice that Hitler is also preparing to strike.

Why, after all, intelligence reported, Sorge signaled, Churchill convinced that Hitler would attack. Suvorov easily explains why Stalin did not trust the "defector" Sorge and political opponent Churchill, who was extremely interested in the Soviet-German conflict. But there were other sources as well.

Why Stalin was not afraid that Hitler would "cover" his army with a sudden blow? Why did Stalin not believe that Hitler was preparing to start a war against the USSR on June 22, 1941?

This is one of the key mysteries of 1941. Suvorov answers: "Hitler really did not prepare for a war against the Soviet Union"²⁰³. Because it doesn't

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Suvorov V. The Last Republic. M., 1995. S. 177.

²⁰³

Suvorov V. Icebreaker. S. 312.

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fat sheepskin coats, winter lubrication - the Fuhrer was not preparing for winter war. "So let's understand Stalin: he too I thought so - this is clearly a mistaken step, this is suicide. And if the Nazis decided to fight, then in three months they could not meet, so they had to prepare to fight in the winter. There is no such preparation. Therefore, considered Stalin, Hitler to fight against the Soviet Union does not intend. Pure logic..."²⁰⁴ The reason for Hitler's unpreparedness is the strategic plan to defeat the USSR precisely in 1941, before winters. Otherwise, it makes no sense to fence the garden. Hence the unpreparedness for the winter war: "It was assumed that the military power of Russia would be destroyed even more. before the onset of the autumn thaw ... For this reason, stocks of winter uniforms were limited on the basis that for every five people it will take only one set"²⁰⁵ , G. Guderian recalled. Hitler acted rationally, just like Stalin before the war with Finland. This war taught Stalin something. Hitler is not.

So it is. But even Stalin did not prepare for the winter war when he attacked Finland, but the Finns believed that such an attack was possible. Is Stalin, who has gone through the experience of the winter war, really so reckless? Stalin knew that Hitler was not preparing for war in winter. The conclusions that Suvorov draws did not follow from this at all. If Hitler is not going to storm Moscow in the winter, this does not mean that he I didn't mean to attack her at all. Stalin knew that The USSR has sufficient forces at its disposal to prevent the Germans from making a military walk to Moscow. How should Hitler act under these conditions?

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Suvorov V. Suicide. M., 2000. S. 378.
Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. S. 117.

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Throughout the existence of the unified Russian
Invading states from the west were carried out in three
directions: from the north - here the main goal since the 18th century.
was Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad; in the center -
Moscow, which, due to its transport and geographic position,
is the most convenient center for governing the country; from
the south - to Ukraine and the Caucasus, rich in resources. In
the conditions of the war of the 20th century, when huge
armies are operating, which cannot
be supplied with "pasture", the offensive must be provided
with communications through which
food, ammunition, ammunition arrives.

A direct breakthrough to Moscow under these conditions becomes
almost impossible - communications are easily cut from the
north and south. Since the death of Napoleon's army in
Russia, this lesson has been fairly obvious.

Direct throw to Moscow from the western border
was possible only with a simultaneous offensive in the north
and south along divergent directions.
But this is contrary to the basics of military art. It turns out a
blow in divergent directions, "spread fingers". On the main line

it is possible to concentrate about three times fewer troops
than is allocated for the entire campaign. But to
to end the war with Russia, it is necessary to advance
precisely on Moscow. Therefore, the only sense of an attack
directly on Moscow and at the same time in the north and
south - to end the war in one year. If such a risky task is not
set, then the offensive must
be carried out in northern and southern directions. From
The Baltic invading army, well supplied through the Baltic
Sea, attacks Petrograd-Lening
happy and captures it for the year, getting good winter
apartments and again excellent communications.

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And the next year, from this position, you can start an attack on Moscow. From the south in the first year comes fight for Ukraine. The invading army can be supplied both through Poland and Rumania, and along the Black Sea, and from the resources of Ukraine itself - Eastern European granaries. In the event of the capture of Ukraine for the next year, you can also attack Moscow from a relatively close distance. Or if the Bolsheviks will be beaten enough, but not defeated at all, you can to conclude an honorable "Second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk" (on the model of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918), receiving the resources of Ukraine and, possibly, the Caucasus. Thus, the optimal strategy for a war with Russia for European countries was an offensive from the north and south, followed by a closure around Moscow with "pincers". We henceforth, we will call this strategy the word "pincers", which was borrowed from one of the Soviet intelligence reports. The danger of "pincers" in 1938-1939. made the Soviet leadership especially nervous, when it came to approaching the potential aggressor to the Baltic states, Leningrad, about flirting "imperialists" with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), as well as the abolition of the established in May 1936, at a conference in Montreux, a ban on the passage of ships of warring countries through belonging Turkey straits in the Black Sea. The strategic "pincers" of the enemy hung over the USSR like a sword of Damocles

Chom.

But this strategy had an important drawback - the howl did not stretch for at least two seasons. And Hitler ; sought to solve the "Russian problem" by blitzkrieg - in one season. Under what conditions is this possible?

*

Napoleon showed that from the Neman to Moscow it was possible to walk with an army in two or three months. If not diverted j

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go to war for a long time. In the first half of the XX century. the advance of the army is connected with constant fighting and, consequently, is slower (after all, most of the infantry is not yet motorized). If you start a war after the spring thaw, in

May, then you should be in Moscow in September - before the autumn thaw. It's four months. Time is running out.

Consequently, in one year the war could be ended only by defeating the main forces of the Red Army in border battle, in order to further move forward to Moscow in marching order, scum

forcing the semi-partisan detachments of the "Russians" from three directions, so that they would not start operating in the rear.

In the 30s, in order to prevent such a development of events, the USSR did not keep the main forces of its army in border areas, relying on strong reserves. A powerful defensive line was created along the border, which, bearing in mind the experience of the First World War, could turn the war into a positional one. During a positional war, the anti-Soviet

the coalition could only count on "pincers" and years of war that would undermine the economy of the USSR and force the Bolsheviks to capitulate. The members of the coalition were not in danger of an economic catastrophe, because after the Munich Agreement they would have relied on the help of all of Europe.

In September 1939, new opportunities arose for the USSR . The Western world was divided, and Stalin got the opportunity to occupy bridgeheads from which the "pincers" could be carried out. However, this only weakened the threat of "ticks", but did not remove it.

²⁰⁶ More about the development of the international situation in the 30s. cm.: Shubin A. V. World on the edge of the abyss. From global depression to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004.

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Blue arrows on the cards

The shortcomings of the Barbarossa plan stemmed largely from the circumstances of its birth. Already in July 1940, realizing that England might not succeed capture this year, Hitler gave the command to prepare a plan for a possible attack on the USSR - in order to deprive Great Britain of hope for help from the east. Accordingly, the improbable from the point of view of Stalin's point of view, the condition was that the war must be carried out in one season. Immediately after the miraculous defeat of France seemed quite likely. In the future, German staff members did not deviate from this assumption. July 22 Hitler and Brauchitsch extruded Halder his directives: if necessary inflict a crushing blow on the Red Army, throw it into the depths of Russia so that aviation can finish off the Soviet eastern industrial centers, achieve the creation of puppet states in the Baltic, Belarus and Ukraine. To kick was crushing, it was planned to allocate up to 100 divisions, since it was believed that the USSR had up to 75 "good" divisions. The Germans underestimated the size of the Red Army at the western borders by half.

Boiled work. General E. Marx painted the following picture: strike at Ukraine with all his might, go to the Donbass and, relying on the Black Sea as to the rear, to launch an offensive against Kyiv and Moscow. Thus, Marx, realizing that Germany not so many forces, began to develop only the southern direction of "strategic pincers". But July 31st Having familiarized himself with the proposals of the headquarters, Hitler set more serious tasks - to eliminate USSR in five months, to supplement the southern impact of the north-

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nym, which should crush the Soviet troops in Belarus and the Baltic states, and then move on to Mos kva. "Pincers" acquired their completeness.

Having received these directives, General Marx added to his plan the northern arrow through Vitebsk to Moskva. Since there were now fewer forces left in the south, the southern group of troops was given a more modest task - to reach Kyiv. But Marx did not fully follow instructions of the Fuhrer and made an important mistake - according to the Russians could strike the northern group from the north - from the Baltic. Therefore, the northern group willy-nilly will have to be diverted towards Leningrad.

Paying attention to this, General von Sodenstern suggested that while the struggle for Leningrad was going on, allocate another small group (strength is not enough) for pinning down the enemy in the center. Strategic "pincers" were still in force. But the idea of Army Group Center had a great future.

Since Hitler set the task of reaching Moscow as soon as possible, then it was necessary to advance along the shortest road in the center. And the flanks could play a supporting role. Thus, from a real (for a two-year war) plan of "strategic pincers"

it was necessary to move on to the adventuristic plan of a direct attack on Moscow.

F. Paulus, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, took up the task of finalizing the plan. Under his leadership, a plan was prepared, signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940 as Directive No. 21 "Barba Rossa". At this stage, the intention carried traces

realistic "strategic pincer" plan, but infected with unrealistic foundations of the general idea of capturing Moscow in 1941. defeat the Red Army in Belarus, then

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turn north and take Leningrad, and only then "should we start operations to take Moscow - an important center of communications and military industry"²⁰⁷. German military command

understood that to surround the Soviet troops in the Baltic and take Leningrad only by the forces of the army group "North" is not possible. Therefore, after the defeat of the Russians in Byelorussia, the Center group should join in the capture of Leningrad. To Moscow via Leningrad quickly, smartly. In order not to end up in the position of Napoleon, who took Moscow, but Peter did not. But, moving far forward towards Moscow, acting not along the coast, but in the depths of Soviet territory, the Center group will be able to turn north only under one condition - if from the east, and even more so from the south will no longer threaten her.

The detailed operational plan for Barbarossa was developed in the OKH directive of January 31, 1941. The decision to attack was still formulated as not final, but possible: "In the event that if Russia does not change its current attitude to Germany, as a precautionary measure opportunities to carry out extensive preparatory measures measures that would make it possible to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign even before the end of the war against England... At the same time, it is necessary to prevent the possibility retreat of combat-ready Russian troops to the vast interior regions of the country"²⁰⁸. In the last fra-

²⁰⁷ Nuremberg Trials. Collection of materials: In 8 vols. T.Z. M., 1989. P.539.

²⁰⁸There. S. 195.

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ze - the essence of the plan. His details are built on the assumption that everything will go like clockwork. In Ukraine: "South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group South" under command of Field Marshal Rundstedt, using the swift blow of powerful tank formations from the Lublin region, cuts off the Soviet troops stationed in Galicia and Western Ukraine, from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossings over the river. Dnieper near Kyiv and south of it and thus provides freedom of maneuver for solving subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or the fulfillment of new tasks in the south of Russia.

To the north of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing... Having introduced powerful tank formations into battle, it is making a breakthrough from the Warsaw area and Suvalok in the direction of Smolensk; turns then tank troops to the north and destroy together with Army Group North, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic states..." Thus, "freedom of maneuver will be ensured for performing subsequent tasks in collaboration with German troops advancing in the southern part of Russia.

In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of the Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north is no longer possible and the question of an immediate strike on Moscow may arise .

The authors are full of optimism. But it's not clear what to do if you fail to capture the crossings in the area on the move Kyiv? And how to deploy troops to the north, if under Smolensk will remain troops capable of covering western direction? The whole plan is just under construction

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on the fact that there will be a "sudden and complete defeat Russian forces." And if it doesn't happen?

On the whole, Barbarossa was very reminiscent of strategic pincers. Originally intended by the authors plan the main blow and was supposed to be delivered through Ukraine. Then the idea changed. Back in February 1941 it was assumed that if the Russians did blow to the east, then "first you should master the north, ignoring the Russian troops stationed to the east"²⁰⁹, and then, relying on Leningrad, advance on Moscow. But in practice it will be impossible to "not pay attention".

The plan continued to be based on the original "zest" - the main blow is applied in the center, along the shortest road to Moscow. Coverage of the Western front was planned on an incredible scale - the German encirclement was supposed to close at Smolensk: "Mobile formations advancing south and north of Minsk are promptly connected to area of Smolensk..."²¹⁰ In reality, faced with strong resistance, the Wehrmacht had to close the ring closer - near Minsk. Despite this amendment, the defeat of the Western Front was complete, and this was the beginning of a series of disasters for the Red Army. The underestimation of the main blow in the center predetermined the collapse of the entire Soviet "preemptive strike" plan. The Soviet command did not expect such a blow forces through Brest, believing that the Germans are capable here only for an auxiliary and short lunge. After all a strike of such force in the center of the front with the option of strategic "pincers" would be too risky dispersion of forces. And the invasion from the main direction

²⁰⁹

The Nuremberg Trials ... T. 3. S. 546.

²¹⁰

Hitler's secrets on Stalin's desk. S. 197.

"Pincers" Stalin

attacking Moscow when unprepared for the winter war it would be an absolute gamble. But the paradox The main reason was that only completely adventurous, unpredictable behavior gave Hitler the opportunity to jump over the trap set by Stalin, to outflank the enemy at a short distance. But only for short.

Red arrows on the maps

It is in strategic planning that the key to unraveling the tragedy of 1941. Many authors explain the failures of 1941 by "incorrect determination of the direction of the aggressor's strike..."²¹¹. But what caused this major mistake? As paradoxical as it may seem, the logic of the calculations of the Soviet leadership and the lack of prudence of Hitler.

When Suvorov "calculated" the preparation of the Red army to strike at the Wehrmacht, they demanded from him present a plan of attack from the Soviet archives.

"A detailed state plan

was to be received in the Kremlin no later than January the same year. But even at the beginning of May 41, the only the Soviet state plan was the "Plan defense of the state border in 1941",²¹² - the publicist A.V. Afanasiev categorically asserts. Serious historians were not in a hurry to draw conclusions. Researches of archives showed that closer to the truth here V. Suvorov - such were the plans.

"Introduction to the scientific circulation of documents of the council-

²¹¹ *Kumanev G. A. Feat and forgery: Pages of the Great Patriotic War noah war 1941-1945. M., 2000. S. 87.*

²¹² Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? S. 8.

A. Shubin

military planning showed that Germany continued to be regarded as a probable enemy No. 1, despite the imitation of rapprochement with her"²¹³ — claims M. I. Meltyukhov.

The first concrete plans for a strike against Germany did not accidentally appeared in July-September 1940. Before The military strategy of the USSR essentially fell apart into two wars. In the north: defense of the north centered in Leningrad with further dropping of the enemy into the Baltic and the advance on Warsaw. In the south - the defense of Ukraine, followed by the dropping of interventionists into the Black Sea and an attack on Lvov and, after opportunities, Bessarabia.

The defeat of France and the division of spheres of influence with Germany allowed Stalin to bloodlessly carry out part of the former strategic plans - to eliminate the main bridgeheads of strategic "pincers". Now the enemy will have to get to Leningrad across the entire Baltic from Vyborg, and push his way to Kyiv from Romania and Hungary, as well as from the Black Sea. And the Red Army is much closer and to Warsaw, and even to Berlin. It follows that it is harder for the enemy to conquer the USSR in two seasons. But otherwise defeat the Soviet Union all the same but you can't.

Now the strategists divided the theater of operations according to Pripyat (due to swamps and forests, the basin of this river is poorly suited for maneuvering) to the northern and southern areas. This division of the theater is in fact two independent "scenes" continued the tradition fight against strategic "pincers". At the same time, the central direction was perceived as a "branch" northern theatre. **That, along with a wide coverage**

²¹³ Meltyukhov M. Decree. op. S. 273.

"Pincers" Stalin

the enemy can deliver the most powerful blow in center was not provided. After all, then on myself

coverage is not strong enough.

According to the estimates of the Soviet General Staff, the main blow the enemy could be inflicted on the Baltic (with access to Leningrad and Minsk) in the north and in the direction of Kyiv in the south.

M. I. Meltyukhov believes that estimates of probable enemy strikes "came only from the configuration Soviet-German border. It is also unclear why the authors of the documents completely ruled out the option of delivering the main blow in Belarus..."²¹⁴. It's just very clear. The main blow in Belarus meant that the offensive was being waged immediately on Moscow, which was perceived in the Kremlin as a gamble. After all, Hitler is not preparing to fight in the winter. If the main blow is struck in Belarus, all the same, it is necessary to direct forces to north, and south so that the central group of troops does not was surrounded. The nature of the theater of operations meant that the enemy would act according to a scenario which we call "pincers". With such a strategy of war, only a secondary, covering blow could be inflicted on Belarus.

The Soviet plan is calculated precisely on the fact that the Germans will concentrate forces for strategic "pincers". If two enemy groupings are prepared for attacks to the north and south, then Soviet strikes from center to the northwest and southwest would cut off both groupings from communications. At the same time, a southwestern blow cuts off Germany from Romanian oil. A perfectly logical plan.

If the German shock groups will be with concentrated in East Prussia and in the south against

²¹⁴ There. S. 379.

A. Shubin

Ukraine, then a blow from the center could easily cut through the German front and press the northern group to the sea, and cut off the southern one, hiding behind the Carpathians. But it is important that the Wehrmacht return to its original positions. While against the Soviet center they can significant German reserves must be gathered, it is impossible to carry out a blow - you can disrupt the whole thing.

Soviet military planning documents

1940 mention that an attack will be made adversary. From the point of view of the "defencists", this is proof of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet leadership. From the point of view of the "aggressors" - a purely ideological preface. As we shall see, the materials of the January 1941 staff exercises rather confirm

that a strike against the enemy was of more interest to the Soviet command than defense. However, "Considerations on the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the west and east of

1940 and 1941" dated September 18, 1940 are built on a certain idea of the enemy's offensive intentions. Therefore, the Soviet strike

it was impossible to inflict just like that, without taking into account the threat to the fall of the enemy. And this is a problem for the attackers.

The Soviet plan was based on the fact that the enemy is concentrated at the borders. At the same time, the concentration Soviet troops should take place simultaneously

with the advance of the enemy. It was planned "on completion of the concentration of Soviet troops to inflict

a retaliatory strike (depending on the specific political situation) in the direction of Lublin - Krakow - the upper reaches of the river. Oder or in East Prussia "215. It turns out that "the completion of concentration"

should have happened almost by the time

²¹⁵ Vishlev O. V. Decree. op. S. 36.

"Pincers" Stalin

German strike. Or even before. And it's already a mystery for the "defenders". On October 5, the "considerations" were reported to Stalin and Voroshilov, and they proposed intensify the strike in the southwestern direction (V. Suvorov's assumption about the preparation of a strike against Romania, thus, is confirmed). ending final refinement of the "northern" and "southern" options for the offensive was scheduled for May 1, 1941. "Northern" option" assumed the main strike to the north of Pri five, and the "southern" one to the south with a further exit in a northwestern direction to Poland and Silesia. "Those the Soviet Armed Forces received a valid document on the basis of which more detailed military planning

In the Soviet plans, the German troops "are designated the term "concentrating", which means that the initiative to start the war will come entirely from the Soviet parties..."²¹⁷ However, if we take the word "concentrating" literally, and not as propagandistic stamp designed to justify the strike (propaganda assumptions in such documents are superfluous), then the moment the beginning of the conflict, the Soviet side does not choose independently. The whole operation is calculated on the fact that we are confronted not by a defensive grouping, but by an offensive one, which has already unloaded in the areas of concentration, but not yet fully operational. A blow against a concentrating offensive grouping is the most crushing. This "discovery" of V. Suvorov was made by the Soviet General Staff officers already in 1940. But in order to put his plans into action, Stalin must now was to wait for the concentration of the enemy - while waiting

in various quantities and places.

²¹⁶ Meltyukhov M. Decree. op. S. 372.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 384.

A. Shubin

O. V. Vishlev asks the "offensives": "If if the USSR planned an attack on Germany, then he hardly worth waiting for the completion of the operational deployment of the Wehrmacht"²¹⁸. And it was just worth the wait. Actually, this expectation was the "raisin of the mink" of a possible Stalinist plan. To hit on USSR Germany needs maximum strength. On the border with The USSR will concentrate the main forces of the Wehrmacht. The offensive grouping is not ready for defense. If Hitler will concentrate sufficient (from Stalin's point of view) strength, then he will no longer have strategic reserves, and the Soviet strike will inflict maximum damage on Germany. So wait concentration of the Wehrmacht is possible and even should.

The dispute in the Soviet military leadership over where to wait for the concentration of the main forces of the enemy and, consequently, where to inflict a preemptive the blow by ourselves continued until the beginning of 1941. On January 2-11, 1941, the war with Germany and its allies was lost in staff games.

After the release of the memoirs of G. Zhukov, a myth arose about extraordinary foresight of this commander. On headquarters game Zhukov, it turns out, showed how events unfold in the event of a German attack on THE USSR. But for some reason, after such a wise prophecy, no measures were taken - including by the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov.

The reason for this paradox was revealed in 1993 by P. N. Bobylev,²¹⁹ who discovered the materials of this game in the archives. Zhukov, as often happened to him, took credit for extra accomplishments.

²¹⁸ Vishlev O. V. Decree. op. S. 33.

²¹⁹ Bobylev P.N. Rehearsal of the disaster. // Military history magazine. 1993. No. 6-8.

"Pincers" Stalin

The scenario of the game provided for a "prehistory":

the Germans invaded, reached the line Siauliai - Kauus - Lida - Osoveti, from where they were thrown back to the borders of the USSR. After that, it was time to transfer the war to the territory of the enemy. From this moment the game begins. On an imaginary calendar - August 1st.

The team of General D. Pavlov, playing for the USSR, began to storm the fortifications of East Prussia.

Then the team of G. Zhukov, who played for the Germans, hit to the south and broke through to Lomzha. Pavlov began, with some delay, to transfer reserves in order to

close the gap. The game has been stopped. Counterstrike

Zhukov thwarted the offensive of the Red Army in East Prussia. Zhukov beat Pavlov. But Stalin

was pleased with both commanders. Pavlov headed the Western

direction, the second most important

point of view of the Soviet command. The thing is,

that Zhukov showed the worthlessness of one of the variants of the Soviet military plans. It was not only Pavlov who was to blame, but the

plan as well. And "our" Zhukov opposed Pavlov. He was not a visionary, but a commander: the game had little in common with the real events of the summer of 1941.

But the plan had to be corrected - to let

troops V detour Eastern Prussia²²⁰.

²²⁰ A. K. Isaev believes that the January "games were general, educational character, the situation in them is abstract", does not have relation to real war plans (*Isaev A.K. Georgy Zhukov.*

The last argument of the king. M., 2006. P. 61.). This is motivated by the fact that the circumstances of the game did not correspond to the plans of September 1940. But military planning did not stand still. Moreover, the Soviet command provided that in some sectors of the front the enemy will be able to strike, which will make the situation more complex, will require not blindly following plans, but creative response to the situation. Therefore, not the first stage is played out. wars, and subsequent events, when the situation becomes less predictable. If "the situation was abstract,"

²²⁰ Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Book. 1. M., 1998. P. 104.

Another version of the Soviet offensive was played out in the second stage of the game. Again the same legend: tsy, with the support of the Hungarians and Romanians, hit, but from abandoned from Lvov. During this time, the Red Army took Lublin (which, according to the real Soviet plan should have happened during the first strike against the Germans). The southwestern front of the Red Army, commanded by Zhukov, had superiority over the enemy, also divided into two directions (Pavlov this time he was in command of the Germans, but the group advancing on the USSR from Romania acted separately). Zhukov stopped Pavlov, landed troops, broke through the front and moved to Hungary, cutting off Romania from Germany and along the way encircling the Romanian-German army commanded by F. Kuznetsov. Bottom line: the southern direction of the main attack on Germany and its allies turned out to be more promising.

As a prophet who "figured out" the plan Germany, sometimes they represent the chief of the general staff, Shaposhnikov. "To the credit of the General headquarters, and first of all his former chief Shaposhnikov, it should be attributed to the fact that the enemy's plan was foreseen by him with great accuracy even when the command of the Wehrmacht only learned from Hitler about his intention to start a direct preparing for an attack on the USSR. Shaposhnikov believed that "Germany will most likely deploy its the main forces north of the mouth of the river. San order out East Prussia through the Lithuanian SSR inflict and

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THE TRAGEDY OF 1941

Causes of the disaster

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¹ Russian State Military Archive. F. 9. Op. 39. D. 98.

L. 163.

¹ There. D. 98. L. 243-249.

¹ There. D. 101. L. 328-329; D. 105. L. 55-56.

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1997. S. 567.

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³ The first modifications of the T-IV weighed 19 tons, produced in 1940-

1941 modifications E and F - 22 tons. See: *Shmelev I. P.*

Armored

technology of Germany in World War II // Technique and

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nie yesterday, today, tomorrow ... November-December 2000. No. 11-12. S.

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S. 301.

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³ History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. 4. S. 76.

¹ *Toptygin A. V.* Unknown Beria. M.: SPb., 2002. S. 439-440.

² Hitler's secrets on Stalin's desk. Intelligence and counterintelligence in preparation for

German aggression against the USSR March-June 1941

G.

Documents from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. M., 1995. S. 193.

¹ Hitler's secrets on Stalin's desk. S. 8.

¹ There. pp. 181-182.

¹ There. S. 32.

¹ See: *Thomas L. Jentz*. Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the

Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Forces. 1933-1942.

Shifter Military History, Atglen PA, 1996. P. 190-191. Commander's ki (Pz.Bef) are included in tan
the number of vehicles on the basis of which they are
were created.

¹ Collection of military documents of the Great Patriotic War.

Issue 34. P. 77. So by June 30, part of the forces of the 2nd and 5th

tank divisions of the 3rd mechanized corps,

surrounded by

the defeated in the Rasseinaya area.

¹ There. S. 98.

¹ Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. VGK rate. Documents and materials.

1941 S. 40.

¹ Collection of military documents of the Great Patriotic War.

Issue 34. S. 263.

¹ Degtyarev light machine gun.

¹ According to other sources, in the 23rd Panzer Division by July 4
counted

22 tanks fell. See: *Drig E.* Mechanized Corps of the Red Army

in battle. S. 355.

¹ Illegible.

¹ Collection of military documents of the Great Patriotic War.

Issue 34. S. 118-120.

¹ There.